cachepc-linux

Fork of AMDESE/linux with modifications for CachePC side-channel attack
git clone https://git.sinitax.com/sinitax/cachepc-linux
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fortify-string.h (17596B)


      1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
      2#ifndef _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_
      3#define _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_
      4
      5#include <linux/const.h>
      6
      7#define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __gnu_inline __overloadable
      8#define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x)
      9
     10void fortify_panic(const char *name) __noreturn __cold;
     11void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)");
     12void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object (2nd parameter)");
     13void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");
     14void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object (1st parameter)");
     15void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");
     16
     17#define __compiletime_strlen(p)					\
     18({								\
     19	unsigned char *__p = (unsigned char *)(p);		\
     20	size_t __ret = (size_t)-1;				\
     21	size_t __p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);		\
     22	if (__p_size != (size_t)-1) {				\
     23		size_t __p_len = __p_size - 1;			\
     24		if (__builtin_constant_p(__p[__p_len]) &&	\
     25		    __p[__p_len] == '\0')			\
     26			__ret = __builtin_strlen(__p);		\
     27	}							\
     28	__ret;							\
     29})
     30
     31#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
     32extern void *__underlying_memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memchr);
     33extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp);
     34extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcpy);
     35extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memmove);
     36extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memset);
     37extern char *__underlying_strcat(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcat);
     38extern char *__underlying_strcpy(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcpy);
     39extern __kernel_size_t __underlying_strlen(const char *p) __RENAME(strlen);
     40extern char *__underlying_strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) __RENAME(strncat);
     41extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(strncpy);
     42#else
     43#define __underlying_memchr	__builtin_memchr
     44#define __underlying_memcmp	__builtin_memcmp
     45#define __underlying_memcpy	__builtin_memcpy
     46#define __underlying_memmove	__builtin_memmove
     47#define __underlying_memset	__builtin_memset
     48#define __underlying_strcat	__builtin_strcat
     49#define __underlying_strcpy	__builtin_strcpy
     50#define __underlying_strlen	__builtin_strlen
     51#define __underlying_strncat	__builtin_strncat
     52#define __underlying_strncpy	__builtin_strncpy
     53#endif
     54
     55/**
     56 * unsafe_memcpy - memcpy implementation with no FORTIFY bounds checking
     57 *
     58 * @dst: Destination memory address to write to
     59 * @src: Source memory address to read from
     60 * @bytes: How many bytes to write to @dst from @src
     61 * @justification: Free-form text or comment describing why the use is needed
     62 *
     63 * This should be used for corner cases where the compiler cannot do the
     64 * right thing, or during transitions between APIs, etc. It should be used
     65 * very rarely, and includes a place for justification detailing where bounds
     66 * checking has happened, and why existing solutions cannot be employed.
     67 */
     68#define unsafe_memcpy(dst, src, bytes, justification)		\
     69	__underlying_memcpy(dst, src, bytes)
     70
     71/*
     72 * Clang's use of __builtin_object_size() within inlines needs hinting via
     73 * __pass_object_size(). The preference is to only ever use type 1 (member
     74 * size, rather than struct size), but there remain some stragglers using
     75 * type 0 that will be converted in the future.
     76 */
     77#define POS	__pass_object_size(1)
     78#define POS0	__pass_object_size(0)
     79
     80__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strncpy, 1, 2, 3)
     81char *strncpy(char * const POS p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
     82{
     83	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
     84
     85	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
     86		__write_overflow();
     87	if (p_size < size)
     88		fortify_panic(__func__);
     89	return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size);
     90}
     91
     92__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2)
     93char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
     94{
     95	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
     96
     97	if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
     98		return __underlying_strcat(p, q);
     99	if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
    100		fortify_panic(__func__);
    101	return p;
    102}
    103
    104extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
    105__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
    106{
    107	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
    108	size_t p_len = __compiletime_strlen(p);
    109	size_t ret;
    110
    111	/* We can take compile-time actions when maxlen is const. */
    112	if (__builtin_constant_p(maxlen) && p_len != (size_t)-1) {
    113		/* If p is const, we can use its compile-time-known len. */
    114		if (maxlen >= p_size)
    115			return p_len;
    116	}
    117
    118	/* Do not check characters beyond the end of p. */
    119	ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
    120	if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret)
    121		fortify_panic(__func__);
    122	return ret;
    123}
    124
    125/*
    126 * Defined after fortified strnlen to reuse it. However, it must still be
    127 * possible for strlen() to be used on compile-time strings for use in
    128 * static initializers (i.e. as a constant expression).
    129 */
    130#define strlen(p)							\
    131	__builtin_choose_expr(__is_constexpr(__builtin_strlen(p)),	\
    132		__builtin_strlen(p), __fortify_strlen(p))
    133__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strlen, 1)
    134__kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p)
    135{
    136	__kernel_size_t ret;
    137	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
    138
    139	/* Give up if we don't know how large p is. */
    140	if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
    141		return __underlying_strlen(p);
    142	ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
    143	if (p_size <= ret)
    144		fortify_panic(__func__);
    145	return ret;
    146}
    147
    148/* defined after fortified strlen to reuse it */
    149extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy);
    150__FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t size)
    151{
    152	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
    153	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
    154	size_t q_len;	/* Full count of source string length. */
    155	size_t len;	/* Count of characters going into destination. */
    156
    157	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
    158		return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size);
    159	q_len = strlen(q);
    160	len = (q_len >= size) ? size - 1 : q_len;
    161	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && __builtin_constant_p(q_len) && size) {
    162		/* Write size is always larger than destination. */
    163		if (len >= p_size)
    164			__write_overflow();
    165	}
    166	if (size) {
    167		if (len >= p_size)
    168			fortify_panic(__func__);
    169		__underlying_memcpy(p, q, len);
    170		p[len] = '\0';
    171	}
    172	return q_len;
    173}
    174
    175/* defined after fortified strnlen to reuse it */
    176extern ssize_t __real_strscpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strscpy);
    177__FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t size)
    178{
    179	size_t len;
    180	/* Use string size rather than possible enclosing struct size. */
    181	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
    182	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
    183
    184	/* If we cannot get size of p and q default to call strscpy. */
    185	if (p_size == (size_t) -1 && q_size == (size_t) -1)
    186		return __real_strscpy(p, q, size);
    187
    188	/*
    189	 * If size can be known at compile time and is greater than
    190	 * p_size, generate a compile time write overflow error.
    191	 */
    192	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && size > p_size)
    193		__write_overflow();
    194
    195	/*
    196	 * This call protects from read overflow, because len will default to q
    197	 * length if it smaller than size.
    198	 */
    199	len = strnlen(q, size);
    200	/*
    201	 * If len equals size, we will copy only size bytes which leads to
    202	 * -E2BIG being returned.
    203	 * Otherwise we will copy len + 1 because of the final '\O'.
    204	 */
    205	len = len == size ? size : len + 1;
    206
    207	/*
    208	 * Generate a runtime write overflow error if len is greater than
    209	 * p_size.
    210	 */
    211	if (len > p_size)
    212		fortify_panic(__func__);
    213
    214	/*
    215	 * We can now safely call vanilla strscpy because we are protected from:
    216	 * 1. Read overflow thanks to call to strnlen().
    217	 * 2. Write overflow thanks to above ifs.
    218	 */
    219	return __real_strscpy(p, q, len);
    220}
    221
    222/* defined after fortified strlen and strnlen to reuse them */
    223__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strncat, 1, 2, 3)
    224char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t count)
    225{
    226	size_t p_len, copy_len;
    227	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
    228	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
    229
    230	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
    231		return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count);
    232	p_len = strlen(p);
    233	copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
    234	if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
    235		fortify_panic(__func__);
    236	__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
    237	p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
    238	return p;
    239}
    240
    241__FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
    242					 const size_t p_size,
    243					 const size_t p_size_field)
    244{
    245	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
    246		/*
    247		 * Length argument is a constant expression, so we
    248		 * can perform compile-time bounds checking where
    249		 * buffer sizes are known.
    250		 */
    251
    252		/* Error when size is larger than enclosing struct. */
    253		if (p_size > p_size_field && p_size < size)
    254			__write_overflow();
    255
    256		/* Warn when write size is larger than dest field. */
    257		if (p_size_field < size)
    258			__write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
    259	}
    260	/*
    261	 * At this point, length argument may not be a constant expression,
    262	 * so run-time bounds checking can be done where buffer sizes are
    263	 * known. (This is not an "else" because the above checks may only
    264	 * be compile-time warnings, and we want to still warn for run-time
    265	 * overflows.)
    266	 */
    267
    268	/*
    269	 * Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the
    270	 * field, when the buffer's remaining size is known.
    271	 * (The -1 test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
    272	 * lengths are unknown.)
    273	 */
    274	if (p_size != (size_t)(-1) && p_size < size)
    275		fortify_panic("memset");
    276}
    277
    278#define __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, size, p_size, p_size_field) ({	\
    279	size_t __fortify_size = (size_t)(size);				\
    280	fortify_memset_chk(__fortify_size, p_size, p_size_field),	\
    281	__underlying_memset(p, c, __fortify_size);			\
    282})
    283
    284/*
    285 * __builtin_object_size() must be captured here to avoid evaluating argument
    286 * side-effects further into the macro layers.
    287 */
    288#define memset(p, c, s) __fortify_memset_chk(p, c, s,			\
    289		__builtin_object_size(p, 0), __builtin_object_size(p, 1))
    290
    291/*
    292 * To make sure the compiler can enforce protection against buffer overflows,
    293 * memcpy(), memmove(), and memset() must not be used beyond individual
    294 * struct members. If you need to copy across multiple members, please use
    295 * struct_group() to create a named mirror of an anonymous struct union.
    296 * (e.g. see struct sk_buff.) Read overflow checking is currently only
    297 * done when a write overflow is also present, or when building with W=1.
    298 *
    299 * Mitigation coverage matrix
    300 *					Bounds checking at:
    301 *					+-------+-------+-------+-------+
    302 *					| Compile time  |   Run time    |
    303 * memcpy() argument sizes:		| write | read  | write | read  |
    304 *        dest     source   length      +-------+-------+-------+-------+
    305 * memcpy(known,   known,   constant)	|   y   |   y   |  n/a  |  n/a  |
    306 * memcpy(known,   unknown, constant)	|   y   |   n   |  n/a  |   V   |
    307 * memcpy(known,   known,   dynamic)	|   n   |   n   |   B   |   B   |
    308 * memcpy(known,   unknown, dynamic)	|   n   |   n   |   B   |   V   |
    309 * memcpy(unknown, known,   constant)	|   n   |   y   |   V   |  n/a  |
    310 * memcpy(unknown, unknown, constant)	|   n   |   n   |   V   |   V   |
    311 * memcpy(unknown, known,   dynamic)	|   n   |   n   |   V   |   B   |
    312 * memcpy(unknown, unknown, dynamic)	|   n   |   n   |   V   |   V   |
    313 *					+-------+-------+-------+-------+
    314 *
    315 * y = perform deterministic compile-time bounds checking
    316 * n = cannot perform deterministic compile-time bounds checking
    317 * n/a = no run-time bounds checking needed since compile-time deterministic
    318 * B = can perform run-time bounds checking (currently unimplemented)
    319 * V = vulnerable to run-time overflow (will need refactoring to solve)
    320 *
    321 */
    322__FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
    323					 const size_t p_size,
    324					 const size_t q_size,
    325					 const size_t p_size_field,
    326					 const size_t q_size_field,
    327					 const char *func)
    328{
    329	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
    330		/*
    331		 * Length argument is a constant expression, so we
    332		 * can perform compile-time bounds checking where
    333		 * buffer sizes are known.
    334		 */
    335
    336		/* Error when size is larger than enclosing struct. */
    337		if (p_size > p_size_field && p_size < size)
    338			__write_overflow();
    339		if (q_size > q_size_field && q_size < size)
    340			__read_overflow2();
    341
    342		/* Warn when write size argument larger than dest field. */
    343		if (p_size_field < size)
    344			__write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
    345		/*
    346		 * Warn for source field over-read when building with W=1
    347		 * or when an over-write happened, so both can be fixed at
    348		 * the same time.
    349		 */
    350		if ((IS_ENABLED(KBUILD_EXTRA_WARN1) || p_size_field < size) &&
    351		    q_size_field < size)
    352			__read_overflow2_field(q_size_field, size);
    353	}
    354	/*
    355	 * At this point, length argument may not be a constant expression,
    356	 * so run-time bounds checking can be done where buffer sizes are
    357	 * known. (This is not an "else" because the above checks may only
    358	 * be compile-time warnings, and we want to still warn for run-time
    359	 * overflows.)
    360	 */
    361
    362	/*
    363	 * Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the
    364	 * field, when the buffer's remaining size is known.
    365	 * (The -1 test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
    366	 * lengths are unknown.)
    367	 */
    368	if ((p_size != (size_t)(-1) && p_size < size) ||
    369	    (q_size != (size_t)(-1) && q_size < size))
    370		fortify_panic(func);
    371}
    372
    373#define __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, size, p_size, q_size,		\
    374			     p_size_field, q_size_field, op) ({		\
    375	size_t __fortify_size = (size_t)(size);				\
    376	fortify_memcpy_chk(__fortify_size, p_size, q_size,		\
    377			   p_size_field, q_size_field, #op);		\
    378	__underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);			\
    379})
    380
    381/*
    382 * __builtin_object_size() must be captured here to avoid evaluating argument
    383 * side-effects further into the macro layers.
    384 */
    385#define memcpy(p, q, s)  __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s,			\
    386		__builtin_object_size(p, 0), __builtin_object_size(q, 0), \
    387		__builtin_object_size(p, 1), __builtin_object_size(q, 1), \
    388		memcpy)
    389#define memmove(p, q, s)  __fortify_memcpy_chk(p, q, s,			\
    390		__builtin_object_size(p, 0), __builtin_object_size(q, 0), \
    391		__builtin_object_size(p, 1), __builtin_object_size(q, 1), \
    392		memmove)
    393
    394extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);
    395__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
    396{
    397	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
    398
    399	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
    400		__read_overflow();
    401	if (p_size < size)
    402		fortify_panic(__func__);
    403	return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
    404}
    405
    406__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_memcmp, 1, 2, 3)
    407int memcmp(const void * const POS0 p, const void * const POS0 q, __kernel_size_t size)
    408{
    409	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
    410	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
    411
    412	if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
    413		if (p_size < size)
    414			__read_overflow();
    415		if (q_size < size)
    416			__read_overflow2();
    417	}
    418	if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
    419		fortify_panic(__func__);
    420	return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
    421}
    422
    423__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_memchr, 1, 2, 3)
    424void *memchr(const void * const POS0 p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
    425{
    426	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
    427
    428	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
    429		__read_overflow();
    430	if (p_size < size)
    431		fortify_panic(__func__);
    432	return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size);
    433}
    434
    435void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);
    436__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void * const POS0 p, int c, size_t size)
    437{
    438	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
    439
    440	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
    441		__read_overflow();
    442	if (p_size < size)
    443		fortify_panic(__func__);
    444	return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
    445}
    446
    447extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup);
    448__FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void * const POS0 p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
    449{
    450	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
    451
    452	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
    453		__read_overflow();
    454	if (p_size < size)
    455		fortify_panic(__func__);
    456	return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
    457}
    458
    459/* Defined after fortified strlen to reuse it. */
    460__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcpy, 1, 2)
    461char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)
    462{
    463	size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
    464	size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
    465	size_t size;
    466
    467	/* If neither buffer size is known, immediately give up. */
    468	if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
    469		return __underlying_strcpy(p, q);
    470	size = strlen(q) + 1;
    471	/* Compile-time check for const size overflow. */
    472	if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
    473		__write_overflow();
    474	/* Run-time check for dynamic size overflow. */
    475	if (p_size < size)
    476		fortify_panic(__func__);
    477	__underlying_memcpy(p, q, size);
    478	return p;
    479}
    480
    481/* Don't use these outside the FORITFY_SOURCE implementation */
    482#undef __underlying_memchr
    483#undef __underlying_memcmp
    484#undef __underlying_strcat
    485#undef __underlying_strcpy
    486#undef __underlying_strlen
    487#undef __underlying_strncat
    488#undef __underlying_strncpy
    489
    490#undef POS
    491#undef POS0
    492
    493#endif /* _LINUX_FORTIFY_STRING_H_ */