cachepc-linux

Fork of AMDESE/linux with modifications for CachePC side-channel attack
git clone https://git.sinitax.com/sinitax/cachepc-linux
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net.c (5594B)


      1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
      2/*
      3 * AppArmor security module
      4 *
      5 * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
      6 *
      7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
      8 * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
      9 */
     10
     11#include "include/apparmor.h"
     12#include "include/audit.h"
     13#include "include/cred.h"
     14#include "include/label.h"
     15#include "include/net.h"
     16#include "include/policy.h"
     17#include "include/secid.h"
     18
     19#include "net_names.h"
     20
     21
     22struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
     23	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
     24	{ }
     25};
     26
     27static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
     28	"unknown",
     29	"send",
     30	"receive",
     31	"unknown",
     32
     33	"create",
     34	"shutdown",
     35	"connect",
     36	"unknown",
     37
     38	"setattr",
     39	"getattr",
     40	"setcred",
     41	"getcred",
     42
     43	"chmod",
     44	"chown",
     45	"chgrp",
     46	"lock",
     47
     48	"mmap",
     49	"mprot",
     50	"unknown",
     51	"unknown",
     52
     53	"accept",
     54	"bind",
     55	"listen",
     56	"unknown",
     57
     58	"setopt",
     59	"getopt",
     60	"unknown",
     61	"unknown",
     62
     63	"unknown",
     64	"unknown",
     65	"unknown",
     66	"unknown",
     67};
     68
     69
     70/* audit callback for net specific fields */
     71void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
     72{
     73	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
     74
     75	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
     76		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
     77				 address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
     78	else
     79		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
     80				 sa->u.net->family);
     81	if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
     82		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
     83				 sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
     84	else
     85		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
     86				 aad(sa)->net.type);
     87	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
     88
     89	if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
     90		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
     91		aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
     92				   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
     93
     94		if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
     95			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
     96			aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
     97					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
     98		}
     99	}
    100	if (aad(sa)->peer) {
    101		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
    102		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
    103				FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
    104	}
    105}
    106
    107/* Generic af perm */
    108int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
    109		       u32 request, u16 family, int type)
    110{
    111	struct aa_perms perms = { };
    112	unsigned int state;
    113	__be16 buffer[2];
    114
    115	AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
    116	AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
    117
    118	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
    119		return 0;
    120	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
    121	if (!state)
    122		return 0;
    123
    124	buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
    125	buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
    126	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
    127				 4);
    128	aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
    129	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
    130
    131	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
    132}
    133
    134int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
    135	       int type, int protocol)
    136{
    137	struct aa_profile *profile;
    138	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
    139
    140	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
    141			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
    142					   type));
    143}
    144
    145static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
    146			    struct sock *sk)
    147{
    148	int error = 0;
    149
    150	AA_BUG(!label);
    151	AA_BUG(!sk);
    152
    153	if (!unconfined(label)) {
    154		struct aa_profile *profile;
    155		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
    156
    157		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
    158			    aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
    159	}
    160
    161	return error;
    162}
    163
    164int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
    165{
    166	struct aa_label *label;
    167	int error;
    168
    169	AA_BUG(!sk);
    170	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
    171
    172	/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
    173	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
    174	error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
    175	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
    176
    177	return error;
    178}
    179
    180
    181int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
    182		      struct socket *sock)
    183{
    184	AA_BUG(!label);
    185	AA_BUG(!sock);
    186	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
    187
    188	return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
    189}
    190
    191#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
    192static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
    193{
    194	struct aa_label *label;
    195
    196	if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
    197		secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
    198		return 0;
    199	}
    200
    201	label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
    202				    secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
    203				    GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
    204
    205	if (IS_ERR(label))
    206		return PTR_ERR(label);
    207
    208	secmark->secid = label->secid;
    209
    210	return 0;
    211}
    212
    213static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
    214			   struct common_audit_data *sa)
    215{
    216	int i, ret;
    217	struct aa_perms perms = { };
    218
    219	if (profile->secmark_count == 0)
    220		return 0;
    221
    222	for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++) {
    223		if (!profile->secmark[i].secid) {
    224			ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&profile->secmark[i]);
    225			if (ret)
    226				return ret;
    227		}
    228
    229		if (profile->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
    230		    profile->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
    231			if (profile->secmark[i].deny)
    232				perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
    233			else
    234				perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
    235
    236			if (profile->secmark[i].audit)
    237				perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
    238		}
    239	}
    240
    241	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
    242
    243	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
    244}
    245
    246int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
    247			   u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
    248{
    249	struct aa_profile *profile;
    250	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
    251
    252	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
    253				    aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
    254						    &sa));
    255}
    256#endif