cachepc-linux

Fork of AMDESE/linux with modifications for CachePC side-channel attack
git clone https://git.sinitax.com/sinitax/cachepc-linux
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capability.h (8486B)


      1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
      2/*
      3 * This is <linux/capability.h>
      4 *
      5 * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
      6 * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
      7 * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
      8 *
      9 * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
     10 *
     11 * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
     12 */
     13#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
     14#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
     15
     16#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
     17#include <linux/uidgid.h>
     18
     19#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
     20#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
     21
     22extern int file_caps_enabled;
     23
     24typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
     25	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
     26} kernel_cap_t;
     27
     28/* same as vfs_ns_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
     29struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
     30	__u32 magic_etc;
     31	kernel_cap_t permitted;
     32	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
     33	kuid_t rootid;
     34};
     35
     36#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
     37#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
     38
     39
     40struct file;
     41struct inode;
     42struct dentry;
     43struct task_struct;
     44struct user_namespace;
     45
     46extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
     47extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
     48
     49/*
     50 * Internal kernel functions only
     51 */
     52
     53#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi)  \
     54	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
     55
     56/*
     57 * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
     58 *
     59 * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
     60 * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
     61 *
     62 * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
     63 *
     64 * We could also define fsmask as follows:
     65 *   1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
     66 *   2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
     67 */
     68
     69# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN)		\
     70			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD)		\
     71			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)	\
     72			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)	\
     73			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
     74			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
     75
     76# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
     77
     78#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
     79# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
     80#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
     81
     82#define CAP_LAST_U32			((_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) - 1)
     83#define CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK		(CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1)
     84
     85# define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
     86# define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK }})
     87# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
     88				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
     89				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
     90# define CAP_NFSD_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
     91				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
     92				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
     93
     94#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
     95
     96# define cap_clear(c)         do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
     97
     98#define cap_raise(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
     99#define cap_lower(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
    100#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
    101
    102#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP)                                    \
    103do {                                                                \
    104	unsigned __capi;                                            \
    105	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
    106		c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi];     \
    107	}                                                           \
    108} while (0)
    109
    110#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP)                                       \
    111do {                                                                \
    112	unsigned __capi;                                            \
    113	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
    114		c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi];                   \
    115	}                                                           \
    116} while (0)
    117
    118static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
    119				       const kernel_cap_t b)
    120{
    121	kernel_cap_t dest;
    122	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
    123	return dest;
    124}
    125
    126static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
    127					 const kernel_cap_t b)
    128{
    129	kernel_cap_t dest;
    130	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
    131	return dest;
    132}
    133
    134static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
    135				    const kernel_cap_t drop)
    136{
    137	kernel_cap_t dest;
    138	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
    139	return dest;
    140}
    141
    142static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
    143{
    144	kernel_cap_t dest;
    145	CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
    146	return dest;
    147}
    148
    149static inline bool cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
    150{
    151	unsigned __capi;
    152	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
    153		if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
    154			return false;
    155	}
    156	return true;
    157}
    158
    159/*
    160 * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
    161 * return true if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
    162 *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return true
    163 * return false if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
    164 *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return false
    165 */
    166static inline bool cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
    167{
    168	kernel_cap_t dest;
    169	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
    170	return cap_isclear(dest);
    171}
    172
    173/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
    174
    175static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
    176{
    177	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
    178	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
    179}
    180
    181static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
    182					    const kernel_cap_t permitted)
    183{
    184	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
    185	return cap_combine(a,
    186			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
    187}
    188
    189static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
    190{
    191	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
    192	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
    193}
    194
    195static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
    196					      const kernel_cap_t permitted)
    197{
    198	const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
    199	return cap_combine(a,
    200			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
    201}
    202
    203#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER
    204extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
    205extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
    206			      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
    207extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
    208extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
    209				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
    210extern bool capable(int cap);
    211extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
    212extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
    213extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
    214#else
    215static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
    216{
    217	return true;
    218}
    219static inline bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
    220			      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
    221{
    222	return true;
    223}
    224static inline bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
    225{
    226	return true;
    227}
    228static inline bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
    229				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
    230{
    231	return true;
    232}
    233static inline bool capable(int cap)
    234{
    235	return true;
    236}
    237static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
    238{
    239	return true;
    240}
    241static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
    242{
    243	return true;
    244}
    245static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
    246{
    247	return true;
    248}
    249#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
    250bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns,
    251				 struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
    252				 const struct inode *inode);
    253bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
    254			      const struct inode *inode, int cap);
    255extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
    256extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
    257static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
    258{
    259	return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
    260}
    261
    262static inline bool bpf_capable(void)
    263{
    264	return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
    265}
    266
    267static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
    268{
    269	return ns_capable(ns, CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
    270		ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
    271}
    272
    273/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
    274int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
    275			   const struct dentry *dentry,
    276			   struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
    277
    278int cap_convert_nscap(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
    279		      const void **ivalue, size_t size);
    280
    281#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */