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authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2016-03-13 22:40:24 -0400
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2016-03-13 22:40:24 -0400
commit010998815230792aa8923a4b72deef0fd0c5f2e5 (patch)
tree0919c709606d0ab3d8dd278f82fd158c559a682e /include
parentf3c986908cc3b369b57f75de306c635a0074b76b (diff)
parentc09440f7dcb304002dfced8c0fea289eb25f2da0 (diff)
downloadcachepc-linux-010998815230792aa8923a4b72deef0fd0c5f2e5.tar.gz
cachepc-linux-010998815230792aa8923a4b72deef0fd0c5f2e5.zip
Merge branch 'macsec'
Sabrina Dubroca says: ==================== MACsec IEEE 802.1AE implementation MACsec (IEEE 802.1AE [0]) is a protocol that provides security for wired ethernet LANs. MACsec offers two protection modes: authentication only, or authenticated encryption. MACsec defines "secure channels" that allow transmission from one node to one or more others. Communication on a channel is done over a succession of "secure associations", that each use a specific key. Secure associations are identified by their "association number" in the range 0..3. A secure association is retired when its 32-bit packet number would wrap, and the same association number can later be reused with a new key and packet number. The standard mode of encryption is GCM AES with 128 bits keys, although an extension allows 256 bits keys [1] (not implemented in this submission). When using MACsec, an extra header, called "SecTAG", is added between the ethernet header and the original payload: +---------------------------------+----------------+----------------+ | (MACsec ethertype) | TCI_AN | SL | +---------------------------------+----------------+----------------+ | Packet Number | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Secure Channel Identifier | | (optional) | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ TCI_AN: version end_station sci_present scb encrypted changed_text association_number (2 bits) SL: short_length (6 bits) unused (2 bits) The ethertype for the packet is set to 0x88E5, and the original ethertype becomes part of the secure payload, which may be encrypted. The ethernet header and the SecTAG are always transmitted in the clear, but are integrity-protected. MACsec supports optional replay protection with a configurable replay window. MACsec is designed to be used with the MKA extension to 802.1X (MACsec Key Agreement protocol) [2], which provides channel attribution and key distribution to the nodes, but can also be used with static keys getting fed manually by an administrator. Optional (not supported yet) features: - confidentiality offset: in encryption mode, part of the payload may be left unencrypted. - choice of cipher suite: GCM AES with 256 bits has been standardised [1]. Implementation A netdevice is created on top of a real device for each TX secure channel, like we do for VLANs. Multiple TX channels can be created on top of the same underlying device. Several other approaches were considered for the RX path: - dev_add_pack: doesn't work, because we want to filter out unprotected packets - transparent mode: MACsec would be enabled directly on the real netdevice. For this, we cannot use a rx_handler directly because MACsec must be available for underlying devices enslaved in a bridge or in a bond, so we need a hook directly in __netif_receive_skb_core. This approach makes it harder to filter non-encrypted packets on RX without forcing the user to setup some rules, so the "transparent" mode is not so transparent after all. It also makes TX more complex than with a dedicated netdevice. One issue with the proposed implementation is that the qdisc layer for the real device operates on already encrypted packets. Netlink API This is currently a mix of rtnetlink (to create the device and set up the TX channel) and genl (for RX channels, secure associations and their keys). genl provides clean demultiplexing of the {TX,RX}{SC,SA} commands. Use cases The normal use case is wired LANs, including veth and slave devices for bonding/teaming or bridges. MACsec can also be used on any device that makes a full ethernet header visible, for example VXLAN. The VXLAN+MACsec setup would be: hypervisor | virtual machine <real_dev>---<VXLAN>---|---<dev>---<macsec_dev> And the packets would look like this: | eth | IP | UDP | VXLAN | eth | MACsec | IP | ... | MACsec ICV | One benefit on this approach to encryption in the cloud is that the payload is encrypted by the tenant, not by the tunnel provider, thus the tenant has full control over the keys. Changes from v1: - rework netlink API after discussion with Johannes Berg - nest attributes, rename - export stats as separate attributes - add some comments - misc small fixes (rcu, constants, struct organization) Changes from RFCv2: - fix ENCODING_SA param validation - add parent link to netlink ifdumps Changes from RFCv1: - addressed comments from Florian and Paolo + kbuild robot - also perform post-decrypt handling after crypto callback - fixed ->dellink behavior Future plans: - offload to hardware, on nics that support it - implement optional features [0] http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.1AE-2006.pdf [1] http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.1AEbn-2011.pdf [2] http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.1X-2010.pdf [3] RFCv1: http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg358151.html [4] RFCv2: http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg362389.html [5] v1: http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367959.html ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/netdevice.h8
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/Kbuild1
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/if_ether.h1
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/if_link.h29
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h161
5 files changed, 200 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h
index 41df0b450757..be693b34662f 100644
--- a/include/linux/netdevice.h
+++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h
@@ -1328,6 +1328,7 @@ struct net_device_ops {
* @IFF_RXFH_CONFIGURED: device has had Rx Flow indirection table configured
* @IFF_PHONY_HEADROOM: the headroom value is controlled by an external
* entity (i.e. the master device for bridged veth)
+ * @IFF_MACSEC: device is a MACsec device
*/
enum netdev_priv_flags {
IFF_802_1Q_VLAN = 1<<0,
@@ -1357,6 +1358,7 @@ enum netdev_priv_flags {
IFF_TEAM = 1<<24,
IFF_RXFH_CONFIGURED = 1<<25,
IFF_PHONY_HEADROOM = 1<<26,
+ IFF_MACSEC = 1<<27,
};
#define IFF_802_1Q_VLAN IFF_802_1Q_VLAN
@@ -1385,6 +1387,7 @@ enum netdev_priv_flags {
#define IFF_L3MDEV_SLAVE IFF_L3MDEV_SLAVE
#define IFF_TEAM IFF_TEAM
#define IFF_RXFH_CONFIGURED IFF_RXFH_CONFIGURED
+#define IFF_MACSEC IFF_MACSEC
/**
* struct net_device - The DEVICE structure.
