cachepc-linux

Fork of AMDESE/linux with modifications for CachePC side-channel attack
git clone https://git.sinitax.com/sinitax/cachepc-linux
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dh.c (29784B)


      1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
      2/*  Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [RFC2631]
      3 *
      4 * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
      5 * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
      6 */
      7
      8#include <linux/fips.h>
      9#include <linux/module.h>
     10#include <crypto/internal/kpp.h>
     11#include <crypto/kpp.h>
     12#include <crypto/dh.h>
     13#include <crypto/rng.h>
     14#include <linux/mpi.h>
     15
     16struct dh_ctx {
     17	MPI p;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
     18	MPI g;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
     19	MPI xa;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
     20};
     21
     22static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
     23{
     24	mpi_free(ctx->p);
     25	mpi_free(ctx->g);
     26	mpi_free(ctx->xa);
     27	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
     28}
     29
     30/*
     31 * If base is g we compute the public key
     32 *	ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
     33 * else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret
     34 *	ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
     35 */
     36static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val)
     37{
     38	/* val = base^xa mod p */
     39	return mpi_powm(val, base, ctx->xa, ctx->p);
     40}
     41
     42static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
     43{
     44	return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
     45}
     46
     47static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len)
     48{
     49	if (fips_enabled)
     50		return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0;
     51
     52	return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0;
     53}
     54
     55static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)
     56{
     57	if (dh_check_params_length(params->p_size << 3))
     58		return -EINVAL;
     59
     60	ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(params->p, params->p_size);
     61	if (!ctx->p)
     62		return -EINVAL;
     63
     64	ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size);
     65	if (!ctx->g)
     66		return -EINVAL;
     67
     68	return 0;
     69}
     70
     71static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
     72			 unsigned int len)
     73{
     74	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
     75	struct dh params;
     76
     77	/* Free the old MPI key if any */
     78	dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
     79
     80	if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0)
     81		goto err_clear_ctx;
     82
     83	if (dh_set_params(ctx, &params) < 0)
     84		goto err_clear_ctx;
     85
     86	ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size);
     87	if (!ctx->xa)
     88		goto err_clear_ctx;
     89
     90	return 0;
     91
     92err_clear_ctx:
     93	dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
     94	return -EINVAL;
     95}
     96
     97/*
     98 * SP800-56A public key verification:
     99 *
    100 * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed
    101 *   trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A
    102 *   section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed.
    103 *
    104 * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation
    105 *   according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed.
    106 */
    107static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y)
    108{
    109	if (unlikely(!ctx->p))
    110		return -EINVAL;
    111
    112	/*
    113	 * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2.
    114	 *
    115	 * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1
    116	 * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that
    117	 * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and
    118	 * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1.
    119	 */
    120	if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0)
    121		return -EINVAL;
    122
    123	/*
    124	 * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p
    125	 *
    126	 * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2.
    127	 */
    128	if (fips_enabled) {
    129		MPI val, q;
    130		int ret;
    131
    132		val = mpi_alloc(0);
    133		if (!val)
    134			return -ENOMEM;
    135
    136		q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p));
    137		if (!q) {
    138			mpi_free(val);
    139			return -ENOMEM;
    140		}
    141
    142		/*
    143		 * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one
    144		 * from it before shifting to the right.
    145		 */
    146		mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1);
    147
    148		ret = mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p);
    149		mpi_free(q);
    150		if (ret) {
    151			mpi_free(val);
    152			return ret;
    153		}
    154
    155		ret = mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1);
    156
    157		mpi_free(val);
    158
    159		if (ret != 0)
    160			return -EINVAL;
    161	}
    162
    163	return 0;
    164}
    165
    166static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
    167{
    168	struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req);
    169	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
    170	MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(0);
    171	int ret = 0;
    172	int sign;
    173
    174	if (!val)
    175		return -ENOMEM;
    176
    177	if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) {
    178		ret = -EINVAL;
    179		goto err_free_val;
    180	}
    181
    182	if (req->src) {
    183		base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(req->src, req->src_len);
    184		if (!base) {
    185			ret = -EINVAL;
    186			goto err_free_val;
    187		}
    188		ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, base);
    189		if (ret)
    190			goto err_free_base;
    191	} else {
    192		base = ctx->g;
    193	}
    194
    195	ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val);
    196	if (ret)
    197		goto err_free_base;
    198
    199	if (fips_enabled) {
    200		/* SP800-56A rev3 5.7.1.1 check: Validation of shared secret */
    201		if (req->src) {
    202			MPI pone;
    203
    204			/* z <= 1 */
    205			if (mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1) < 1) {
    206				ret = -EBADMSG;
    207				goto err_free_base;
    208			}
    209
    210			/* z == p - 1 */
    211			pone = mpi_alloc(0);
    212
    213			if (!pone) {
    214				ret = -ENOMEM;
    215				goto err_free_base;
    216			}
    217
    218			ret = mpi_sub_ui(pone, ctx->p, 1);
    219			if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(pone, val))
    220				ret = -EBADMSG;
    221
    222			mpi_free(pone);
    223
    224			if (ret)
    225				goto err_free_base;
    226
    227		/* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */
    228		} else {
    229			if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, val)) {
    230				ret = -EAGAIN;
    231				goto err_free_val;
    232			}
    233		}
    234	}
    235
    236	ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(val, req->dst, req->dst_len, &sign);
    237	if (ret)
    238		goto err_free_base;
    239
    240	if (sign < 0)
    241		ret = -EBADMSG;
    242err_free_base:
    243	if (req->src)
    244		mpi_free(base);
    245err_free_val:
    246	mpi_free(val);
    247	return ret;
    248}
    249
    250static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
    251{
    252	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
    253
    254	return mpi_get_size(ctx->p);
    255}
    256
    257static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
    258{
    259	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
    260
    261	dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
    262}
    263
    264static struct kpp_alg dh = {
    265	.set_secret = dh_set_secret,
    266	.generate_public_key = dh_compute_value,
    267	.compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value,
    268	.max_size = dh_max_size,
    269	.exit = dh_exit_tfm,
    270	.base = {
    271		.cra_name = "dh",
    272		.cra_driver_name = "dh-generic",
    273		.cra_priority = 100,
    274		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
    275		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx),
    276	},
    277};
    278
    279
    280struct dh_safe_prime {
    281	unsigned int max_strength;
    282	unsigned int p_size;
    283	const char *p;
    284};
    285
    286static const char safe_prime_g[]  = { 2 };
    287
    288struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx {
    289	struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn;
    290	const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime;
    291};
    292
    293struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx {
    294	struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm;
    295};
    296
    297static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst)
    298{
    299	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
    300
    301	crypto_drop_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn);
    302	kfree(inst);
    303}
    304
    305static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(
    306	struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
    307{
    308	return kpp_instance_ctx(kpp_alg_instance(tfm));
    309}
    310
    311static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
    312{
    313	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
    314		dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
    315	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
    316
    317	tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(&inst_ctx->dh_spawn);
    318	if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm))
    319		return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
    320
    321	return 0;
    322}
    323
    324static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
    325{
    326	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
    327
    328	crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
    329}
    330
    331static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val)
    332{
    333	unsigned int i;
    334
    335	for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) {
    336		u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]);
    337
    338		tmp += val;
    339		val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1;
    340		dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp);
    341	}
    342
    343	return val;
    344}
    345
    346static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime,
    347				       unsigned int *key_size)
    348{
    349	unsigned int n, oversampling_size;
    350	__be64 *key;
    351	int err;
    352	u64 h, o;
    353
    354	/*
    355	 * Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3,
    356	 * sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp..
    357	 *
    358	 * 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that
    359	 * 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1
    360	 * with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups.
    361	 * Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to
    362	 * avoid excessively large private keys while still
    363	 * maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in
    364	 * most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[],
    365	 * the following holds for such N:
    366	 * - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64
    367	 *   bits and
    368	 * - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound.
    369	 */
    370	n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength);
    371	WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1));
    372	n >>= 6; /* Convert N into units of u64. */
    373
    374	/*
    375	 * Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits
    376	 * required as per 5.6.1.1.3.
    377	 */
    378	oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64);
    379	key = kmalloc(oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL);
    380	if (!key)
    381		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
    382
    383	/*
    384	 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64
    385	 * random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer.
    386	 */
    387	err = -EFAULT;
    388	if (crypto_get_default_rng())
    389		goto out_err;
    390
    391	err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, (u8 *)key,
    392				   oversampling_size);
    393	crypto_put_default_rng();
    394	if (err)
    395		goto out_err;
    396
    397	/*
    398	 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus,
    399	 * M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N.
    400	 *
    401	 * For step 6, calculate
    402	 * key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1.
    403	 *
    404	 * In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that
    405	 * 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h,
    406	 * 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds.
    407	 * The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words
    408	 * may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0]
    409	 * representing the 64 most significant bits and l
    410	 * corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark
    411	 * from above,
    412	 * h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1).
    413	 * As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after
    414	 * this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2.
    415	 * Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as
    416	 * h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one,
    417	 * then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will
    418	 * be zero after a second reduction:
    419	 * h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1).
    420	 * At this point, it is still possible that
    421	 * l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1)
    422	 * is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of
    423	 * the final increment overflowing in this case.
