From 0aed55af88345b5d673240f90e671d79662fb01e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams Date: Mon, 29 May 2017 12:22:50 -0700 Subject: x86, uaccess: introduce copy_from_iter_flushcache for pmem / cache-bypass operations The pmem driver has a need to transfer data with a persistent memory destination and be able to rely on the fact that the destination writes are not cached. It is sufficient for the writes to be flushed to a cpu-store-buffer (non-temporal / "movnt" in x86 terms), as we expect userspace to call fsync() to ensure data-writes have reached a power-fail-safe zone in the platform. The fsync() triggers a REQ_FUA or REQ_FLUSH to the pmem driver which will turn around and fence previous writes with an "sfence". Implement a __copy_from_user_inatomic_flushcache, memcpy_page_flushcache, and memcpy_flushcache, that guarantee that the destination buffer is not dirty in the cpu cache on completion. The new copy_from_iter_flushcache and sub-routines will be used to replace the "pmem api" (include/linux/pmem.h + arch/x86/include/asm/pmem.h). The availability of copy_from_iter_flushcache() and memcpy_flushcache() are gated by the CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE config symbol, and fallback to copy_from_iter_nocache() and plain memcpy() otherwise. This is meant to satisfy the concern from Linus that if a driver wants to do something beyond the normal nocache semantics it should be something private to that driver [1], and Al's concern that anything uaccess related belongs with the rest of the uaccess code [2]. The first consumer of this interface is a new 'copy_from_iter' dax operation so that pmem can inject cache maintenance operations without imposing this overhead on other dax-capable drivers. [1]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2017-January/008364.html [2]: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/linux-nvdimm/2017-April/009942.html Cc: Cc: Jan Kara Cc: Jeff Moyer Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Toshi Kani Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Al Viro Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Matthew Wilcox Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- include/linux/string.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux/string.h') diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h index 537918f8a98e..7439d83eaa33 100644 --- a/include/linux/string.h +++ b/include/linux/string.h @@ -122,6 +122,12 @@ static inline __must_check int memcpy_mcsafe(void *dst, const void *src, return 0; } #endif +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY_FLUSHCACHE +static inline void memcpy_flushcache(void *dst, const void *src, size_t cnt) +{ + memcpy(dst, src, cnt); +} +#endif void *memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n); char *strreplace(char *s, char old, char new); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From f35157417215ec138c920320c746fdb3e04ef1d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2017 17:25:02 +0100 Subject: Provide a function to create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data Provide a function, kmemdup_nul(), that will create a NUL-terminated string from an unterminated character array where the length is known in advance. This is better than kstrndup() in situations where we already know the string length as the strnlen() in kstrndup() is superfluous. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- include/linux/string.h | 1 + mm/util.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux/string.h') diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h index 537918f8a98e..3dd944cfe171 100644 --- a/include/linux/string.h +++ b/include/linux/string.h @@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ extern char *kstrdup(const char *s, gfp_t gfp) __malloc; extern const char *kstrdup_const(const char *s, gfp_t gfp); extern char *kstrndup(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp); extern void *kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp); +extern char *kmemdup_nul(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp); extern char **argv_split(gfp_t gfp, const char *str, int *argcp); extern void argv_free(char **argv); diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c index 26be6407abd7..21ddf90f883d 100644 --- a/mm/util.c +++ b/mm/util.c @@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kstrdup_const); * @s: the string to duplicate * @max: read at most @max chars from @s * @gfp: the GFP mask used in the kmalloc() call when allocating memory + * + * Note: Use kmemdup_nul() instead if the size is known exactly. */ char *kstrndup(const char *s, size_t max, gfp_t gfp) { @@ -120,6 +122,28 @@ void *kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmemdup); +/** + * kmemdup_nul - Create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data + * @s: The data to stringify + * @len: The size of the data + * @gfp: the GFP mask used in the kmalloc() call when allocating memory + */ +char *kmemdup_nul(const char *s, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) +{ + char *buf; + + if (!s) + return NULL; + + buf = kmalloc_track_caller(len + 1, gfp); + if (buf) { + memcpy(buf, s, len); + buf[len] = '\0'; + } + return buf; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmemdup_nul); + /** * memdup_user - duplicate memory region from user space * -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 6974f0c4555e285ab217cee58b6e874f776ff409 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Micay Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 14:36:10 -0700 Subject: include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Daniel Axtens Cc: Rasmus Villemoes Cc: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/Kconfig | 6 ++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/string.h | 5 + arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 5 + arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h | 9 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/lib/memcpy_32.c | 2 +- include/linux/string.h | 200 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/string.c | 7 ++ security/Kconfig | 7 ++ 12 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/linux/string.h') diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index fb9bd7d36b05..21d0089117fe 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -223,6 +223,12 @@ config GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD config GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP bool +config ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE + bool + help + An architecture should select this when it can successfully + build and run with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE. + # Select if arch has all set_memory_ro/rw/x/nx() functions in asm/cacheflush.h config ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY bool diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 8addb851ab5e..dfd908630631 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE + select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE if (MEMORY_ISOLATION && COMPACTION) || CMA select ARCH_HAS_KCOV diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/string.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/string.h index 2eb714c4639f..d0aa42907569 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/string.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/string.h @@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ extern int memcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); #define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len) #define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len) #define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n) + +#ifndef __NO_FORTIFY +#define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */ +#endif + #endif #endif diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index fce2f4f20891..36f858c37ca7 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ config PPC select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED select ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_COHERENT_MASK select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE + select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL select ARCH_HAS_SCALED_CPUTIME if VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_NATIVE select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 3d2b8ce54e00..781521b7cf9e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ config X86 select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER + select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL select ARCH_HAS_KCOV if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c index 00241c815524..a0838ab929f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c @@ -411,3 +411,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap, debug_putstr("done.\nBooting the kernel.\n"); return output; } + +void fortify_panic(const char *name) +{ + error("detected buffer overflow"); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h index 3d3e8353ee5c..e9ee84873de5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h @@ -142,7 +142,9 @@ static __always_inline void *__constant_memcpy(void *to, const void *from, } #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY +extern void *memcpy(void *, const void *, size_t); +#ifndef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE #ifdef CONFIG_X86_USE_3DNOW #include @@ -195,11 +197,15 @@ static inline void *__memcpy3d(void *to, const void *from, size_t len) #endif #endif +#endif /* !CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE */ #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n); +extern int memcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); +#ifndef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE #define memcmp __builtin_memcmp +#endif #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCHR extern void *memchr(const void *cs, int c, size_t count); @@ -321,6 +327,8 @@ void *__constant_c_and_count_memset(void *s, unsigned long pattern, : __memset_generic((s), (c), (count))) #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET +extern void *memset(void *, int, size_t); +#ifndef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE #if (__GNUC__ >= 4) #define memset(s, c, count) __builtin_memset(s, c, count) #else @@ -330,6 +338,7 @@ void *__constant_c_and_count_memset(void *s, unsigned long pattern, (count)) \ : __memset((s), (c), (count))) #endif +#endif /* !CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE */ /* * find the first occurrence of byte 'c', or 1 past the area if none diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h index 1f22bc277c45..2a8c822de1fc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ static __always_inline void *__inline_memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t extern void *memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t len); extern void *__memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t len); +#ifndef CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE #ifndef CONFIG_KMEMCHECK #if (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ < 3) || __GNUC__ < 4 #define memcpy(dst, src, len) \ @@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ extern void *__memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t len); */ #define memcpy(dst, src, len) __inline_memcpy((dst), (src), (len)) #endif +#endif /* !CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE */ #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET void *memset(void *s, int c, size_t n); @@ -77,6 +79,11 @@ int strcmp(const char *cs, const char *ct); #define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len) #define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len) #define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n) + +#ifndef __NO_FORTIFY +#define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */ +#endif + #endif #define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY_MCSAFE 1 diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_32.c index cad12634d6bd..2eab7d0bfedd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_32.c @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ __visible void *memcpy(void *to, const void *from, size_t n) { -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USE_3DNOW +#if defined(CONFIG_X86_USE_3DNOW) && !defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) return __memcpy3d(to, from, n); #else return __memcpy(to, from, n); diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h index 7439d83eaa33..96f5a5fd0377 100644 --- a/include/linux/string.h +++ b/include/linux/string.h @@ -193,4 +193,204 @@ static inline const char *kbasename(const char *path) return tail ? tail + 1 : path; } +#define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __attribute__((gnu_inline)) +#define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x) + +void fortify_panic(const char *name) __noreturn __cold; +void __read_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter"); +void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of object passed as 2nd parameter"); +void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter"); + +#if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) +__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); + if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) + return __builtin_strcpy(p, q); + if (strscpy(p, q, p_size < q_size ? p_size : q_size) < 0) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return p; +} + +__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size) + __write_overflow(); + if (p_size < size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); +} + +__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + if (p_size == (size_t)-1) + return __builtin_strcat(p, q); + if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return p; +} + +__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p) +{ + __kernel_size_t ret; + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + if (p_size == (size_t)-1) + return __builtin_strlen(p); + ret = strnlen(p, p_size); + if (p_size <= ret) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return ret; +} + +extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen); +__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + __kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size); + if (p_size <= ret && maxlen != ret) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return