@@ -4045,6 +4048,11 @@ static inline void skb_gso_error_unwind(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 protocol,
skb->mac_len = mac_len;
}
+static inline bool netif_is_macsec(const struct net_device *dev)
+{
+ return dev->priv_flags & IFF_MACSEC;
+}
+
static inline bool netif_is_macvlan(const struct net_device *dev)
{
return dev->priv_flags & IFF_MACVLAN;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/Kbuild b/include/uapi/linux/Kbuild
index ebd10e624598..e25ebcfbcb48 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/Kbuild
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/Kbuild
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ header-y += if_hippi.h
header-y += if_infiniband.h
header-y += if_link.h
header-y += if_ltalk.h
+header-y += if_macsec.h
header-y += if_packet.h
header-y += if_phonet.h
header-y += if_plip.h
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_ether.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_ether.h
index ea9221b0331a..4a93051c578c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/if_ether.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_ether.h
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
#define ETH_P_8021AD 0x88A8 /* 802.1ad Service VLAN */
#define ETH_P_802_EX1 0x88B5 /* 802.1 Local Experimental 1. */
#define ETH_P_TIPC 0x88CA /* TIPC */
+#define ETH_P_MACSEC 0x88E5 /* 802.1ae MACsec */
#define ETH_P_8021AH 0x88E7 /* 802.1ah Backbone Service Tag */
#define ETH_P_MVRP 0x88F5 /* 802.1Q MVRP */
#define ETH_P_1588 0x88F7 /* IEEE 1588 Timesync */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
index 249eef9a21bd..8e3f88fa5b59 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
@@ -413,6 +413,35 @@ enum {
#define IFLA_VRF_PORT_MAX (__IFLA_VRF_PORT_MAX - 1)
+/* MACSEC section */
+enum {
+ IFLA_MACSEC_UNSPEC,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_SCI,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_PORT,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_ICV_LEN,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_CIPHER_SUITE,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_WINDOW,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_ENCODING_SA,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_ENCRYPT,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_PROTECT,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_INC_SCI,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_ES,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_SCB,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_REPLAY_PROTECT,
+ IFLA_MACSEC_VALIDATION,
+ __IFLA_MACSEC_MAX,
+};
+
+#define IFLA_MACSEC_MAX (__IFLA_MACSEC_MAX - 1)
+
+enum macsec_validation_type {
+ MACSEC_VALIDATE_DISABLED = 0,
+ MACSEC_VALIDATE_CHECK = 1,
+ MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT = 2,
+ __MACSEC_VALIDATE_END,
+ MACSEC_VALIDATE_MAX = __MACSEC_VALIDATE_END - 1,
+};
+
/* IPVLAN section */
enum {
IFLA_IPVLAN_UNSPEC,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..26b0d1e3e3e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/*
+ * include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h - MACsec device
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UAPI_MACSEC_H
+#define _UAPI_MACSEC_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define MACSEC_GENL_NAME "macsec"
+#define MACSEC_GENL_VERSION 1
+
+#define MACSEC_MAX_KEY_LEN 128
+
+#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID 0x0080020001000001ULL
+#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALT 0x0080C20001000001ULL
+
+#define MACSEC_MIN_ICV_LEN 8
+#define MACSEC_MAX_ICV_LEN 32
+
+enum macsec_attrs {
+ MACSEC_ATTR_UNSPEC,
+ MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX, /* u32, ifindex of the MACsec netdevice */
+ MACSEC_ATTR_RXSC_CONFIG, /* config, nested macsec_rxsc_attrs */
+ MACSEC_ATTR_SA_CONFIG, /* config, nested macsec_sa_attrs */
+ MACSEC_ATTR_SECY, /* dump, nested macsec_secy_attrs */
+ MACSEC_ATTR_TXSA_LIST, /* dump, nested, macsec_sa_attrs for each TXSA */
+ MACSEC_ATTR_RXSC_LIST, /* dump, nested, macsec_rxsc_attrs for each RXSC */
+ MACSEC_ATTR_TXSC_STATS, /* dump, nested, macsec_txsc_stats_attr */
+ MACSEC_ATTR_SECY_STATS, /* dump, nested, macsec_secy_stats_attr */
+ __MACSEC_ATTR_END,
+ NUM_MACSEC_ATTR = __MACSEC_ATTR_END,
+ MACSEC_ATTR_MAX = __MACSEC_ATTR_END - 1,
+};
+
+enum macsec_secy_attrs {
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_UNSPEC,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SCI,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_ENCODING_SA,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_WINDOW,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_CIPHER_SUITE,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_ICV_LEN,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_PROTECT,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_REPLAY,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_OPER,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_VALIDATE,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_ENCRYPT,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_INC_SCI,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_ES,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SCB,
+ __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
+ NUM_MACSEC_SECY_ATTR = __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
+ MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_MAX = __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END - 1,
+};
+
+enum macsec_rxsc_attrs {
+ MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_UNSPEC,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SCI, /* config/dump, u64 */
+ MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_ACTIVE, /* config/dump, u8 0..1 */
+ MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SA_LIST, /* dump, nested */
+ MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_STATS, /* dump, nested, macsec_rxsc_stats_attr */
+ __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
+ NUM_MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR = __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_MAX = __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END - 1,
+};
+
+enum macsec_sa_attrs {
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_UNSPEC,
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, /* config/dump, u8 0..3 */
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, /* config/dump, u8 0..1 */
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, /* config/dump, u32 */
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY, /* config, data */
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, /* config/dump, u64 */
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_STATS, /* dump, nested, macsec_sa_stats_attr */
+ __MACSEC_SA_ATTR_END,
+ NUM_MACSEC_SA_ATTR = __MACSEC_SA_ATTR_END,
+ MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX = __MACSEC_SA_ATTR_END - 1,
+};
+
+enum macsec_nl_commands {
+ MACSEC_CMD_GET_TXSC,
+ MACSEC_CMD_ADD_RXSC,
+ MACSEC_CMD_DEL_RXSC,
+ MACSEC_CMD_UPD_RXSC,
+ MACSEC_CMD_ADD_TXSA,
+ MACSEC_CMD_DEL_TXSA,
+ MACSEC_CMD_UPD_TXSA,
+ MACSEC_CMD_ADD_RXSA,
+ MACSEC_CMD_DEL_RXSA,
+ MACSEC_CMD_UPD_RXSA,
+};
+
+/* u64 per-RXSC stats */
+enum macsec_rxsc_stats_attr {
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_UNSPEC,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_IN_OCTETS_VALIDATED,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_IN_OCTETS_DECRYPTED,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_UNCHECKED,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_DELAYED,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_OK,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_INVALID,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_LATE,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_NOT_VALID,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_NOT_USING_SA,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_UNUSED_SA,
+ __MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_END,
+ NUM_MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR = __MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_END,
+ MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_MAX = __MACSEC_RXSC_STATS_ATTR_END - 1,
+};
+
+/* u32 per-{RX,TX}SA stats */
+enum macsec_sa_stats_attr {
+ MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_UNSPEC,
+ MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_OK,
+ MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_INVALID,
+ MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_NOT_VALID,
+ MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_NOT_USING_SA,
+ MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_UNUSED_SA,
+ MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_OUT_PKTS_PROTECTED,
+ MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_OUT_PKTS_ENCRYPTED,
+ __MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_END,
+ NUM_MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR = __MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_END,
+ MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_MAX = __MACSEC_SA_STATS_ATTR_END - 1,
+};
+
+/* u64 per-TXSC stats */
+enum macsec_txsc_stats_attr {
+ MACSEC_TXSC_STATS_ATTR_UNSPEC,
+ MACSEC_TXSC_STATS_ATTR_OUT_PKTS_PROTECTED,
+ MACSEC_TXSC_STATS_ATTR_OUT_PKTS_ENCRYPTED,
+ MACSEC_TXSC_STATS_ATTR_OUT_OCTETS_PROTECTED,
+ MACSEC_TXSC_STATS_ATTR_OUT_OCTETS_ENCRYPTED,
+ __MACSEC_TXSC_STATS_ATTR_END,
+ NUM_MACSEC_TXSC_STATS_ATTR = __MACSEC_TXSC_STATS_ATTR_END,
+ MACSEC_TXSC_STATS_ATTR_MAX = __MACSEC_TXSC_STATS_ATTR_END - 1,
+};
+
+/* u64 per-SecY stats */
+enum macsec_secy_stats_attr {
+ MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_UNSPEC,
+ MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_OUT_PKTS_UNTAGGED,
+ MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_UNTAGGED,
+ MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_OUT_PKTS_TOO_LONG,
+ MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_NO_TAG,
+ MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_BAD_TAG,
+ MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_UNKNOWN_SCI,
+ MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_NO_SCI,
+ MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_IN_PKTS_OVERRUN,
+ __MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_END,
+ NUM_MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR = __MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_END,
+ MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_MAX = __MACSEC_SECY_STATS_ATTR_END - 1,
+};
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_MACSEC_H */