    424	 */
    425	h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]);
    426	h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
    427	h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
    428	WARN_ON_ONCE(h);
    429
    430	/* Increment to obtain the final result. */
    431	o = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, 1);
    432	/*
    433	 * The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or
    434	 * one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian
    435	 * order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to
    436	 * one, c.f. above.
    437	 */
    438	if (o)
    439		key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1);
    440
    441	/* n is in units of u64, convert to bytes. */
    442	*key_size = n << 3;
    443	/* Strip the leading extra __be64, which is (virtually) zero by now. */
    444	memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size);
    445
    446	return key;
    447
    448out_err:
    449	kfree_sensitive(key);
    450	return ERR_PTR(err);
    451}
    452
    453static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer,
    454				    unsigned int len)
    455{
    456	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
    457		dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
    458	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
    459	struct dh params = {};
    460	void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL;
    461	unsigned int buf_size;
    462	int err;
    463
    464	if (buffer) {
    465		err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buffer, len, &params);
    466		if (err)
    467			return err;
    468		if (params.p_size || params.g_size)
    469			return -EINVAL;
    470	}
    471
    472	params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p;
    473	params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size;
    474	params.g = safe_prime_g;
    475	params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g);
    476
    477	if (!params.key_size) {
    478		key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(inst_ctx->safe_prime,
    479						&params.key_size);
    480		if (IS_ERR(key))
    481			return PTR_ERR(key);
    482		params.key = key;
    483	}
    484
    485	buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(&params);
    486	buf = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
    487	if (!buf) {
    488		err = -ENOMEM;
    489		goto out;
    490	}
    491
    492	err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, buf_size, &params);
    493	if (err)
    494		goto out;
    495
    496	err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buf, buf_size);
    497out:
    498	kfree_sensitive(buf);
    499	kfree_sensitive(key);
    500	return err;
    501}
    502
    503static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(struct crypto_async_request *dh_req,
    504				       int err)
    505{
    506	struct kpp_request *req = dh_req->data;
    507
    508	kpp_request_complete(req, err);
    509}
    510
    511static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req)
    512{
    513	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx =
    514		kpp_tfm_ctx(crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req));
    515	struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req);
    516
    517	kpp_request_set_tfm(dh_req, tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
    518	kpp_request_set_callback(dh_req, req->base.flags,
    519				 dh_safe_prime_complete_req, req);
    520
    521	kpp_request_set_input(dh_req, req->src, req->src_len);
    522	kpp_request_set_output(dh_req, req->dst, req->dst_len);
    523
    524	return dh_req;
    525}
    526
    527static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req)
    528{
    529	struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
    530
    531	return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(dh_req);
    532}
    533
    534static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req)
    535{
    536	struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
    537
    538	return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(dh_req);
    539}
    540
    541static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
    542{
    543	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
    544
    545	return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
    546}
    547
    548static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create(
    549	struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
    550	const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime)
    551{
    552	struct kpp_instance *inst;
    553	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx;
    554	const char *dh_name;
    555	struct kpp_alg *dh_alg;
    556	u32 mask;
    557	int err;
    558
    559	err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, &mask);
    560	if (err)
    561		return err;
    562
    563	dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
    564	if (IS_ERR(dh_name))
    565		return PTR_ERR(dh_name);
    566
    567	inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
    568	if (!inst)
    569		return -ENOMEM;
    570
    571	ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
    572
    573	err = crypto_grab_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn, kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
    574			      dh_name, 0, mask);
    575	if (err)
    576		goto err_free_inst;
    577
    578	err = -EINVAL;
    579	dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(&ctx->dh_spawn);
    580	if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh"))
    581		goto err_free_inst;
    582
    583	ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime;
    584
    585	err = crypto_inst_setname(kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
    586				  tmpl->name, &dh_alg->base);
    587	if (err)
    588		goto err_free_inst;
    589
    590	inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret;
    591	inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key;
    592	inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret;
    593	inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size;
    594	inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm;
    595	inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm;
    596	inst->alg.reqsize = sizeof(struct kpp_request) + dh_alg->reqsize;
    597	inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority;
    598	inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
    599	inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx);
    600
    601	inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance;
    602
    603	err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
    604	if (err)
    605		goto err_free_inst;
    606
    607	return 0;
    608
    609err_free_inst:
    610	dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst);
    611
    612	return err;
    613}
    614
    615#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS
    616
    617static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = {
    618	.max_strength = 112,
    619	.p_size = 256,
    620	.p =
    621	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
    622	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
    623	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
    624	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
    625	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
    626	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
    627	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
    628	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
    629	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
    630	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
    631	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
    632	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
    633	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
    634	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
    635	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
    636	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
    637};
    638
    639static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = {
    640	.max_strength = 128,
    641	.p_size = 384,
    642	.p =
    643	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
    644	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
    645	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
    646	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
    647	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
    648	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
    649	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
    650	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
    651	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
    652	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
    653	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
    654	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
    655	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
    656	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
    657	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
    658	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
    659	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
    660	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
    661	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
    662	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
    663	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
    664	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
    665	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
    666	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
    667};
    668
    669static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = {
    670	.max_strength = 152,
    671	.p_size = 512,
    672	.p =
    673	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
    674	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
    675	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
    676	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
    677	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
    678	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
    679	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
    680	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
    681	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
    682	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
    683	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
    684	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
    685	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
    686	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
    687	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
    688	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
    689	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
    690	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
