cachepc-linux

Fork of AMDESE/linux with modifications for CachePC side-channel attack
git clone https://git.sinitax.com/sinitax/cachepc-linux
Log | Files | Refs | README | LICENSE | sfeed.txt

ipc.c (6006B)


      1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
      2/*
      3 * AppArmor security module
      4 *
      5 * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
      6 *
      7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
      8 * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
      9 */
     10
     11#include <linux/gfp.h>
     12#include <linux/ptrace.h>
     13
     14#include "include/audit.h"
     15#include "include/capability.h"
     16#include "include/cred.h"
     17#include "include/policy.h"
     18#include "include/ipc.h"
     19#include "include/sig_names.h"
     20
     21/**
     22 * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
     23 * @mask: permission mask to convert
     24 *
     25 * Returns: pointer to static string
     26 */
     27static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
     28{
     29	switch (mask) {
     30	case MAY_READ:
     31		return "read";
     32	case MAY_WRITE:
     33		return "trace";
     34	case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
     35		return "readby";
     36	case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
     37		return "tracedby";
     38	}
     39	return "";
     40}
     41
     42/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
     43static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
     44{
     45	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
     46
     47	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
     48		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
     49				 audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
     50
     51		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
     52			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
     53					 audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
     54		}
     55	}
     56	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
     57	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
     58			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
     59}
     60
     61/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
     62/* TODO: conditionals */
     63static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
     64			     struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
     65			     struct common_audit_data *sa)
     66{
     67	struct aa_perms perms = { };
     68
     69	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
     70	aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
     71			       &perms);
     72	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
     73	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
     74}
     75
     76static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
     77			       struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
     78			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
     79{
     80	if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
     81	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
     82		return 0;
     83
     84	return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
     85}
     86
     87static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
     88			       struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
     89			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
     90{
     91	if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
     92		return 0;
     93
     94	if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
     95		return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
     96
     97	/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
     98	if (&tracer->label == tracee)
     99		return 0;
    100
    101	aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
    102	aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
    103	aad(sa)->request = 0;
    104	aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
    105				    CAP_OPT_NONE);
    106
    107	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
    108}
    109
    110/**
    111 * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
    112 * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
    113 * @tracee: task label to be traced
    114 * @request: permission request
    115 *
    116 * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
    117 */
    118int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
    119		  u32 request)
    120{
    121	struct aa_profile *profile;
    122	u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
    123	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
    124
    125	return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
    126			profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
    127			profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
    128}
    129
    130
    131static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
    132{
    133	if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
    134		return SIGUNKNOWN;
    135	else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
    136		return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
    137	else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
    138		return sig_map[sig];
    139	return SIGUNKNOWN;
    140}
    141
    142/**
    143 * audit_signal_mask - convert mask to permission string
    144 * @mask: permission mask to convert
    145 *
    146 * Returns: pointer to static string
    147 */
    148static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask)
    149{
    150	if (mask & MAY_READ)
    151		return "receive";
    152	if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
    153		return "send";
    154	return "";
    155}
    156
    157/**
    158 * audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields
    159 * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
    160 * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
    161 */
    162static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
    163{
    164	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
    165
    166	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
    167		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
    168				 audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->request));
    169		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
    170			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
    171					 audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
    172		}
    173	}
    174	if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
    175		audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
    176				 aad(sa)->unmappedsig);
    177	else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
    178		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
    179	else
    180		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
    181				 aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
    182	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
    183	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
    184			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
    185}
    186
    187static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
    188			       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
    189			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
    190{
    191	struct aa_perms perms;
    192	unsigned int state;
    193
    194	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
    195	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
    196		return 0;
    197
    198	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
    199	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
    200	state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
    201			    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
    202			    aad(sa)->signal);
    203	aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
    204	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
    205	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
    206}
    207
    208int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
    209{
    210	struct aa_profile *profile;
    211	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
    212
    213	aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
    214	aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig;
    215	return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
    216			profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
    217			profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
    218}