ret; +} + +/* defined after fortified strlen to reuse it */ +extern size_t __real_strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t) __RENAME(strlcpy); +__FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size) +{ + size_t ret; + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); + if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) + return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size); + ret = strlen(q); + if (size) { + size_t len = (ret >= size) ? size - 1 : ret; + if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && len >= p_size) + __write_overflow(); + if (len >= p_size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + __builtin_memcpy(p, q, len); + p[len] = '\0'; + } + return ret; +} + +/* defined after fortified strlen and strnlen to reuse them */ +__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) +{ + size_t p_len, copy_len; + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); + if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) + return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count); + p_len = strlen(p); + copy_len = strnlen(q, count); + if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1) + fortify_panic(__func__); + __builtin_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); + p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0'; + return p; +} + +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size) + __write_overflow(); + if (p_size < size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return __builtin_memset(p, c, size); +} + +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); + if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { + if (p_size < size) + __write_overflow(); + if (q_size < size) + __read_overflow2(); + } + if (p_size < size || q_size < size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size); +} + +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); + if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { + if (p_size < size) + __write_overflow(); + if (q_size < size) + __read_overflow2(); + } + if (p_size < size || q_size < size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return __builtin_memmove(p, q, size); +} + +extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan); +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size) + __read_overflow(); + if (p_size < size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return __real_memscan(p, c, size); +} + +__FORTIFY_INLINE int memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); + if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) { + if (p_size < size) + __read_overflow(); + if (q_size < size) + __read_overflow2(); + } + if (p_size < size || q_size < size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return __builtin_memcmp(p, q, size); +} + +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size) + __read_overflow(); + if (p_size < size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return __builtin_memchr(p, c, size); +} + +void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv); +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void *p, int c, size_t size) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size) + __read_overflow(); + if (p_size < size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size); +} + +extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup); +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size) + __read_overflow(); + if (p_size < size) + fortify_panic(__func__); + return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp); +} +#endif + #endif /* _LINUX_STRING_H_ */ diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c index 1c1fc9187b05..ebbb99c775bd 100644 --- a/lib/string.c +++ b/lib/string.c @@ -978,3 +978,10 @@ char *strreplace(char *s, char old, char new) return s; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(strreplace); + +void fortify_panic(const char *name) +{ + pr_emerg("detected buffer overflow in %s\n", name); + BUG(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(fortify_panic); diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index d540bfe73190..e8e449444e65 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -163,6 +163,13 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN been removed. This config is intended to be used only while trying to find such users. +config FORTIFY_SOURCE + bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows" + depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE + help + Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions + where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes. + config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary" help -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 077d2ba519b2e8bf1abd80cbade699b1de42cafe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Micay Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 17:28:12 -0400 Subject: replace incorrect strscpy use in FORTIFY_SOURCE Using strscpy was wrong because FORTIFY_SOURCE is passing the maximum possible size of the outermost object, but strscpy defines the count parameter as the exact buffer size, so this could copy past the end of the source. This would still be wrong with the planned usage of __builtin_object_size(p, 1) for intra-object overflow checks since it's the maximum possible size of the specified object with no guarantee of it being that large. Reuse of the fortified functions like this currently makes the runtime error reporting less precise but that can be improved later on. Noticed by Dave Jones and KASAN. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay Acked-by: Kees Cook Reported-by: Dave Jones Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/string.h | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux/string.h') diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h index 96f5a5fd0377..049866760e8b 100644 --- a/include/linux/string.h +++ b/include/linux/string.h @@ -202,17 +202,6 @@ void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter"); #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) -__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q) -{ - size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); - size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) - return __builtin_strcpy(p, q); - if (strscpy(p, q, p_size < q_size ? p_size : q_size) < 0) - fortify_panic(__func__); - return p; -} - __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) { size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); @@ -391,6 +380,18 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) fortify_panic(__func__); return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp); } + +/* defined after fortified strlen and memcpy to reuse them */ +__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q) +{ + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); + size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); + if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) + return __builtin_strcpy(p, q); + memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1); + return p; +} + #endif #endif /* _LINUX_STRING_H_ */ -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317