    691	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
    692	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
    693	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
    694	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
    695	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
    696	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
    697	"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
    698	"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
    699	"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
    700	"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
    701	"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
    702	"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
    703	"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
    704	"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
    705};
    706
    707static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = {
    708	.max_strength = 176,
    709	.p_size = 768,
    710	.p =
    711	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
    712	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
    713	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
    714	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
    715	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
    716	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
    717	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
    718	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
    719	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
    720	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
    721	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
    722	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
    723	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
    724	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
    725	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
    726	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
    727	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
    728	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
    729	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
    730	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
    731	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
    732	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
    733	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
    734	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
    735	"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
    736	"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
    737	"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
    738	"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
    739	"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
    740	"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
    741	"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
    742	"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
    743	"\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
    744	"\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
    745	"\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
    746	"\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
    747	"\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
    748	"\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
    749	"\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
    750	"\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
    751	"\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
    752	"\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
    753	"\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
    754	"\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
    755	"\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
    756	"\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
    757	"\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
    758	"\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
    759};
    760
    761static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = {
    762	.max_strength = 200,
    763	.p_size = 1024,
    764	.p =
    765	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
    766	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
    767	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
    768	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
    769	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
    770	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
    771	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
    772	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
    773	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
    774	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
    775	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
    776	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
    777	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
    778	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
    779	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
    780	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
    781	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
    782	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
    783	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
    784	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
    785	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
    786	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
    787	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
    788	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
    789	"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
    790	"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
    791	"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
    792	"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
    793	"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
    794	"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
    795	"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
    796	"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
    797	"\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
    798	"\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
    799	"\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
    800	"\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
    801	"\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
    802	"\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
    803	"\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
    804	"\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
    805	"\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
    806	"\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
    807	"\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
    808	"\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
    809	"\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
    810	"\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
    811	"\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
    812	"\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38"
    813	"\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43"
    814	"\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef"
    815	"\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65"
    816	"\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4"
    817	"\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c"
    818	"\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22"
    819	"\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee"
    820	"\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc"
    821	"\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9"
    822	"\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31"
    823	"\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8"
    824	"\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30"
    825	"\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe"
    826	"\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d"
    827	"\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c"
    828	"\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
    829};
    830
    831static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
    832			       struct rtattr **tb)
    833{
    834	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe2048_prime);
    835}
    836
    837static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
    838			       struct rtattr **tb)
    839{
    840	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe3072_prime);
    841}
    842
    843static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
    844			       struct rtattr **tb)
    845{
    846	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe4096_prime);
    847}
    848
    849static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
    850			       struct rtattr **tb)
    851{
    852	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe6144_prime);
    853}
    854
    855static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
    856			       struct rtattr **tb)
    857{
    858	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe8192_prime);
    859}
    860
    861static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {
    862	{
    863		.name = "ffdhe2048",
    864		.create = dh_ffdhe2048_create,
    865		.module = THIS_MODULE,
    866	},
    867	{
    868		.name = "ffdhe3072",
    869		.create = dh_ffdhe3072_create,
    870		.module = THIS_MODULE,
    871	},
    872	{
    873		.name = "ffdhe4096",
    874		.create = dh_ffdhe4096_create,
    875		.module = THIS_MODULE,
    876	},
    877	{
    878		.name = "ffdhe6144",
    879		.create = dh_ffdhe6144_create,
    880		.module = THIS_MODULE,
    881	},
    882	{
    883		.name = "ffdhe8192",
    884		.create = dh_ffdhe8192_create,
    885		.module = THIS_MODULE,
    886	},
    887};
    888
    889#else /* ! CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
    890
    891static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {};
    892
    893#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
    894
    895
    896static int dh_init(void)
    897{
    898	int err;
    899
    900	err = crypto_register_kpp(&dh);
    901	if (err)
    902		return err;
    903
    904	err = crypto_register_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
    905					ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
    906	if (err) {
    907		crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
    908		return err;
    909	}
    910
    911	return 0;
    912}
    913
    914static void dh_exit(void)
    915{
    916	crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
    917				    ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
    918	crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
    919}
    920
    921subsys_initcall(dh_init);
    922module_exit(dh_exit);
    923MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh");
    924MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
    925MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm");