cachepc-linux

Fork of AMDESE/linux with modifications for CachePC side-channel attack
git clone https://git.sinitax.com/sinitax/cachepc-linux
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securebits.h (2719B)


      1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
      2#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
      3#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
      4
      5/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
      6   whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
      7   setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
      8   changed from user-level. */
      9#define issecure_mask(X)	(1 << (X))
     10
     11#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
     12
     13/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
     14   inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
     15   compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
     16   *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
     17   0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the
     18   executable file. */
     19#define SECURE_NOROOT			0
     20#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED		1  /* make bit-0 immutable */
     21
     22#define SECBIT_NOROOT		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT))
     23#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED))
     24
     25/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup".
     26   When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on
     27   set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
     28   capabilities to be gained/lost. */
     29#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP		2
     30#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED	3  /* make bit-2 immutable */
     31
     32#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP	(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
     33#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \
     34			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
     35
     36/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after
     37   transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by
     38   bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
     39   bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d
     40   child can use this feature again. */
     41#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS		4
     42#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED		5  /* make bit-4 immutable */
     43
     44#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS	(issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
     45#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
     46
     47/* When set, a process cannot add new capabilities to its ambient set. */
     48#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE		6
     49#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED	7  /* make bit-6 immutable */
     50
     51#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
     52#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \
     53			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED))
     54
     55#define SECURE_ALL_BITS		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
     56				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
     57				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \
     58				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
     59#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
     60
     61#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */