cachepc-linux

Fork of AMDESE/linux with modifications for CachePC side-channel attack
git clone https://git.sinitax.com/sinitax/cachepc-linux
Log | Files | Refs | README | LICENSE | sfeed.txt

security-bugs.rst (4467B)


      1.. _securitybugs:
      2
      3Security bugs
      4=============
      5
      6Linux kernel developers take security very seriously.  As such, we'd
      7like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
      8disclosed as quickly as possible.  Please report security bugs to the
      9Linux kernel security team.
     10
     11Contact
     12-------
     13
     14The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
     15<security@kernel.org>.  This is a private list of security officers
     16who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
     17If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
     18that can speed up the process considerably.  It is possible that the
     19security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
     20understand and fix the security vulnerability.
     21
     22As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
     23will be to diagnose and fix.  Please review the procedure outlined in
     24'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what
     25information is helpful.  Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
     26be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
     27made public.
     28
     29Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible.
     30It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex
     31issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments.  Think of it like a
     32:doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>`
     33(even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list
     34reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text.
     35
     36Disclosure and embargoed information
     37------------------------------------
     38
     39The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination
     40below.
     41
     42Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts.  Fixes
     43for publicly known bugs are released immediately.
     44
     45Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
     46as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
     47the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
     48of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
     49if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time.  The
     50only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
     51the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
     52coordination.
     53
     54While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
     55order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
     56the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
     57reporter.  This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
     58and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
     59identity of the reporter.
     60
     61In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed.  All other
     62information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
     63of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
     64lifted, in perpetuity.
     65
     66Coordination
     67------------
     68
     69Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
     70escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
     71<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
     72are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
     73upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
     74will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
     75publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
     76the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
     77include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
     78the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
     79<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
     80
     81CVE assignment
     82--------------
     83
     84The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them
     85for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and
     86may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
     87assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
     88linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
     89before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
     90message if the reporter agrees.
     91
     92Non-disclosure agreements
     93-------------------------
     94
     95The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
     96to enter any non-disclosure agreements.