From 31c9590ae468478fe47dc0f5f0d3562b2f69450e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2020 21:06:23 -0400 Subject: SUNRPC: Add "@len" parameter to gss_unwrap() Refactor: This is a pre-requisite to fixing the client-side ralign computation in gss_unwrap_resp_priv(). The length value is passed in explicitly rather that as the value of buf->len. This will subsequently allow gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1() to compute a slack and align value, instead of computing it in gss_unwrap_resp_priv(). Fixes: 35e77d21baa0 ("SUNRPC: Add rpc_auth::au_ralign field") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 4 ++-- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 8 ++++---- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c | 3 ++- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 8 ++------ 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c index 25fbd8d9de74..7885f37e3688 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c @@ -2043,9 +2043,9 @@ gss_unwrap_resp_priv(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred, offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base; if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; - rcv_buf->len = offset + opaque_len; - maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, rcv_buf); + maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, + offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf); if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &cred->cr_flags); if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c index 6f2d30d7b766..e7180da1fc6a 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c @@ -851,8 +851,8 @@ out_err: } u32 -gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, - u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip) +gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len, + struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip) { struct xdr_buf subbuf; u32 ret = 0; @@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, /* create a segment skipping the header and leaving out the checksum */ xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, - (buf->len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - + (len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength)); nblocks = (subbuf.len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, goto out_err; /* Get the packet's hmac value */ - ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength, + ret = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, len - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength, pkt_hmac, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength); if (ret) goto out_err; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c index 6c1920eed771..c7589e35d5d9 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -261,7 +261,8 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, } static u32 -gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) +gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, + struct xdr_buf *buf) { int signalg; int sealalg; @@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr, - buf->len - offset)) + len - offset)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) || @@ -324,6 +325,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0)) return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + buf->len = len; if (kctx->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher; int err; @@ -376,7 +378,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start; memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len); buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start); - buf->len -= (data_start - orig_start); + buf->len = len - (data_start - orig_start); if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; @@ -486,7 +488,8 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, } static u32 -gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) +gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, + struct xdr_buf *buf) { time64_t now; u8 *ptr; @@ -532,7 +535,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) if (rrc != 0) rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc); - err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, + err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, len, buf, &headskip, &tailskip); if (err) return GSS_S_FAILURE; @@ -542,7 +545,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) * it against the original */ err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, - buf->len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip, + len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip, decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN); if (err) { dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err); @@ -568,14 +571,14 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) * Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available * head buffer space rather than that actually occupied. */ - movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, buf->len); + movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len); movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; if (offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > buf->head[0].iov_len) return GSS_S_FAILURE; memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen); buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; - buf->len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; + buf->len = len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; /* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */ buf->len -= ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip; @@ -603,7 +606,8 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, } u32 -gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) +gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, + int len, struct xdr_buf *buf) { struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; @@ -613,9 +617,9 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC: - return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf); + return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, len, buf); case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: - return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf); + return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, len, buf); } } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c index db550bfc2642..69316ab1b9fa 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c @@ -411,10 +411,11 @@ gss_wrap(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 gss_unwrap(struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, int offset, + int len, struct xdr_buf *buf) { return ctx_id->mech_type->gm_ops - ->gss_unwrap(ctx_id, offset, buf); + ->gss_unwrap(ctx_id, offset, len, buf); } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index 54ae5be62f6a..d0a2f084e5a4 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ static int unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx) { u32 priv_len, maj_stat; - int pad, saved_len, remaining_len, offset; + int pad, remaining_len, offset; clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags); @@ -954,12 +954,8 @@ unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gs buf->len -= pad; fix_priv_head(buf, pad); - /* Maybe it would be better to give gss_unwrap a length parameter: */ - saved_len = buf->len; - buf->len = priv_len; - maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, buf); + maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, priv_len, buf); pad = priv_len - buf->len; - buf->len = saved_len; buf->len -= pad; /* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries. * In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From a7e429a6fa6d612d1dacde96c885dc1bb4a9f400 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2020 14:38:19 -0400 Subject: SUNRPC: Fix GSS privacy computation of auth->au_ralign When the au_ralign field was added to gss_unwrap_resp_priv, the wrong calculation was used. Setting au_rslack == au_ralign is probably correct for kerberos_v1 privacy, but kerberos_v2 privacy adds additional GSS data after the clear text RPC message. au_ralign needs to be smaller than au_rslack in that fairly common case. When xdr_buf_trim() is restored to gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(), it does exactly what I feared it would: it trims off part of the clear text RPC message. However, that's because rpc_prepare_reply_pages() does not set up the rq_rcv_buf's tail correctly because au_ralign is too large. Fixing the au_ralign computation also corrects the alignment of rq_rcv_buf->pages so that the client does not have to shift reply data payloads after they are received. Fixes: 35e77d21baa0 ("SUNRPC: Add rpc_auth::au_ralign field") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h | 1 + net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 8 +++----- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h index e9a79518d652..bc07e51f20d1 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct gss_ctx { struct gss_api_mech *mech_type; void *internal_ctx_id; + unsigned int slack, align; }; #define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ((struct xdr_netobj) 0) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c index 7885f37e3688..ac5cac0dd24b 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c @@ -2032,7 +2032,6 @@ gss_unwrap_resp_priv(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred, struct xdr_buf *rcv_buf = &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf; struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_rcv_buf.head; struct rpc_auth *auth = cred->cr_auth; - unsigned int savedlen = rcv_buf->len; u32 offset, opaque_len, maj_stat; __be32 *p; @@ -2059,10 +2058,9 @@ gss_unwrap_resp_priv(struct rpc_task *task, struct rpc_cred *cred, */ xdr_init_decode(xdr, rcv_buf, p, rqstp); - auth->au_rslack = auth->au_verfsize + 2 + - XDR_QUADLEN(savedlen - rcv_buf->len); - auth->au_ralign = auth->au_verfsize + 2 + - XDR_QUADLEN(savedlen - rcv_buf->len); + auth->au_rslack = auth->au_verfsize + 2 + ctx->gc_gss_ctx->slack; + auth->au_ralign = auth->au_verfsize + 2 + ctx->gc_gss_ctx->align; + return 0; unwrap_failed: trace_rpcgss_unwrap_failed(task); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c index c7589e35d5d9..4905652e7567 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -262,7 +262,8 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, static u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, - struct xdr_buf *buf) + struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack, + unsigned int *align) { int signalg; int sealalg; @@ -280,6 +281,7 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen; int crypt_offset; u8 *cksumkey; + unsigned int saved_len = buf->len; dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n"); @@ -383,6 +385,10 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize)) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + /* slack must include room for krb5 padding */ + *slack = XDR_QUADLEN(saved_len - buf->len); + /* The GSS blob always precedes the RPC message payload */ + *align = *slack; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } @@ -489,7 +495,8 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, static u32 gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, - struct xdr_buf *buf) + struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack, + unsigned int *align) { time64_t now; u8 *ptr; @@ -583,6 +590,8 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, /* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */ buf->len -= ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip; + *align = XDR_QUADLEN(GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); + *slack = *align + XDR_QUADLEN(ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } @@ -617,9 +626,11 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC: - return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, len, buf); + return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, len, buf, + &gctx->slack, &gctx->align); case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: - return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, len, buf); + return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, len, buf, + &gctx->slack, &gctx->align); } } -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 0a8e7b7d08466b5fc52f8e96070acc116d82a8bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 17:36:22 -0400 Subject: SUNRPC: Revert 241b1f419f0e ("SUNRPC: Remove xdr_buf_trim()") I've noticed that when krb5i or krb5p security is in use, retransmitted requests are missing the server's duplicate reply cache. The computed checksum on the retransmitted request does not match the cached checksum, resulting in the server performing the retransmitted request again instead of returning the cached reply. The assumptions made when removing xdr_buf_trim() were not correct. In the send paths, the upper layer has already set the segment lengths correctly, and shorting the buffer's content is simply a matter of reducing buf->len. xdr_buf_trim() is the right answer in the receive/unwrap path on both the client and the server. The buffer segment lengths have to be shortened one-by-one. On the server side in particular, head.iov_len needs to be updated correctly to enable nfsd_cache_csum() to work correctly. The simple buf->len computation doesn't do that, and that results in checksumming stale data in the buffer. The problem isn't noticed until there's significant instability of the RPC transport. At that point, the reliability of retransmit detection on the server becomes crucial. Fixes: 241b1f419f0e ("SUNRPC: Remove xdr_buf_trim()") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h | 1 + net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 7 +++---- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 2 +- net/sunrpc/xdr.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h index 01bb41908c93..22c207b2425f 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ xdr_adjust_iovec(struct kvec *iov, __be32 *p) extern void xdr_shift_buf(struct xdr_buf *, size_t); extern void xdr_buf_from_iov(struct kvec *, struct xdr_buf *); extern int xdr_buf_subsegment(struct xdr_buf *, struct xdr_buf *, unsigned int, unsigned int); +extern void xdr_buf_trim(struct xdr_buf *, unsigned int); extern int read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *, unsigned int, void *, unsigned int); extern int write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *, unsigned int, void *, unsigned int); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c index 4905652e7567..cf0fd170ac18 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -580,15 +580,14 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, */ movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len); movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; - if (offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > - buf->head[0].iov_len) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; + BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > + buf->head[0].iov_len); memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen); buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; buf->len = len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; /* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */ - buf->len -= ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip; + xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); *align = XDR_QUADLEN(GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); *slack = *align + XDR_QUADLEN(ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index d0a2f084e5a4..50d93c49ef1a 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ unwrap_integ_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct g if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq) goto out; /* trim off the mic and padding at the end before returning */ - buf->len -= 4 + round_up_to_quad(mic.len); + xdr_buf_trim(buf, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) + 4); stat = 0; out: kfree(mic.data); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xdr.c b/net/sunrpc/xdr.c index 15b58c5144f9..6f7d82fb1eb0 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xdr.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xdr.c @@ -1150,6 +1150,47 @@ xdr_buf_subsegment(struct xdr_buf *buf, struct xdr_buf *subbuf, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xdr_buf_subsegment); +/** + * xdr_buf_trim - lop at most "len" bytes off the end of "buf" + * @buf: buf to be trimmed + * @len: number of bytes to reduce "buf" by + * + * Trim an xdr_buf by the given number of bytes by fixing up the lengths. Note + * that it's possible that we'll trim less than that amount if the xdr_buf is + * too small, or if (for instance) it's all in the head and the parser has + * already read too far into it. + */ +void xdr_buf_trim(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int len) +{ + size_t cur; + unsigned int trim = len; + + if (buf->tail[0].iov_len) { + cur = min_t(size_t, buf->tail[0].iov_len, trim); + buf->tail[0].iov_len -= cur; + trim -= cur; + if (!trim) + goto fix_len; + } + + if (buf->page_len) { + cur = min_t(unsigned int, buf->page_len, trim); + buf->page_len -= cur; + trim -= cur; + if (!trim) + goto fix_len; + } + + if (buf->head[0].iov_len) { + cur = min_t(size_t, buf->head[0].iov_len, trim); + buf->head[0].iov_len -= cur; + trim -= cur; + } +fix_len: + buf->len -= (len - trim); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xdr_buf_trim); + static void __read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *subbuf, void *obj, unsigned int len) { unsigned int this_len; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 18f02ad19e2c2a1d9e1d55a4e1c0cbf51419151c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiyu Yang Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2020 11:35:15 +0800 Subject: bpf: Fix sk_psock refcnt leak when receiving message tcp_bpf_recvmsg() invokes sk_psock_get(), which returns a reference of the specified sk_psock object to "psock" with increased refcnt. When tcp_bpf_recvmsg() returns, local variable "psock" becomes invalid, so the refcount should be decreased to keep refcount balanced. The reference counting issue happens in several exception handling paths of tcp_bpf_recvmsg(). When those error scenarios occur such as "flags" includes MSG_ERRQUEUE, the function forgets to decrease the refcnt increased by sk_psock_get(), causing a refcnt leak. Fix this issue by calling sk_psock_put() or pulling up the error queue read handling when those error scenarios occur. Fixes: e7a5f1f1cd000 ("bpf/sockmap: Read psock ingress_msg before sk_receive_queue") Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang Signed-off-by: Xin Tan Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1587872115-42805-1-git-send-email-xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn --- net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c index 5a05327f97c1..ff96466ea6da 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c @@ -262,14 +262,17 @@ static int tcp_bpf_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, struct sk_psock *psock; int copied, ret; + if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)) + return inet_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len); + psock = sk_psock_get(sk); if (unlikely(!psock)) return tcp_recvmsg(sk, msg, len, nonblock, flags, addr_len); - if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)) - return inet_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len); if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) && - sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) + sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) { + sk_psock_put(sk, psock); return tcp_recvmsg(sk, msg, len, nonblock, flags, addr_len); + } lock_sock(sk); msg_bytes_ready: copied = __tcp_bpf_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len, flags); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 3e104c23816220919ea1b3fd93fabe363c67c484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Fastabend Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 10:21:23 -0700 Subject: bpf, sockmap: msg_pop_data can incorrecty set an sge length When sk_msg_pop() is called where the pop operation is working on the end of a sge element and there is no additional trailing data and there _is_ data in front of pop, like the following case, |____________a_____________|__pop__| We have out of order operations where we incorrectly set the pop variable so that instead of zero'ing pop we incorrectly leave it untouched, effectively. This can cause later logic to shift the buffers around believing it should pop extra space. The result is we have 'popped' more data then we expected potentially breaking program logic. It took us a while to hit this case because typically we pop headers which seem to rarely be at the end of a scatterlist elements but we can't rely on this. Fixes: 7246d8ed4dcce ("bpf: helper to pop data from messages") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158861288359.14306.7654891716919968144.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower --- net/core/filter.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 7d6ceaa54d21..5cc9276f1023 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -2590,8 +2590,8 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, } pop = 0; } else if (pop >= sge->length - a) { - sge->length = a; pop -= (sge->length - a); + sge->length = a; } } -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 81aabbb9fb7b4b1efd073b62f0505d3adad442f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Fastabend Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 10:21:44 -0700 Subject: bpf, sockmap: bpf_tcp_ingress needs to subtract bytes from sg.size In bpf_tcp_ingress we used apply_bytes to subtract bytes from sg.size which is used to track total bytes in a message. But this is not correct because apply_bytes is itself modified in the main loop doing the mem_charge. Then at the end of this we have sg.size incorrectly set and out of sync with actual sk values. Then we can get a splat if we try to cork the data later and again try to redirect the msg to ingress. To fix instead of trying to track msg.size do the easy thing and include it as part of the sk_msg_xfer logic so that when the msg is moved the sg.size is always correct. To reproduce the below users will need ingress + cork and hit an error path that will then try to 'free' the skmsg. [ 173.699981] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120 [ 173.699987] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000008 by task test_sockmap/5317 [ 173.700000] CPU: 2 PID: 5317 Comm: test_sockmap Tainted: G I 5.7.0-rc1+ #43 [ 173.700005] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [ 173.700009] Call Trace: [ 173.700021] dump_stack+0x8e/0xcb [ 173.700029] ? sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120 [ 173.700034] ? sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120 [ 173.700042] __kasan_report+0x102/0x15f [ 173.700052] ? sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120 [ 173.700060] kasan_report+0x32/0x50 [ 173.700070] sk_msg_free_elem+0xdd/0x120 [ 173.700080] __sk_msg_free+0x87/0x150 [ 173.700094] tcp_bpf_send_verdict+0x179/0x4f0 [ 173.700109] tcp_bpf_sendpage+0x3ce/0x5d0 Fixes: 604326b41a6fb ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158861290407.14306.5327773422227552482.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower --- include/linux/skmsg.h | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c | 1 - 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h index 8a709f63c5e5..ad31c9fb7158 100644 --- a/include/linux/skmsg.h +++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h @@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ static inline void sk_msg_xfer(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src, dst->sg.data[which] = src->sg.data[which]; dst->sg.data[which].length = size; dst->sg.size += size; + src->sg.size -= size; src->sg.data[which].length -= size; src->sg.data[which].offset += size; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c index ff96466ea6da..629aaa9a1eb9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c @@ -125,7 +125,6 @@ static int bpf_tcp_ingress(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, if (!ret) { msg->sg.start = i; - msg->sg.size -= apply_bytes; sk_psock_queue_msg(psock, tmp); sk_psock_data_ready(sk, psock); } else { -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 09454fd0a4ce23cb3d8af65066c91a1bf27120dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maciej Żenczykowski Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 11:57:23 -0700 Subject: Revert "ipv6: add mtu lock check in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This reverts commit 19bda36c4299ce3d7e5bce10bebe01764a655a6d: | ipv6: add mtu lock check in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu | | Prior to this patch, ipv6 didn't do mtu lock check in ip6_update_pmtu. | It leaded to that mtu lock doesn't really work when receiving the pkt | of ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG. | | This patch is to add mtu lock check in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu just as ipv4 | did in __ip_rt_update_pmtu. The above reasoning is incorrect. IPv6 *requires* icmp based pmtu to work. There's already a comment to this effect elsewhere in the kernel: $ git grep -p -B1 -A3 'RTAX_MTU lock' net/ipv6/route.c=4813= static int rt6_mtu_change_route(struct fib6_info *f6i, void *p_arg) ... /* In IPv6 pmtu discovery is not optional, so that RTAX_MTU lock cannot disable it. We still use this lock to block changes caused by addrconf/ndisc. */ This reverts to the pre-4.9 behaviour. Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Willem de Bruijn Cc: Xin Long Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski Fixes: 19bda36c4299 ("ipv6: add mtu lock check in __ip6_rt_update_pmtu") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/route.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index 8d418038fe32..ff847a324220 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -2722,8 +2722,10 @@ static void __ip6_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, const struct sock *sk, const struct in6_addr *daddr, *saddr; struct rt6_info *rt6 = (struct rt6_info *)dst; - if (dst_metric_locked(dst, RTAX_MTU)) - return; + /* Note: do *NOT* check dst_metric_locked(dst, RTAX_MTU) + * IPv6 pmtu discovery isn't optional, so 'mtu lock' cannot disable it. + * [see also comment in rt6_mtu_change_route()] + */ if (iph) { daddr = &iph->daddr; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 7d14b0d2b9b317cfc14161143e2006b95a5da9b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 18:53:24 +0200 Subject: mptcp: set correct vfs info for subflows When a subflow is created via mptcp_subflow_create_socket(), a new 'struct socket' is allocated, with a new i_ino value. When inspecting TCP sockets via the procfs and or the diag interface, the above ones are not related to the process owning the MPTCP master socket, even if they are a logical part of it ('ss -p' shows an empty process field) Additionally, subflows created by the path manager get the uid/gid from the running workqueue. Subflows are part of the owning MPTCP master socket, let's adjust the vfs info to reflect this. After this patch, 'ss' correctly displays subflows as belonging to the msk socket creator. Fixes: 2303f994b3e1 ("mptcp: Associate MPTCP context with TCP socket") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mptcp/subflow.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/subflow.c b/net/mptcp/subflow.c index 67a4e35d4838..4931a29a6f08 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/subflow.c +++ b/net/mptcp/subflow.c @@ -1012,6 +1012,16 @@ int mptcp_subflow_create_socket(struct sock *sk, struct socket **new_sock) if (err) return err; + /* the newly created socket really belongs to the owning MPTCP master + * socket, even if for additional subflows the allocation is performed + * by a kernel workqueue. Adjust inode references, so that the + * procfs/diag interaces really show this one belonging to the correct + * user. + */ + SOCK_INODE(sf)->i_ino = SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_ino; + SOCK_INODE(sf)->i_uid = SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_uid; + SOCK_INODE(sf)->i_gid = SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_gid; + subflow = mptcp_subflow_ctx(sf->sk); pr_debug("subflow=%p", subflow); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From dd912306ff008891c82cd9f63e8181e47a9cb2fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cong Wang Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 12:19:03 -0700 Subject: net: fix a potential recursive NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE syzbot managed to trigger a recursive NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE event between bonding master and slave. I managed to find a reproducer for this: ip li set bond0 up ifenslave bond0 eth0 brctl addbr br0 ethtool -K eth0 lro off brctl addif br0 bond0 ip li set br0 up When a NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE event is triggered on a bonding slave, it captures this and calls bond_compute_features() to fixup its master's and other slaves' features. However, when syncing with its lower devices by netdev_sync_lower_features() this event is triggered again on slaves when the LRO feature fails to change, so it goes back and forth recursively until the kernel stack is exhausted. Commit 17b85d29e82c intentionally lets __netdev_update_features() return -1 for such a failure case, so we have to just rely on the existing check inside netdev_sync_lower_features() and skip NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE event only for this specific failure case. Fixes: fd867d51f889 ("net/core: generic support for disabling netdev features down stack") Reported-by: syzbot+e73ceacfd8560cc8a3ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+c2fb6f9ddcea95ba49b5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jarod Wilson Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Jann Horn Reviewed-by: Jay Vosburgh Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dev.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 522288177bbd..6d327b7aa813 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -8907,11 +8907,13 @@ static void netdev_sync_lower_features(struct net_device *upper, netdev_dbg(upper, "Disabling feature %pNF on lower dev %s.\n", &feature, lower->name); lower->wanted_features &= ~feature; - netdev_update_features(lower); + __netdev_update_features(lower); if (unlikely(lower->features & feature)) netdev_WARN(upper, "failed to disable %pNF on %s!\n", &feature, lower->name); + else + netdev_features_change(lower); } } } -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From cc4de047b33be247f9c8150d3e496743a49642b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kelly Littlepage Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 19:58:46 +0000 Subject: net: tcp: fix rx timestamp behavior for tcp_recvmsg The stated intent of the original commit is to is to "return the timestamp corresponding to the highest sequence number data returned." The current implementation returns the timestamp for the last byte of the last fully read skb, which is not necessarily the last byte in the recv buffer. This patch converts behavior to the original definition, and to the behavior of the previous draft versions of commit 98aaa913b4ed ("tcp: Extend SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE to TCP recvmsg") which also match this behavior. Fixes: 98aaa913b4ed ("tcp: Extend SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE to TCP recvmsg") Co-developed-by: Iris Liu Signed-off-by: Iris Liu Signed-off-by: Kelly Littlepage Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 6d87de434377..e72bd651d21a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2154,13 +2154,15 @@ skip_copy: tp->urg_data = 0; tcp_fast_path_check(sk); } - if (used + offset < skb->len) - continue; if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp) { tcp_update_recv_tstamps(skb, &tss); cmsg_flags |= 2; } + + if (used + offset < skb->len) + continue; + if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_FIN) goto found_fin_ok; if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 57644431a6c2faac5d754ebd35780cf43a531b1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 19:28:34 +0200 Subject: net: ipv4: really enforce backoff for redirects In commit b406472b5ad7 ("net: ipv4: avoid mixed n_redirects and rate_tokens usage") I missed the fact that a 0 'rate_tokens' will bypass the backoff algorithm. Since rate_tokens is cleared after a redirect silence, and never incremented on redirects, if the host keeps receiving packets requiring redirect it will reply ignoring the backoff. Additionally, the 'rate_last' field will be updated with the cadence of the ingress packet requiring redirect. If that rate is high enough, that will prevent the host from generating any other kind of ICMP messages The check for a zero 'rate_tokens' value was likely a shortcut to avoid the more complex backoff algorithm after a redirect silence period. Address the issue checking for 'n_redirects' instead, which is incremented on successful redirect, and does not interfere with other ICMP replies. Fixes: b406472b5ad7 ("net: ipv4: avoid mixed n_redirects and rate_tokens usage") Reported-and-tested-by: Colin Walters Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 788c69d9bfe0..fa829f31a3f5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ void ip_rt_send_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb) /* Check for load limit; set rate_last to the latest sent * redirect. */ - if (peer->rate_tokens == 0 || + if (peer->n_redirects == 0 || time_after(jiffies, (peer->rate_last + (ip_rt_redirect_load << peer->n_redirects)))) { -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 090e28b229af92dc5b40786ca673999d59e73056 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zefan Li Date: Sat, 9 May 2020 11:32:10 +0800 Subject: netprio_cgroup: Fix unlimited memory leak of v2 cgroups If systemd is configured to use hybrid mode which enables the use of both cgroup v1 and v2, systemd will create new cgroup on both the default root (v2) and netprio_cgroup hierarchy (v1) for a new session and attach task to the two cgroups. If the task does some network thing then the v2 cgroup can never be freed after the session exited. One of our machines ran into OOM due to this memory leak. In the scenario described above when sk_alloc() is called cgroup_sk_alloc() thought it's in v2 mode, so it stores the cgroup pointer in sk->sk_cgrp_data and increments the cgroup refcnt, but then sock_update_netprioidx() thought it's in v1 mode, so it stores netprioidx value in sk->sk_cgrp_data, so the cgroup refcnt will never be freed. Currently we do the mode switch when someone writes to the ifpriomap cgroup control file. The easiest fix is to also do the switch when a task is attached to a new cgroup. Fixes: bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup") Reported-by: Yang Yingliang Tested-by: Yang Yingliang Signed-off-by: Zefan Li Acked-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/core/netprio_cgroup.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c b/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c index 8881dd943dd0..9bd4cab7d510 100644 --- a/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c +++ b/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c @@ -236,6 +236,8 @@ static void net_prio_attach(struct cgroup_taskset *tset) struct task_struct *p; struct cgroup_subsys_state *css; + cgroup_sk_alloc_disable(); + cgroup_taskset_for_each(p, css, tset) { void *v = (void *)(unsigned long)css->id; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 2c407aca64977ede9b9f35158e919773cae2082f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 23:30:48 +0200 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: avoid gcc-10 zero-length-bounds warning gcc-10 warns around a suspicious access to an empty struct member: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: In function '__nf_conntrack_alloc': net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1522:9: warning: array subscript 0 is outside the bounds of an interior zero-length array 'u8[0]' {aka 'unsigned char[0]'} [-Wzero-length-bounds] 1522 | memset(&ct->__nfct_init_offset[0], 0, | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In file included from net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:37: include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h:90:5: note: while referencing '__nfct_init_offset' 90 | u8 __nfct_init_offset[0]; | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The code is correct but a bit unusual. Rework it slightly in a way that does not trigger the warning, using an empty struct instead of an empty array. There are probably more elegant ways to do this, but this is the smallest change. Fixes: c41884ce0562 ("netfilter: conntrack: avoid zeroing timer") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h index 9f551f3b69c6..90690e37a56f 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ struct nf_conn { struct hlist_node nat_bysource; #endif /* all members below initialized via memset */ - u8 __nfct_init_offset[0]; + struct { } __nfct_init_offset; /* If we were expected by an expectation, this will be it */ struct nf_conn *master; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index c4582eb71766..0173398f4ced 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -1519,9 +1519,9 @@ __nf_conntrack_alloc(struct net *net, ct->status = 0; ct->timeout = 0; write_pnet(&ct->ct_net, net); - memset(&ct->__nfct_init_offset[0], 0, + memset(&ct->__nfct_init_offset, 0, offsetof(struct nf_conn, proto) - - offsetof(struct nf_conn, __nfct_init_offset[0])); + offsetof(struct nf_conn, __nfct_init_offset)); nf_ct_zone_add(ct, zone); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 31e9a7f353526bbe53165a292f8ea9695ead3168 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: NeilBrown Date: Sat, 9 May 2020 07:25:11 +1000 Subject: SUNRPC: fix use-after-free in rpc_free_client_work() Parts of rpc_free_client() were recently moved to a separate rpc_free_clent_work(). This introduced a use-after-free as rpc_clnt_remove_pipedir() calls rpc_net_ns(), and that uses clnt->cl_xprt which has already been freed. So move the call to xprt_put() after the call to rpc_clnt_remove_pipedir(). Reported-by: syzbot+22b5ef302c7c40d94ea8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 7c4310ff5642 ("SUNRPC: defer slow parts of rpc_free_client() to a workqueue.") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c index 8350d3a2e9a7..8d3972ea688b 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c @@ -890,6 +890,7 @@ static void rpc_free_client_work(struct work_struct *work) */ rpc_clnt_debugfs_unregister(clnt); rpc_clnt_remove_pipedir(clnt); + xprt_put(rcu_dereference_raw(clnt->cl_xprt)); kfree(clnt); rpciod_down(); @@ -907,7 +908,6 @@ rpc_free_client(struct rpc_clnt *clnt) rpc_unregister_client(clnt); rpc_free_iostats(clnt->cl_metrics); clnt->cl_metrics = NULL; - xprt_put(rcu_dereference_raw(clnt->cl_xprt)); xprt_iter_destroy(&clnt->cl_xpi); put_cred(clnt->cl_cred); rpc_free_clid(clnt); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 2c8897953f3b2ff5498f3f275708a742bfcdbc24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Blakey Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 14:24:39 +0300 Subject: netfilter: flowtable: Add pending bit for offload work Gc step can queue offloaded flow del work or stats work. Those work items can race each other and a flow could be freed before the stats work is executed and querying it. To avoid that, add a pending bit that if a work exists for a flow don't queue another work for it. This will also avoid adding multiple stats works in case stats work didn't complete but gc step started again. Signed-off-by: Paul Blakey Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- include/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table.h | 1 + net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table.h index 6bf69652f57d..c54a7f707e50 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table.h @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ enum nf_flow_flags { NF_FLOW_HW_DYING, NF_FLOW_HW_DEAD, NF_FLOW_HW_REFRESH, + NF_FLOW_HW_PENDING, }; enum flow_offload_type { diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c index e3b099c14eff..3d4ca62c81f9 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c @@ -817,6 +817,7 @@ static void flow_offload_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) WARN_ON_ONCE(1); } + clear_bit(NF_FLOW_HW_PENDING, &offload->flow->flags); kfree(offload); } @@ -831,9 +832,14 @@ nf_flow_offload_work_alloc(struct nf_flowtable *flowtable, { struct flow_offload_work *offload; + if (test_and_set_bit(NF_FLOW_HW_PENDING, &flow->flags)) + return NULL; + offload = kmalloc(sizeof(struct flow_offload_work), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!offload) + if (!offload) { + clear_bit(NF_FLOW_HW_PENDING, &flow->flags); return NULL; + } offload->cmd = cmd; offload->flow = flow; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From c410bf01933e5e09d142c66c3df9ad470a7eec13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 14:54:34 +0100 Subject: rxrpc: Fix the excessive initial retransmission timeout rxrpc currently uses a fixed 4s retransmission timeout until the RTT is sufficiently sampled. This can cause problems with some fileservers with calls to the cache manager in the afs filesystem being dropped from the fileserver because a packet goes missing and the retransmission timeout is greater than the call expiry timeout. Fix this by: (1) Copying the RTT/RTO calculation code from Linux's TCP implementation and altering it to fit rxrpc. (2) Altering the various users of the RTT to make use of the new SRTT value. (3) Replacing the use of rxrpc_resend_timeout to use the calculated RTO value instead (which is needed in jiffies), along with a backoff. Notes: (1) rxrpc provides RTT samples by matching the serial numbers on outgoing DATA packets that have the RXRPC_REQUEST_ACK set and PING ACK packets against the reference serial number in incoming REQUESTED ACK and PING-RESPONSE ACK packets. (2) Each packet that is transmitted on an rxrpc connection gets a new per-connection serial number, even for retransmissions, so an ACK can be cross-referenced to a specific trigger packet. This allows RTT information to be drawn from retransmitted DATA packets also. (3) rxrpc maintains the RTT/RTO state on the rxrpc_peer record rather than on an rxrpc_call because many RPC calls won't live long enough to generate more than one sample. (4) The calculated SRTT value is in units of 8ths of a microsecond rather than nanoseconds. The (S)RTT and RTO values are displayed in /proc/net/rxrpc/peers. Fixes: 17926a79320a ([AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both"") Signed-off-by: David Howells --- fs/afs/fs_probe.c | 18 ++-- fs/afs/vl_probe.c | 18 ++-- include/net/af_rxrpc.h | 2 +- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 17 ++-- net/rxrpc/Makefile | 1 + net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 25 ++++-- net/rxrpc/call_accept.c | 2 +- net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 22 ++--- net/rxrpc/input.c | 6 +- net/rxrpc/misc.c | 5 -- net/rxrpc/output.c | 9 +- net/rxrpc/peer_event.c | 46 ---------- net/rxrpc/peer_object.c | 12 +-- net/rxrpc/proc.c | 8 +- net/rxrpc/rtt.c | 195 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 26 ++---- net/rxrpc/sysctl.c | 9 -- 17 files changed, 266 insertions(+), 155 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/rxrpc/rtt.c (limited to 'net') diff --git a/fs/afs/fs_probe.c b/fs/afs/fs_probe.c index a587767b6ae1..237352d3cb53 100644 --- a/fs/afs/fs_probe.c +++ b/fs/afs/fs_probe.c @@ -32,9 +32,8 @@ void afs_fileserver_probe_result(struct afs_call *call) struct afs_server *server = call->server; unsigned int server_index = call->server_index; unsigned int index = call->addr_ix; - unsigned int rtt = UINT_MAX; + unsigned int rtt_us; bool have_result = false; - u64 _rtt; int ret = call->error; _enter("%pU,%u", &server->uuid, index); @@ -93,15 +92,9 @@ responded: } } - /* Get the RTT and scale it to fit into a 32-bit value that represents - * over a minute of time so that we can access it with one instruction - * on a 32-bit system. - */ - _rtt = rxrpc_kernel_get_rtt(call->net->socket, call->rxcall); - _rtt /= 64; - rtt = (_rtt > UINT_MAX) ? UINT_MAX : _rtt; - if (rtt < server->probe.rtt) { - server->probe.rtt = rtt; + rtt_us = rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt(call->net->socket, call->rxcall); + if (rtt_us < server->probe.rtt) { + server->probe.rtt = rtt_us; alist->preferred = index; have_result = true; } @@ -113,8 +106,7 @@ out: spin_unlock(&server->probe_lock); _debug("probe [%u][%u] %pISpc rtt=%u ret=%d", - server_index, index, &alist->addrs[index].transport, - (unsigned int)rtt, ret); + server_index, index, &alist->addrs[index].transport, rtt_us, ret); have_result |= afs_fs_probe_done(server); if (have_result) diff --git a/fs/afs/vl_probe.c b/fs/afs/vl_probe.c index 858498cc1b05..e3aa013c2177 100644 --- a/fs/afs/vl_probe.c +++ b/fs/afs/vl_probe.c @@ -31,10 +31,9 @@ void afs_vlserver_probe_result(struct afs_call *call) struct afs_addr_list *alist = call->alist; struct afs_vlserver *server = call->vlserver; unsigned int server_index = call->server_index; + unsigned int rtt_us = 0; unsigned int index = call->addr_ix; - unsigned int rtt = UINT_MAX; bool have_result = false; - u64 _rtt; int ret = call->error; _enter("%s,%u,%u,%d,%d", server->name, server_index, index, ret, call->abort_code); @@ -93,15 +92,9 @@ responded: } } - /* Get the RTT and scale it to fit into a 32-bit value that represents - * over a minute of time so that we can access it with one instruction - * on a 32-bit system. - */ - _rtt = rxrpc_kernel_get_rtt(call->net->socket, call->rxcall); - _rtt /= 64; - rtt = (_rtt > UINT_MAX) ? UINT_MAX : _rtt; - if (rtt < server->probe.rtt) { - server->probe.rtt = rtt; + rtt_us = rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt(call->net->socket, call->rxcall); + if (rtt_us < server->probe.rtt) { + server->probe.rtt = rtt_us; alist->preferred = index; have_result = true; } @@ -113,8 +106,7 @@ out: spin_unlock(&server->probe_lock); _debug("probe [%u][%u] %pISpc rtt=%u ret=%d", - server_index, index, &alist->addrs[index].transport, - (unsigned int)rtt, ret); + server_index, index, &alist->addrs[index].transport, rtt_us, ret); have_result |= afs_vl_probe_done(server); if (have_result) { diff --git a/include/net/af_rxrpc.h b/include/net/af_rxrpc.h index 04e97bab6f28..ab988940bf04 100644 --- a/include/net/af_rxrpc.h +++ b/include/net/af_rxrpc.h @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ bool rxrpc_kernel_abort_call(struct socket *, struct rxrpc_call *, void rxrpc_kernel_end_call(struct socket *, struct rxrpc_call *); void rxrpc_kernel_get_peer(struct socket *, struct rxrpc_call *, struct sockaddr_rxrpc *); -u64 rxrpc_kernel_get_rtt(struct socket *, struct rxrpc_call *); +u32 rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt(struct socket *, struct rxrpc_call *); int rxrpc_kernel_charge_accept(struct socket *, rxrpc_notify_rx_t, rxrpc_user_attach_call_t, unsigned long, gfp_t, unsigned int); diff --git a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h index 191fe447f990..ab75f261f04a 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +++ b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h @@ -1112,18 +1112,17 @@ TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_rtt_tx, TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_rtt_rx, TP_PROTO(struct rxrpc_call *call, enum rxrpc_rtt_rx_trace why, rxrpc_serial_t send_serial, rxrpc_serial_t resp_serial, - s64 rtt, u8 nr, s64 avg), + u32 rtt, u32 rto), - TP_ARGS(call, why, send_serial, resp_serial, rtt, nr, avg), + TP_ARGS(call, why, send_serial, resp_serial, rtt, rto), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field(unsigned int, call ) __field(enum rxrpc_rtt_rx_trace, why ) - __field(u8, nr ) __field(rxrpc_serial_t, send_serial ) __field(rxrpc_serial_t, resp_serial ) - __field(s64, rtt ) - __field(u64, avg ) + __field(u32, rtt ) + __field(u32, rto ) ), TP_fast_assign( @@ -1132,18 +1131,16 @@ TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_rtt_rx, __entry->send_serial = send_serial; __entry->resp_serial = resp_serial; __entry->rtt = rtt; - __entry->nr = nr; - __entry->avg = avg; + __entry->rto = rto; ), - TP_printk("c=%08x %s sr=%08x rr=%08x rtt=%lld nr=%u avg=%lld", + TP_printk("c=%08x %s sr=%08x rr=%08x rtt=%u rto=%u", __entry->call, __print_symbolic(__entry->why, rxrpc_rtt_rx_traces), __entry->send_serial, __entry->resp_serial, __entry->rtt, - __entry->nr, - __entry->avg) + __entry->rto) ); TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_timer, diff --git a/net/rxrpc/Makefile b/net/rxrpc/Makefile index 6ffb7e9887ce..ddd0f95713a9 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/Makefile +++ b/net/rxrpc/Makefile @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ rxrpc-y := \ peer_event.o \ peer_object.o \ recvmsg.o \ + rtt.o \ security.o \ sendmsg.o \ skbuff.o \ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h index 3eb1ab40ca5c..9fe264bec70c 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -311,11 +312,14 @@ struct rxrpc_peer { #define RXRPC_RTT_CACHE_SIZE 32 spinlock_t rtt_input_lock; /* RTT lock for input routine */ ktime_t rtt_last_req; /* Time of last RTT request */ - u64 rtt; /* Current RTT estimate (in nS) */ - u64 rtt_sum; /* Sum of cache contents */ - u64 rtt_cache[RXRPC_RTT_CACHE_SIZE]; /* Determined RTT cache */ - u8 rtt_cursor; /* next entry at which to insert */ - u8 rtt_usage; /* amount of cache actually used */ + unsigned int rtt_count; /* Number of samples we've got */ + + u32 srtt_us; /* smoothed round trip time << 3 in usecs */ + u32 mdev_us; /* medium deviation */ + u32 mdev_max_us; /* maximal mdev for the last rtt period */ + u32 rttvar_us; /* smoothed mdev_max */ + u32 rto_j; /* Retransmission timeout in jiffies */ + u8 backoff; /* Backoff timeout */ u8 cong_cwnd; /* Congestion window size */ }; @@ -1041,7 +1045,6 @@ extern unsigned long rxrpc_idle_ack_delay; extern unsigned int rxrpc_rx_window_size; extern unsigned int rxrpc_rx_mtu; extern unsigned int rxrpc_rx_jumbo_max; -extern unsigned long rxrpc_resend_timeout; extern const s8 rxrpc_ack_priority[]; @@ -1069,8 +1072,6 @@ void rxrpc_send_keepalive(struct rxrpc_peer *); * peer_event.c */ void rxrpc_error_report(struct sock *); -void rxrpc_peer_add_rtt(struct rxrpc_call *, enum rxrpc_rtt_rx_trace, - rxrpc_serial_t, rxrpc_serial_t, ktime_t, ktime_t); void rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker(struct work_struct *); /* @@ -1102,6 +1103,14 @@ extern const struct seq_operations rxrpc_peer_seq_ops; void rxrpc_notify_socket(struct rxrpc_call *); int rxrpc_recvmsg(struct socket *, struct msghdr *, size_t, int); +/* + * rtt.c + */ +void rxrpc_peer_add_rtt(struct rxrpc_call *, enum rxrpc_rtt_rx_trace, + rxrpc_serial_t, rxrpc_serial_t, ktime_t, ktime_t); +unsigned long rxrpc_get_rto_backoff(struct rxrpc_peer *, bool); +void rxrpc_peer_init_rtt(struct rxrpc_peer *); + /* * rxkad.c */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_accept.c b/net/rxrpc/call_accept.c index 70e44abf106c..b7611cc159e5 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_accept.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_accept.c @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static void rxrpc_send_ping(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); ktime_t now = skb->tstamp; - if (call->peer->rtt_usage < 3 || + if (call->peer->rtt_count < 3 || ktime_before(ktime_add_ms(call->peer->rtt_last_req, 1000), now)) rxrpc_propose_ACK(call, RXRPC_ACK_PING, sp->hdr.serial, true, true, diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c index cedbbb3a7c2e..2a65ac41055f 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ static void __rxrpc_propose_ACK(struct rxrpc_call *call, u8 ack_reason, } else { unsigned long now = jiffies, ack_at; - if (call->peer->rtt_usage > 0) - ack_at = nsecs_to_jiffies(call->peer->rtt); + if (call->peer->srtt_us != 0) + ack_at = usecs_to_jiffies(call->peer->srtt_us >> 3); else ack_at = expiry; @@ -157,24 +157,18 @@ static void rxrpc_congestion_timeout(struct rxrpc_call *call) static void rxrpc_resend(struct rxrpc_call *call, unsigned long now_j) { struct sk_buff *skb; - unsigned long resend_at; + unsigned long resend_at, rto_j; rxrpc_seq_t cursor, seq, top; - ktime_t now, max_age, oldest, ack_ts, timeout, min_timeo; + ktime_t now, max_age, oldest, ack_ts; int ix; u8 annotation, anno_type, retrans = 0, unacked = 0; _enter("{%d,%d}", call->tx_hard_ack, call->tx_top); - if (call->peer->rtt_usage > 1) - timeout = ns_to_ktime(call->peer->rtt * 3 / 2); - else - timeout = ms_to_ktime(rxrpc_resend_timeout); - min_timeo = ns_to_ktime((1000000000 / HZ) * 4); - if (ktime_before(timeout, min_timeo)) - timeout = min_timeo; + rto_j = call->peer->rto_j; now = ktime_get_real(); - max_age = ktime_sub(now, timeout); + max_age = ktime_sub(now, jiffies_to_usecs(rto_j)); spin_lock_bh(&call->lock); @@ -219,7 +213,7 @@ static void rxrpc_resend(struct rxrpc_call *call, unsigned long now_j) } resend_at = nsecs_to_jiffies(ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(now, oldest))); - resend_at += jiffies + rxrpc_resend_timeout; + resend_at += jiffies + rto_j; WRITE_ONCE(call->resend_at, resend_at); if (unacked) @@ -234,7 +228,7 @@ static void rxrpc_resend(struct rxrpc_call *call, unsigned long now_j) rxrpc_timer_set_for_resend); spin_unlock_bh(&call->lock); ack_ts = ktime_sub(now, call->acks_latest_ts); - if (ktime_to_ns(ack_ts) < call->peer->rtt) + if (ktime_to_us(ack_ts) < (call->peer->srtt_us >> 3)) goto out; rxrpc_propose_ACK(call, RXRPC_ACK_PING, 0, true, false, rxrpc_propose_ack_ping_for_lost_ack); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c index 69e09d69c896..e438bfd3fdf5 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/input.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c @@ -91,11 +91,11 @@ static void rxrpc_congestion_management(struct rxrpc_call *call, /* We analyse the number of packets that get ACK'd per RTT * period and increase the window if we managed to fill it. */ - if (call->peer->rtt_usage == 0) + if (call->peer->rtt_count == 0) goto out; if (ktime_before(skb->tstamp, - ktime_add_ns(call->cong_tstamp, - call->peer->rtt))) + ktime_add_us(call->cong_tstamp, + call->peer->srtt_us >> 3))) goto out_no_clear_ca; change = rxrpc_cong_rtt_window_end; call->cong_tstamp = skb->tstamp; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/misc.c b/net/rxrpc/misc.c index 214405f75346..d4144fd86f84 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/misc.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/misc.c @@ -63,11 +63,6 @@ unsigned int rxrpc_rx_mtu = 5692; */ unsigned int rxrpc_rx_jumbo_max = 4; -/* - * Time till packet resend (in milliseconds). - */ -unsigned long rxrpc_resend_timeout = 4 * HZ; - const s8 rxrpc_ack_priority[] = { [0] = 0, [RXRPC_ACK_DELAY] = 1, diff --git a/net/rxrpc/output.c b/net/rxrpc/output.c index 90e263c6aa69..f8b632a5c619 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/output.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/output.c @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ int rxrpc_send_data_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, (test_and_clear_bit(RXRPC_CALL_EV_ACK_LOST, &call->events) || retrans || call->cong_mode == RXRPC_CALL_SLOW_START || - (call->peer->rtt_usage < 3 && sp->hdr.seq & 1) || + (call->peer->rtt_count < 3 && sp->hdr.seq & 1) || ktime_before(ktime_add_ms(call->peer->rtt_last_req, 1000), ktime_get_real()))) whdr.flags |= RXRPC_REQUEST_ACK; @@ -423,13 +423,10 @@ done: if (whdr.flags & RXRPC_REQUEST_ACK) { call->peer->rtt_last_req = skb->tstamp; trace_rxrpc_rtt_tx(call, rxrpc_rtt_tx_data, serial); - if (call->peer->rtt_usage > 1) { + if (call->peer->rtt_count > 1) { unsigned long nowj = jiffies, ack_lost_at; - ack_lost_at = nsecs_to_jiffies(2 * call->peer->rtt); - if (ack_lost_at < 1) - ack_lost_at = 1; - + ack_lost_at = rxrpc_get_rto_backoff(call->peer, retrans); ack_lost_at += nowj; WRITE_ONCE(call->ack_lost_at, ack_lost_at); rxrpc_reduce_call_timer(call, ack_lost_at, nowj, diff --git a/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c b/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c index 923b263c401b..b1449d971883 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c @@ -295,52 +295,6 @@ static void rxrpc_distribute_error(struct rxrpc_peer *peer, int error, } } -/* - * Add RTT information to cache. This is called in softirq mode and has - * exclusive access to the peer RTT data. - */ -void rxrpc_peer_add_rtt(struct rxrpc_call *call, enum rxrpc_rtt_rx_trace why, - rxrpc_serial_t send_serial, rxrpc_serial_t resp_serial, - ktime_t send_time, ktime_t resp_time) -{ - struct rxrpc_peer *peer = call->peer; - s64 rtt; - u64 sum = peer->rtt_sum, avg; - u8 cursor = peer->rtt_cursor, usage = peer->rtt_usage; - - rtt = ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(resp_time, send_time)); - if (rtt < 0) - return; - - spin_lock(&peer->rtt_input_lock); - - /* Replace the oldest datum in the RTT buffer */ - sum -= peer->rtt_cache[cursor]; - sum += rtt; - peer->rtt_cache[cursor] = rtt; - peer->rtt_cursor = (cursor + 1) & (RXRPC_RTT_CACHE_SIZE - 1); - peer->rtt_sum = sum; - if (usage < RXRPC_RTT_CACHE_SIZE) { - usage++; - peer->rtt_usage = usage; - } - - spin_unlock(&peer->rtt_input_lock); - - /* Now recalculate the average */ - if (usage == RXRPC_RTT_CACHE_SIZE) { - avg = sum / RXRPC_RTT_CACHE_SIZE; - } else { - avg = sum; - do_div(avg, usage); - } - - /* Don't need to update this under lock */ - peer->rtt = avg; - trace_rxrpc_rtt_rx(call, why, send_serial, resp_serial, rtt, - usage, avg); -} - /* * Perform keep-alive pings. */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/peer_object.c b/net/rxrpc/peer_object.c index 452163eadb98..ca29976bb193 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/peer_object.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/peer_object.c @@ -225,6 +225,8 @@ struct rxrpc_peer *rxrpc_alloc_peer(struct rxrpc_local *local, gfp_t gfp) spin_lock_init(&peer->rtt_input_lock); peer->debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&rxrpc_debug_id); + rxrpc_peer_init_rtt(peer); + if (RXRPC_TX_SMSS > 2190) peer->cong_cwnd = 2; else if (RXRPC_TX_SMSS > 1095) @@ -497,14 +499,14 @@ void rxrpc_kernel_get_peer(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_get_peer); /** - * rxrpc_kernel_get_rtt - Get a call's peer RTT + * rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt - Get a call's peer smoothed RTT * @sock: The socket on which the call is in progress. * @call: The call to query * - * Get the call's peer RTT. + * Get the call's peer smoothed RTT. */ -u64 rxrpc_kernel_get_rtt(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call) +u32 rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call) { - return call->peer->rtt; + return call->peer->srtt_us >> 3; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_get_rtt); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/proc.c b/net/rxrpc/proc.c index b9d053e42821..8b179e3c802a 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/proc.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/proc.c @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int rxrpc_peer_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) seq_puts(seq, "Proto Local " " Remote " - " Use CW MTU LastUse RTT Rc\n" + " Use CW MTU LastUse RTT RTO\n" ); return 0; } @@ -236,15 +236,15 @@ static int rxrpc_peer_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) now = ktime_get_seconds(); seq_printf(seq, "UDP %-47.47s %-47.47s %3u" - " %3u %5u %6llus %12llu %2u\n", + " %3u %5u %6llus %8u %8u\n", lbuff, rbuff, atomic_read(&peer->usage), peer->cong_cwnd, peer->mtu, now - peer->last_tx_at, - peer->rtt, - peer->rtt_cursor); + peer->srtt_us >> 3, + jiffies_to_usecs(peer->rto_j)); return 0; } diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rtt.c b/net/rxrpc/rtt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..928d8b34a3ee --- /dev/null +++ b/net/rxrpc/rtt.c @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* RTT/RTO calculation. + * + * Adapted from TCP for AF_RXRPC by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6298 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1122#section-4.2.3.1 + * http://ccr.sigcomm.org/archive/1995/jan95/ccr-9501-partridge87.pdf + */ + +#include +#include "ar-internal.h" + +#define RXRPC_RTO_MAX ((unsigned)(120 * HZ)) +#define RXRPC_TIMEOUT_INIT ((unsigned)(1*HZ)) /* RFC6298 2.1 initial RTO value */ +#define rxrpc_jiffies32 ((u32)jiffies) /* As rxrpc_jiffies32 */ +#define rxrpc_min_rtt_wlen 300 /* As sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen */ + +static u32 rxrpc_rto_min_us(struct rxrpc_peer *peer) +{ + return 200; +} + +static u32 __rxrpc_set_rto(const struct rxrpc_peer *peer) +{ + return _usecs_to_jiffies((peer->srtt_us >> 3) + peer->rttvar_us); +} + +static u32 rxrpc_bound_rto(u32 rto) +{ + return min(rto, RXRPC_RTO_MAX); +} + +/* + * Called to compute a smoothed rtt estimate. The data fed to this + * routine either comes from timestamps, or from segments that were + * known _not_ to have been retransmitted [see Karn/Partridge + * Proceedings SIGCOMM 87]. The algorithm is from the SIGCOMM 88 + * piece by Van Jacobson. + * NOTE: the next three routines used to be one big routine. + * To save cycles in the RFC 1323 implementation it was better to break + * it up into three procedures. -- erics + */ +static void rxrpc_rtt_estimator(struct rxrpc_peer *peer, long sample_rtt_us) +{ + long m = sample_rtt_us; /* RTT */ + u32 srtt = peer->srtt_us; + + /* The following amusing code comes from Jacobson's + * article in SIGCOMM '88. Note that rtt and mdev + * are scaled versions of rtt and mean deviation. + * This is designed to be as fast as possible + * m stands for "measurement". + * + * On a 1990 paper the rto value is changed to: + * RTO = rtt + 4 * mdev + * + * Funny. This algorithm seems to be very broken. + * These formulae increase RTO, when it should be decreased, increase + * too slowly, when it should be increased quickly, decrease too quickly + * etc. I guess in BSD RTO takes ONE value, so that it is absolutely + * does not matter how to _calculate_ it. Seems, it was trap + * that VJ failed to avoid. 8) + */ + if (srtt != 0) { + m -= (srtt >> 3); /* m is now error in rtt est */ + srtt += m; /* rtt = 7/8 rtt + 1/8 new */ + if (m < 0) { + m = -m; /* m is now abs(error) */ + m -= (peer->mdev_us >> 2); /* similar update on mdev */ + /* This is similar to one of Eifel findings. + * Eifel blocks mdev updates when rtt decreases. + * This solution is a bit different: we use finer gain + * for mdev in this case (alpha*beta). + * Like Eifel it also prevents growth of rto, + * but also it limits too fast rto decreases, + * happening in pure Eifel. + */ + if (m > 0) + m >>= 3; + } else { + m -= (peer->mdev_us >> 2); /* similar update on mdev */ + } + + peer->mdev_us += m; /* mdev = 3/4 mdev + 1/4 new */ + if (peer->mdev_us > peer->mdev_max_us) { + peer->mdev_max_us = peer->mdev_us; + if (peer->mdev_max_us > peer->rttvar_us) + peer->rttvar_us = peer->mdev_max_us; + } + } else { + /* no previous measure. */ + srtt = m << 3; /* take the measured time to be rtt */ + peer->mdev_us = m << 1; /* make sure rto = 3*rtt */ + peer->rttvar_us = max(peer->mdev_us, rxrpc_rto_min_us(peer)); + peer->mdev_max_us = peer->rttvar_us; + } + + peer->srtt_us = max(1U, srtt); +} + +/* + * Calculate rto without backoff. This is the second half of Van Jacobson's + * routine referred to above. + */ +static void rxrpc_set_rto(struct rxrpc_peer *peer) +{ + u32 rto; + + /* 1. If rtt variance happened to be less 50msec, it is hallucination. + * It cannot be less due to utterly erratic ACK generation made + * at least by solaris and freebsd. "Erratic ACKs" has _nothing_ + * to do with delayed acks, because at cwnd>2 true delack timeout + * is invisible. Actually, Linux-2.4 also generates erratic + * ACKs in some circumstances. + */ + rto = __rxrpc_set_rto(peer); + + /* 2. Fixups made earlier cannot be right. + * If we do not estimate RTO correctly without them, + * all the algo is pure shit and should be replaced + * with correct one. It is exactly, which we pretend to do. + */ + + /* NOTE: clamping at RXRPC_RTO_MIN is not required, current algo + * guarantees that rto is higher. + */ + peer->rto_j = rxrpc_bound_rto(rto); +} + +static void rxrpc_ack_update_rtt(struct rxrpc_peer *peer, long rtt_us) +{ + if (rtt_us < 0) + return; + + //rxrpc_update_rtt_min(peer, rtt_us); + rxrpc_rtt_estimator(peer, rtt_us); + rxrpc_set_rto(peer); + + /* RFC6298: only reset backoff on valid RTT measurement. */ + peer->backoff = 0; +} + +/* + * Add RTT information to cache. This is called in softirq mode and has + * exclusive access to the peer RTT data. + */ +void rxrpc_peer_add_rtt(struct rxrpc_call *call, enum rxrpc_rtt_rx_trace why, + rxrpc_serial_t send_serial, rxrpc_serial_t resp_serial, + ktime_t send_time, ktime_t resp_time) +{ + struct rxrpc_peer *peer = call->peer; + s64 rtt_us; + + rtt_us = ktime_to_us(ktime_sub(resp_time, send_time)); + if (rtt_us < 0) + return; + + spin_lock(&peer->rtt_input_lock); + rxrpc_ack_update_rtt(peer, rtt_us); + if (peer->rtt_count < 3) + peer->rtt_count++; + spin_unlock(&peer->rtt_input_lock); + + trace_rxrpc_rtt_rx(call, why, send_serial, resp_serial, + peer->srtt_us >> 3, peer->rto_j); +} + +/* + * Get the retransmission timeout to set in jiffies, backing it off each time + * we retransmit. + */ +unsigned long rxrpc_get_rto_backoff(struct rxrpc_peer *peer, bool retrans) +{ + u64 timo_j; + u8 backoff = READ_ONCE(peer->backoff); + + timo_j = peer->rto_j; + timo_j <<= backoff; + if (retrans && timo_j * 2 <= RXRPC_RTO_MAX) + WRITE_ONCE(peer->backoff, backoff + 1); + + if (timo_j < 1) + timo_j = 1; + + return timo_j; +} + +void rxrpc_peer_init_rtt(struct rxrpc_peer *peer) +{ + peer->rto_j = RXRPC_TIMEOUT_INIT; + peer->mdev_us = jiffies_to_usecs(RXRPC_TIMEOUT_INIT); + peer->backoff = 0; + //minmax_reset(&peer->rtt_min, rxrpc_jiffies32, ~0U); +} diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c index 0fcf157aa09f..5e9c43d4a314 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c @@ -66,15 +66,14 @@ static int rxrpc_wait_for_tx_window_waitall(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct rxrpc_call *call) { rxrpc_seq_t tx_start, tx_win; - signed long rtt2, timeout; - u64 rtt; + signed long rtt, timeout; - rtt = READ_ONCE(call->peer->rtt); - rtt2 = nsecs_to_jiffies64(rtt) * 2; - if (rtt2 < 2) - rtt2 = 2; + rtt = READ_ONCE(call->peer->srtt_us) >> 3; + rtt = usecs_to_jiffies(rtt) * 2; + if (rtt < 2) + rtt = 2; - timeout = rtt2; + timeout = rtt; tx_start = READ_ONCE(call->tx_hard_ack); for (;;) { @@ -92,7 +91,7 @@ static int rxrpc_wait_for_tx_window_waitall(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, return -EINTR; if (tx_win != tx_start) { - timeout = rtt2; + timeout = rtt; tx_start = tx_win; } @@ -271,16 +270,9 @@ static int rxrpc_queue_packet(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct rxrpc_call *call, _debug("need instant resend %d", ret); rxrpc_instant_resend(call, ix); } else { - unsigned long now = jiffies, resend_at; + unsigned long now = jiffies; + unsigned long resend_at = now + call->peer->rto_j; - if (call->peer->rtt_usage > 1) - resend_at = nsecs_to_jiffies(call->peer->rtt * 3 / 2); - else - resend_at = rxrpc_resend_timeout; - if (resend_at < 1) - resend_at = 1; - - resend_at += now; WRITE_ONCE(call->resend_at, resend_at); rxrpc_reduce_call_timer(call, resend_at, now, rxrpc_timer_set_for_send); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sysctl.c b/net/rxrpc/sysctl.c index 2bbb38161851..18dade4e6f9a 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/sysctl.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/sysctl.c @@ -71,15 +71,6 @@ static struct ctl_table rxrpc_sysctl_table[] = { .extra1 = (void *)&one_jiffy, .extra2 = (void *)&max_jiffies, }, - { - .procname = "resend_timeout", - .data = &rxrpc_resend_timeout, - .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long), - .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax, - .extra1 = (void *)&one_jiffy, - .extra2 = (void *)&max_jiffies, - }, /* Non-time values */ { -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 1d10da0eb09484ae087836da28258316ef4a02be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roi Dayan Date: Sun, 10 May 2020 13:55:43 +0300 Subject: netfilter: flowtable: Remove WQ_MEM_RECLAIM from workqueue This workqueue is in charge of handling offloaded flow tasks like add/del/stats we should not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag. The flag can result in the following warning. [ 485.557189] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 485.562976] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM nf_flow_table_offload:flow_offload_worr [ 485.562985] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 3731 at kernel/workqueue.c:2610 check_flush0 [ 485.590191] Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... [ 485.597100] CPU: 7 PID: 3731 Comm: kworker/u112:8 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1.21802 [ 485.606629] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/177 [ 485.615487] Workqueue: nf_flow_table_offload flow_offload_work_handler [nf_f] [ 485.624834] Call Trace: [ 485.628077] dump_stack+0x50/0x70 [ 485.632280] panic+0xfb/0x2d7 [ 485.636083] ? check_flush_dependency+0x110/0x130 [ 485.641830] __warn.cold.12+0x20/0x2a [ 485.646405] ? check_flush_dependency+0x110/0x130 [ 485.652154] ? check_flush_dependency+0x110/0x130 [ 485.657900] report_bug+0xb8/0x100 [ 485.662187] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0 [ 485.666974] do_error_trap+0x9f/0xc0 [ 485.671464] do_invalid_op+0x36/0x40 [ 485.675950] ? check_flush_dependency+0x110/0x130 [ 485.681699] invalid_op+0x28/0x30 Fixes: 7da182a998d6 ("netfilter: flowtable: Use work entry per offload command") Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: Roi Dayan Reviewed-by: Paul Blakey Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c index 3d4ca62c81f9..2276a73ccba2 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c @@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ static struct flow_indr_block_entry block_ing_entry = { int nf_flow_table_offload_init(void) { nf_flow_offload_wq = alloc_workqueue("nf_flow_table_offload", - WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 0); + WQ_UNBOUND, 0); if (!nf_flow_offload_wq) return -ENOMEM; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 54ab49fde95605a1077f759ce454d94e84b5ca45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sun, 10 May 2020 14:28:07 +0200 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: fix infinite loop on rmmod 'rmmod nf_conntrack' can hang forever, because the netns exit gets stuck in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list(): i_see_dead_people: busy = 0; list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list) { nf_ct_iterate_cleanup(kill_all, net, 0, 0); if (atomic_read(&net->ct.count) != 0) busy = 1; } if (busy) { schedule(); goto i_see_dead_people; } When nf_ct_iterate_cleanup iterates the conntrack table, all nf_conn structures can be found twice: once for the original tuple and once for the conntracks reply tuple. get_next_corpse() only calls the iterator when the entry is in original direction -- the idea was to avoid unneeded invocations of the iterator callback. When support for clashing entries was added, the assumption that all nf_conn objects are added twice, once in original, once for reply tuple no longer holds -- NF_CLASH_BIT entries are only added in the non-clashing reply direction. Thus, if at least one NF_CLASH entry is in the list then nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() always skips it completely. During normal netns destruction, this causes a hang of several seconds, until the gc worker removes the entry (NF_CLASH entries always have a 1 second timeout). But in the rmmod case, the gc worker has already been stopped, so ct.count never becomes 0. We can fix this in two ways: 1. Add a second test for CLASH_BIT and call iterator for those entries as well, or: 2. Skip the original tuple direction and use the reply tuple. 2) is simpler, so do that. Fixes: 6a757c07e51f80ac ("netfilter: conntrack: allow insertion of clashing entries") Reported-by: Chen Yi Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 0173398f4ced..1d57b95d3481 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -2139,8 +2139,19 @@ get_next_corpse(int (*iter)(struct nf_conn *i, void *data), nf_conntrack_lock(lockp); if (*bucket < nf_conntrack_htable_size) { hlist_nulls_for_each_entry(h, n, &nf_conntrack_hash[*bucket], hnnode) { - if (NF_CT_DIRECTION(h) != IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL) + if (NF_CT_DIRECTION(h) != IP_CT_DIR_REPLY) continue; + /* All nf_conn objects are added to hash table twice, one + * for original direction tuple, once for the reply tuple. + * + * Exception: In the IPS_NAT_CLASH case, only the reply + * tuple is added (the original tuple already existed for + * a different object). + * + * We only need to call the iterator once for each + * conntrack, so we just use the 'reply' direction + * tuple while iterating. + */ ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); if (iter(ct, data)) goto found; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From ce99aa62e1eb793e259d023c7f6ccb7c4879917b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Sat, 9 May 2020 14:07:13 -0400 Subject: SUNRPC: Signalled ASYNC tasks need to exit Ensure that signalled ASYNC rpc_tasks exit immediately instead of spinning until a timeout (or forever). To avoid checking for the signal flag on every scheduler iteration, the check is instead introduced in the client's finite state machine. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Fixes: ae67bd3821bb ("SUNRPC: Fix up task signalling") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c index 8d3972ea688b..c74bc402f8c7 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c @@ -2433,6 +2433,11 @@ rpc_check_timeout(struct rpc_task *task) { struct rpc_clnt *clnt = task->tk_client; + if (RPC_SIGNALLED(task)) { + rpc_call_rpcerror(task, -ERESTARTSYS); + return; + } + if (xprt_adjust_timeout(task->tk_rqstp) == 0) return; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 9ed81c8e0deb7bd2aa0d69371e4a0f9a7b31205d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 11:54:31 +0200 Subject: netfilter: flowtable: set NF_FLOW_TEARDOWN flag on entry expiration If the flow timer expires, the gc sets on the NF_FLOW_TEARDOWN flag. Otherwise, the flowtable software path might race to refresh the timeout, leaving the state machine in inconsistent state. Fixes: c29f74e0df7a ("netfilter: nf_flow_table: hardware offload support") Reported-by: Paul Blakey Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c index 4344e572b7f9..42da6e337276 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static void flow_offload_del(struct nf_flowtable *flow_table, if (nf_flow_has_expired(flow)) flow_offload_fixup_ct(flow->ct); - else if (test_bit(NF_FLOW_TEARDOWN, &flow->flags)) + else flow_offload_fixup_ct_timeout(flow->ct); flow_offload_free(flow); @@ -361,8 +361,10 @@ static void nf_flow_offload_gc_step(struct flow_offload *flow, void *data) { struct nf_flowtable *flow_table = data; - if (nf_flow_has_expired(flow) || nf_ct_is_dying(flow->ct) || - test_bit(NF_FLOW_TEARDOWN, &flow->flags)) { + if (nf_flow_has_expired(flow) || nf_ct_is_dying(flow->ct)) + set_bit(NF_FLOW_TEARDOWN, &flow->flags); + + if (test_bit(NF_FLOW_TEARDOWN, &flow->flags)) { if (test_bit(NF_FLOW_HW, &flow->flags)) { if (!test_bit(NF_FLOW_HW_DYING, &flow->flags)) nf_flow_offload_del(flow_table, flow); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 340eaff651160234bdbce07ef34b92a8e45cd540 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phil Sutter Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 15:31:41 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: Add missing expired checks Expired intervals would still match and be dumped to user space until garbage collection wiped them out. Make sure they stop matching and disappear (from users' perspective) as soon as they expire. Fixes: 8d8540c4f5e03 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: add timeout support") Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c index 3ffef454d469..62f416bc0579 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c @@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ static bool __nft_rbtree_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set parent = rcu_dereference_raw(parent->rb_left); continue; } + + if (nft_set_elem_expired(&rbe->ext)) + return false; + if (nft_rbtree_interval_end(rbe)) { if (nft_set_is_anonymous(set)) return false; @@ -94,6 +98,7 @@ static bool __nft_rbtree_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set if (set->flags & NFT_SET_INTERVAL && interval != NULL && nft_set_elem_active(&interval->ext, genmask) && + !nft_set_elem_expired(&interval->ext) && nft_rbtree_interval_start(interval)) { *ext = &interval->ext; return true; @@ -154,6 +159,9 @@ static bool __nft_rbtree_get(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set, continue; } + if (nft_set_elem_expired(&rbe->ext)) + return false; + if (!nft_set_ext_exists(&rbe->ext, NFT_SET_EXT_FLAGS) || (*nft_set_ext_flags(&rbe->ext) & NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END) == (flags & NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END)) { @@ -170,6 +178,7 @@ static bool __nft_rbtree_get(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set, if (set->flags & NFT_SET_INTERVAL && interval != NULL && nft_set_elem_active(&interval->ext, genmask) && + !nft_set_elem_expired(&interval->ext) && ((!nft_rbtree_interval_end(interval) && !(flags & NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END)) || (nft_rbtree_interval_end(interval) && @@ -418,6 +427,8 @@ static void nft_rbtree_walk(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, if (iter->count < iter->skip) goto cont; + if (nft_set_elem_expired(&rbe->ext)) + goto cont; if (!nft_set_elem_active(&rbe->ext, iter->genmask)) goto cont; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 64d950ae0b01eae96eb668b789c6d145c38ac41c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Paasch Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 09:24:42 -0700 Subject: mptcp: Initialize map_seq upon subflow establishment When the other MPTCP-peer uses 32-bit data-sequence numbers, we rely on map_seq to indicate how to expand to a 64-bit data-sequence number in expand_seq() when receiving data. For new subflows, this field is not initialized, thus results in an "invalid" mapping being discarded. Fix this by initializing map_seq upon subflow establishment time. Fixes: f296234c98a8 ("mptcp: Add handling of incoming MP_JOIN requests") Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch Reviewed-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c index e1f23016ed3f..32ea8d35489a 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c @@ -1629,6 +1629,8 @@ bool mptcp_finish_join(struct sock *sk) ret = mptcp_pm_allow_new_subflow(msk); if (ret) { + subflow->map_seq = msk->ack_seq; + /* active connections are already on conn_list */ spin_lock_bh(&msk->join_list_lock); if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&subflow->node))) -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 24adbc1676af4e134e709ddc7f34cf2adc2131e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 06:54:30 -0700 Subject: tcp: fix SO_RCVLOWAT hangs with fat skbs We autotune rcvbuf whenever SO_RCVLOWAT is set to account for 100% overhead in tcp_set_rcvlowat() This works well when skb->len/skb->truesize ratio is bigger than 0.5 But if we receive packets with small MSS, we can end up in a situation where not enough bytes are available in the receive queue to satisfy RCVLOWAT setting. As our sk_rcvbuf limit is hit, we send zero windows in ACK packets, preventing remote peer from sending more data. Even autotuning does not help, because it only triggers at the time user process drains the queue. If no EPOLLIN is generated, this can not happen. Note poll() has a similar issue, after commit c7004482e8dc ("tcp: Respect SO_RCVLOWAT in tcp_poll().") Fixes: 03f45c883c6f ("tcp: avoid extra wakeups for SO_RCVLOWAT users") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/tcp.h | 13 +++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 14 +++++++++++--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 64f84683feae..6f8e60c6fbc7 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -1420,6 +1420,19 @@ static inline int tcp_full_space(const struct sock *sk) return tcp_win_from_space(sk, READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf)); } +/* We provision sk_rcvbuf around 200% of sk_rcvlowat. + * If 87.5 % (7/8) of the space has been consumed, we want to override + * SO_RCVLOWAT constraint, since we are receiving skbs with too small + * len/truesize ratio. + */ +static inline bool tcp_rmem_pressure(const struct sock *sk) +{ + int rcvbuf = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rcvbuf); + int threshold = rcvbuf - (rcvbuf >> 3); + + return atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > threshold; +} + extern void tcp_openreq_init_rwin(struct request_sock *req, const struct sock *sk_listener, const struct dst_entry *dst); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index e72bd651d21a..a385fcaaa03b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -476,9 +476,17 @@ static void tcp_tx_timestamp(struct sock *sk, u16 tsflags) static inline bool tcp_stream_is_readable(const struct tcp_sock *tp, int target, struct sock *sk) { - return (READ_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt) - READ_ONCE(tp->copied_seq) >= target) || - (sk->sk_prot->stream_memory_read ? - sk->sk_prot->stream_memory_read(sk) : false); + int avail = READ_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt) - READ_ONCE(tp->copied_seq); + + if (avail > 0) { + if (avail >= target) + return true; + if (tcp_rmem_pressure(sk)) + return true; + } + if (sk->sk_prot->stream_memory_read) + return sk->sk_prot->stream_memory_read(sk); + return false; } /* diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index b996dc1069c5..29c6fc8c7716 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4757,7 +4757,8 @@ void tcp_data_ready(struct sock *sk) const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int avail = tp->rcv_nxt - tp->copied_seq; - if (avail < sk->sk_rcvlowat && !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE)) + if (avail < sk->sk_rcvlowat && !tcp_rmem_pressure(sk) && + !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE)) return; sk->sk_data_ready(sk); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From eead1c2ea2509fd754c6da893a94f0e69e83ebe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 14:43:14 +0200 Subject: netlabel: cope with NULL catmap The cipso and calipso code can set the MLS_CAT attribute on successful parsing, even if the corresponding catmap has not been allocated, as per current configuration and external input. Later, selinux code tries to access the catmap if the MLS_CAT flag is present via netlbl_catmap_getlong(). That may cause null ptr dereference while processing incoming network traffic. Address the issue setting the MLS_CAT flag only if the catmap is really allocated. Additionally let netlbl_catmap_getlong() cope with NULL catmap. Reported-by: Matthew Sheets Fixes: 4b8feff251da ("netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions") Fixes: ceba1832b1b2 ("calipso: Set the calipso socket label to match the secattr.") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 6 ++++-- net/ipv6/calipso.c | 3 ++- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c index 0bd10a1f477f..a23094b050f8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c @@ -1258,7 +1258,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_rbm(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, return ret_val; } - secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT; + if (secattr->attr.mls.cat) + secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT; } return 0; @@ -1439,7 +1440,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_rng(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, return ret_val; } - secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT; + if (secattr->attr.mls.cat) + secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT; } return 0; diff --git a/net/ipv6/calipso.c b/net/ipv6/calipso.c index 221c81f85cbf..8d3f66c310db 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/calipso.c +++ b/net/ipv6/calipso.c @@ -1047,7 +1047,8 @@ static int calipso_opt_getattr(const unsigned char *calipso, goto getattr_return; } - secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT; + if (secattr->attr.mls.cat) + secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT; } secattr->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CALIPSO; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c index 409a3ae47ce2..5e1239cef000 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c @@ -734,6 +734,12 @@ int netlbl_catmap_getlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap, if ((off & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1)) != 0) return -EINVAL; + /* a null catmap is equivalent to an empty one */ + if (!catmap) { + *offset = (u32)-1; + return 0; + } + if (off < catmap->startbit) { off = catmap->startbit; *offset = off; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From c72685894506a3fec5978b9b11b94069a7d1c995 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tuong Lien Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 19:33:16 +0700 Subject: tipc: fix large latency in smart Nagle streaming Currently when a connection is in Nagle mode, we set the 'ack_required' bit in the last sending buffer and wait for the corresponding ACK prior to pushing more data. However, on the receiving side, the ACK is issued only when application really reads the whole data. Even if part of the last buffer is received, we will not do the ACK as required. This might cause an unnecessary delay since the receiver does not always fetch the message as fast as the sender, resulting in a large latency in the user message sending, which is: [one RTT + the receiver processing time]. The commit makes Nagle ACK as soon as possible i.e. when a message with the 'ack_required' arrives in the receiving side's stack even before it is processed or put in the socket receive queue... This way, we can limit the streaming latency to one RTT as committed in Nagle mode. Acked-by: Ying Xue Acked-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/socket.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/socket.c b/net/tipc/socket.c index 87466607097f..e370ad0edd76 100644 --- a/net/tipc/socket.c +++ b/net/tipc/socket.c @@ -1739,22 +1739,21 @@ static int tipc_sk_anc_data_recv(struct msghdr *m, struct sk_buff *skb, return 0; } -static void tipc_sk_send_ack(struct tipc_sock *tsk) +static struct sk_buff *tipc_sk_build_ack(struct tipc_sock *tsk) { struct sock *sk = &tsk->sk; - struct net *net = sock_net(sk); struct sk_buff *skb = NULL; struct tipc_msg *msg; u32 peer_port = tsk_peer_port(tsk); u32 dnode = tsk_peer_node(tsk); if (!tipc_sk_connected(sk)) - return; + return NULL; skb = tipc_msg_create(CONN_MANAGER, CONN_ACK, INT_H_SIZE, 0, dnode, tsk_own_node(tsk), peer_port, tsk->portid, TIPC_OK); if (!skb) - return; + return NULL; msg = buf_msg(skb); msg_set_conn_ack(msg, tsk->rcv_unacked); tsk->rcv_unacked = 0; @@ -1764,7 +1763,19 @@ static void tipc_sk_send_ack(struct tipc_sock *tsk) tsk->rcv_win = tsk_adv_blocks(tsk->sk.sk_rcvbuf); msg_set_adv_win(msg, tsk->rcv_win); } - tipc_node_xmit_skb(net, skb, dnode, msg_link_selector(msg)); + return skb; +} + +static void tipc_sk_send_ack(struct tipc_sock *tsk) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb; + + skb = tipc_sk_build_ack(tsk); + if (!skb) + return; + + tipc_node_xmit_skb(sock_net(&tsk->sk), skb, tsk_peer_node(tsk), + msg_link_selector(buf_msg(skb))); } static int tipc_wait_for_rcvmsg(struct socket *sock, long *timeop) @@ -1938,7 +1949,6 @@ static int tipc_recvstream(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, bool peek = flags & MSG_PEEK; int offset, required, copy, copied = 0; int hlen, dlen, err, rc; - bool ack = false; long timeout; /* Catch invalid receive attempts */ @@ -1983,7 +1993,6 @@ static int tipc_recvstream(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, /* Copy data if msg ok, otherwise return error/partial data */ if (likely(!err)) { - ack = msg_ack_required(hdr); offset = skb_cb->bytes_read; copy = min_t(int, dlen - offset, buflen - copied); rc = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, hlen + offset, m, copy); @@ -2011,7 +2020,7 @@ static int tipc_recvstream(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, /* Send connection flow control advertisement when applicable */ tsk->rcv_unacked += tsk_inc(tsk, hlen + dlen); - if (ack || tsk->rcv_unacked >= tsk->rcv_win / TIPC_ACK_RATE) + if (tsk->rcv_unacked >= tsk->rcv_win / TIPC_ACK_RATE) tipc_sk_send_ack(tsk); /* Exit if all requested data or FIN/error received */ @@ -2105,9 +2114,11 @@ static void tipc_sk_proto_rcv(struct sock *sk, * tipc_sk_filter_connect - check incoming message for a connection-based socket * @tsk: TIPC socket * @skb: pointer to message buffer. + * @xmitq: for Nagle ACK if any * Returns true if message should be added to receive queue, false otherwise */ -static bool tipc_sk_filter_connect(struct tipc_sock *tsk, struct sk_buff *skb) +static bool tipc_sk_filter_connect(struct tipc_sock *tsk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct sk_buff_head *xmitq) { struct sock *sk = &tsk->sk; struct net *net = sock_net(sk); @@ -2171,8 +2182,17 @@ static bool tipc_sk_filter_connect(struct tipc_sock *tsk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)) tipc_sk_push_backlog(tsk); /* Accept only connection-based messages sent by peer */ - if (likely(con_msg && !err && pport == oport && pnode == onode)) + if (likely(con_msg && !err && pport == oport && + pnode == onode)) { + if (msg_ack_required(hdr)) { + struct sk_buff *skb; + + skb = tipc_sk_build_ack(tsk); + if (skb) + __skb_queue_tail(xmitq, skb); + } return true; + } if (!tsk_peer_msg(tsk, hdr)) return false; if (!err) @@ -2267,7 +2287,7 @@ static void tipc_sk_filter_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&inputq))) { hdr = buf_msg(skb); limit = rcvbuf_limit(sk, skb); - if ((sk_conn && !tipc_sk_filter_connect(tsk, skb)) || + if ((sk_conn && !tipc_sk_filter_connect(tsk, skb, xmitq)) || (!sk_conn && msg_connected(hdr)) || (!grp && msg_in_group(hdr))) err = TIPC_ERR_NO_PORT; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 0771d7df819284d46cf5cfb57698621b503ec17f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tuong Lien Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 19:33:17 +0700 Subject: tipc: fix memory leak in service subscripting Upon receipt of a service subscription request from user via a topology connection, one 'sub' object will be allocated in kernel, so it will be able to send an event of the service if any to the user correspondingly then. Also, in case of any failure, the connection will be shutdown and all the pertaining 'sub' objects will be freed. However, there is a race condition as follows resulting in memory leak: receive-work connection send-work | | | sub-1 |<------//-------| | sub-2 |<------//-------| | | |<---------------| evt for sub-x sub-3 |<------//-------| | : : : : : : | /--------| | | | * peer closed | | | | | | | |<-------X-------| evt for sub-y | | |<===============| sub-n |<------/ X shutdown | -> orphan | | That is, the 'receive-work' may get the last subscription request while the 'send-work' is shutting down the connection due to peer close. We had a 'lock' on the connection, so the two actions cannot be carried out simultaneously. If the last subscription is allocated e.g. 'sub-n', before the 'send-work' closes the connection, there will be no issue at all, the 'sub' objects will be freed. In contrast the last subscription will become orphan since the connection was closed, and we released all references. This commit fixes the issue by simply adding one test if the connection remains in 'connected' state right after we obtain the connection lock, then a subscription object can be created as usual, otherwise we ignore it. Acked-by: Ying Xue Acked-by: Jon Maloy Reported-by: Thang Ngo Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/topsrv.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/topsrv.c b/net/tipc/topsrv.c index 73dbed0c4b6b..931c426673c0 100644 --- a/net/tipc/topsrv.c +++ b/net/tipc/topsrv.c @@ -400,7 +400,9 @@ static int tipc_conn_rcv_from_sock(struct tipc_conn *con) return -EWOULDBLOCK; if (ret == sizeof(s)) { read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - ret = tipc_conn_rcv_sub(srv, con, &s); + /* RACE: the connection can be closed in the meantime */ + if (likely(connected(con))) + ret = tipc_conn_rcv_sub(srv, con, &s); read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); if (!ret) return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 88690b1079d473a44bf4183dfee9b03d4afae866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tuong Lien Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 19:33:18 +0700 Subject: tipc: fix failed service subscription deletion When a service subscription is expired or canceled by user, it needs to be deleted from the subscription list, so that new subscriptions can be registered (max = 65535 per net). However, there are two issues in code that can cause such an unused subscription to persist: 1) The 'tipc_conn_delete_sub()' has a loop on the subscription list but it makes a break shortly when the 1st subscription differs from the one specified, so the subscription will not be deleted. 2) In case a subscription is canceled, the code to remove the 'TIPC_SUB_CANCEL' flag from the subscription filter does not work if it is a local subscription (i.e. the little endian isn't involved). So, it will be no matches when looking for the subscription to delete later. The subscription(s) will be removed eventually when the user terminates its topology connection but that could be a long time later. Meanwhile, the number of available subscriptions may be exhausted. This commit fixes the two issues above, so as needed a subscription can be deleted correctly. Acked-by: Ying Xue Acked-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/subscr.h | 10 ++++++++++ net/tipc/topsrv.c | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/subscr.h b/net/tipc/subscr.h index aa015c233898..6ebbec1bedd1 100644 --- a/net/tipc/subscr.h +++ b/net/tipc/subscr.h @@ -96,6 +96,16 @@ void tipc_sub_get(struct tipc_subscription *subscription); (swap_ ? swab32(val__) : val__); \ }) +/* tipc_sub_write - write val_ to field_ of struct sub_ in user endian format + */ +#define tipc_sub_write(sub_, field_, val_) \ + ({ \ + struct tipc_subscr *sub__ = sub_; \ + u32 val__ = val_; \ + int swap_ = !((sub__)->filter & TIPC_FILTER_MASK); \ + (sub__)->field_ = swap_ ? swab32(val__) : val__; \ + }) + /* tipc_evt_write - write val_ to field_ of struct evt_ in user endian format */ #define tipc_evt_write(evt_, field_, val_) \ diff --git a/net/tipc/topsrv.c b/net/tipc/topsrv.c index 931c426673c0..446af7bbd13e 100644 --- a/net/tipc/topsrv.c +++ b/net/tipc/topsrv.c @@ -237,8 +237,8 @@ static void tipc_conn_delete_sub(struct tipc_conn *con, struct tipc_subscr *s) if (!s || !memcmp(s, &sub->evt.s, sizeof(*s))) { tipc_sub_unsubscribe(sub); atomic_dec(&tn->subscription_count); - } else if (s) { - break; + if (s) + break; } } spin_unlock_bh(&con->sub_lock); @@ -362,9 +362,10 @@ static int tipc_conn_rcv_sub(struct tipc_topsrv *srv, { struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(srv->net); struct tipc_subscription *sub; + u32 s_filter = tipc_sub_read(s, filter); - if (tipc_sub_read(s, filter) & TIPC_SUB_CANCEL) { - s->filter &= __constant_ntohl(~TIPC_SUB_CANCEL); + if (s_filter & TIPC_SUB_CANCEL) { + tipc_sub_write(s, filter, s_filter & ~TIPC_SUB_CANCEL); tipc_conn_delete_sub(con, s); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 933496e9cc02cda16ca8f0c38e56204376d6b0b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 18:38:40 -0400 Subject: SUNRPC: 'Directory with parent 'rpc_clnt' already present!' Each rpc_client has a cl_clid which is allocated from a global ida, and a debugfs directory which is named after cl_clid. We're releasing the cl_clid before we free the debugfs directory named after it. As soon as the cl_clid is released, that value is available for another newly created client. That leaves a window where another client may attempt to create a new debugfs directory with the same name as the not-yet-deleted debugfs directory from the dying client. Symptoms are log messages like Directory 4 with parent 'rpc_clnt' already present! Fixes: 7c4310ff5642 "SUNRPC: defer slow parts of rpc_free_client() to a workqueue." Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust --- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c index c74bc402f8c7..61b21dafd7c0 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c @@ -889,6 +889,7 @@ static void rpc_free_client_work(struct work_struct *work) * here. */ rpc_clnt_debugfs_unregister(clnt); + rpc_free_clid(clnt); rpc_clnt_remove_pipedir(clnt); xprt_put(rcu_dereference_raw(clnt->cl_xprt)); @@ -910,7 +911,6 @@ rpc_free_client(struct rpc_clnt *clnt) clnt->cl_metrics = NULL; xprt_iter_destroy(&clnt->cl_xpi); put_cred(clnt->cl_cred); - rpc_free_clid(clnt); INIT_WORK(&clnt->cl_work, rpc_free_client_work); schedule_work(&clnt->cl_work); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From e776af608f692a7a647455106295fa34469e7475 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 13:58:13 -0700 Subject: tcp: fix error recovery in tcp_zerocopy_receive() If user provides wrong virtual address in TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE operation we want to return -EINVAL error. But depending on zc->recv_skip_hint content, we might return -EIO error if the socket has SOCK_DONE set. Make sure to return -EINVAL in this case. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tcp_zerocopy_receive net/ipv4/tcp.c:1833 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x4494/0x6320 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3685 CPU: 1 PID: 625 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118 kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:121 __msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215 tcp_zerocopy_receive net/ipv4/tcp.c:1833 [inline] do_tcp_getsockopt+0x4494/0x6320 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3685 tcp_getsockopt+0xf8/0x1f0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3728 sock_common_getsockopt+0x13f/0x180 net/core/sock.c:3131 __sys_getsockopt+0x533/0x7b0 net/socket.c:2177 __do_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:2192 [inline] __se_sys_getsockopt+0xe1/0x100 net/socket.c:2189 __x64_sys_getsockopt+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:2189 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:297 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x45c829 Code: 0d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f1deeb72c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004e01e0 RCX: 000000000045c829 RDX: 0000000000000023 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000009 RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000020000200 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000000001d8 R14: 00000000004d3038 R15: 00007f1deeb736d4 Local variable ----zc@do_tcp_getsockopt created at: do_tcp_getsockopt+0x1a74/0x6320 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3670 do_tcp_getsockopt+0x1a74/0x6320 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3670 Fixes: 05255b823a61 ("tcp: add TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE support for zerocopy receive") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index a385fcaaa03b..dd401757eea1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -1764,10 +1764,11 @@ static int tcp_zerocopy_receive(struct sock *sk, down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); - ret = -EINVAL; vma = find_vma(current->mm, address); - if (!vma || vma->vm_start > address || vma->vm_ops != &tcp_vm_ops) - goto out; + if (!vma || vma->vm_start > address || vma->vm_ops != &tcp_vm_ops) { + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + return -EINVAL; + } zc->length = min_t(unsigned long, zc->length, vma->vm_end - address); tp = tcp_sk(sk); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From a14fbcd4f157a5a97b6013289205559d246c5021 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amol Grover Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 23:31:02 +0530 Subject: ipmr: Fix RCU list debugging warning ipmr_for_each_table() macro uses list_for_each_entry_rcu() for traversing outside of an RCU read side critical section but under the protection of rtnl_mutex. Hence, add the corresponding lockdep expression to silence the following false-positive warning at boot: [ 4.319347] ============================= [ 4.319349] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 4.319351] 5.5.4-stable #17 Tainted: G E [ 4.319352] ----------------------------- [ 4.319354] net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1757 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! Fixes: f0ad0860d01e ("ipv4: ipmr: support multiple tables") Signed-off-by: Amol Grover Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c index 9cf83cc85e4a..4897f7420c8f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c @@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ static void ipmr_expire_process(struct timer_list *t); #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES #define ipmr_for_each_table(mrt, net) \ - list_for_each_entry_rcu(mrt, &net->ipv4.mr_tables, list) + list_for_each_entry_rcu(mrt, &net->ipv4.mr_tables, list, \ + lockdep_rtnl_is_held()) static struct mr_table *ipmr_mr_table_iter(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt) -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 7013908c2db285cd6b48fcd427a56354beac2233 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amol Grover Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 23:31:03 +0530 Subject: ipmr: Add lockdep expression to ipmr_for_each_table macro During the initialization process, ipmr_new_table() is called to create new tables which in turn calls ipmr_get_table() which traverses net->ipv4.mr_tables without holding the writer lock. However, this is safe to do so as no tables exist at this time. Hence add a suitable lockdep expression to silence the following false-positive warning: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.7.0-rc3-next-20200428-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/ipv4/ipmr.c:136 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! ipmr_get_table+0x130/0x160 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:136 ipmr_new_table net/ipv4/ipmr.c:403 [inline] ipmr_rules_init net/ipv4/ipmr.c:248 [inline] ipmr_net_init+0x133/0x430 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:3089 Fixes: f0ad0860d01e ("ipv4: ipmr: support multiple tables") Reported-by: syzbot+1519f497f2f9f08183c6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Amol Grover Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c index 4897f7420c8f..5c218db2dede 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c @@ -109,9 +109,10 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, int flags); static void ipmr_expire_process(struct timer_list *t); #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES -#define ipmr_for_each_table(mrt, net) \ - list_for_each_entry_rcu(mrt, &net->ipv4.mr_tables, list, \ - lockdep_rtnl_is_held()) +#define ipmr_for_each_table(mrt, net) \ + list_for_each_entry_rcu(mrt, &net->ipv4.mr_tables, list, \ + lockdep_rtnl_is_held() || \ + list_empty(&net->ipv4.mr_tables)) static struct mr_table *ipmr_mr_table_iter(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt) -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From b6dd5acde3f165e364881c36de942c5b252e2a27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Madhuparna Bhowmik Date: Sat, 16 May 2020 13:15:15 +0530 Subject: ipv6: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in ip6mr This patch fixes the following warning: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.7.0-rc4-next-20200507-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:124 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! ipmr_new_table() returns an existing table, but there is no table at init. Therefore the condition: either holding rtnl or the list is empty is used. Fixes: d1db275dd3f6e ("ipv6: ip6mr: support multiple tables") Reported-by: kernel test robot Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index 65a54d74acc1..1e223e26f079 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ static void ipmr_expire_process(struct timer_list *t); #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES #define ip6mr_for_each_table(mrt, net) \ list_for_each_entry_rcu(mrt, &net->ipv6.mr6_tables, list, \ - lockdep_rtnl_is_held()) + lockdep_rtnl_is_held() || \ + list_empty(&net->ipv6.mr6_tables)) static struct mr_table *ip6mr_mr_table_iter(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt) -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 5e5502e012b8129e11be616acb0f9c34bc8f8adb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: DENG Qingfang Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 23:10:16 +0800 Subject: net: dsa: mt7530: fix roaming from DSA user ports When a client moves from a DSA user port to a software port in a bridge, it cannot reach any other clients that connected to the DSA user ports. That is because SA learning on the CPU port is disabled, so the switch ignores the client's frames from the CPU port and still thinks it is at the user port. Fix it by enabling SA learning on the CPU port. To prevent the switch from learning from flooding frames from the CPU port, set skb->offload_fwd_mark to 1 for unicast and broadcast frames, and let the switch flood them instead of trapping to the CPU port. Multicast frames still need to be trapped to the CPU port for snooping, so set the SA_DIS bit of the MTK tag to 1 when transmitting those frames to disable SA learning. Fixes: b8f126a8d543 ("net-next: dsa: add dsa support for Mediatek MT7530 switch") Signed-off-by: DENG Qingfang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.c | 9 ++------- drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.h | 1 + net/dsa/tag_mtk.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.c index 5c444cd722bd..34e4aadfa705 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.c @@ -628,11 +628,8 @@ mt7530_cpu_port_enable(struct mt7530_priv *priv, mt7530_write(priv, MT7530_PVC_P(port), PORT_SPEC_TAG); - /* Disable auto learning on the cpu port */ - mt7530_set(priv, MT7530_PSC_P(port), SA_DIS); - - /* Unknown unicast frame fordwarding to the cpu port */ - mt7530_set(priv, MT7530_MFC, UNU_FFP(BIT(port))); + /* Unknown multicast frame forwarding to the cpu port */ + mt7530_rmw(priv, MT7530_MFC, UNM_FFP_MASK, UNM_FFP(BIT(port))); /* Set CPU port number */ if (priv->id == ID_MT7621) @@ -1294,8 +1291,6 @@ mt7530_setup(struct dsa_switch *ds) /* Enable and reset MIB counters */ mt7530_mib_reset(ds); - mt7530_clear(priv, MT7530_MFC, UNU_FFP_MASK); - for (i = 0; i < MT7530_NUM_PORTS; i++) { /* Disable forwarding by default on all ports */ mt7530_rmw(priv, MT7530_PCR_P(i), PCR_MATRIX_MASK, diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.h index 979bb6374678..82af4d2d406e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.h +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ enum { #define MT7530_MFC 0x10 #define BC_FFP(x) (((x) & 0xff) << 24) #define UNM_FFP(x) (((x) & 0xff) << 16) +#define UNM_FFP_MASK UNM_FFP(~0) #define UNU_FFP(x) (((x) & 0xff) << 8) #define UNU_FFP_MASK UNU_FFP(~0) #define CPU_EN BIT(7) diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_mtk.c b/net/dsa/tag_mtk.c index b5705cba8318..d6619edd53e5 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_mtk.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_mtk.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #define MTK_HDR_XMIT_TAGGED_TPID_8100 1 #define MTK_HDR_RECV_SOURCE_PORT_MASK GENMASK(2, 0) #define MTK_HDR_XMIT_DP_BIT_MASK GENMASK(5, 0) +#define MTK_HDR_XMIT_SA_DIS BIT(6) static struct sk_buff *mtk_tag_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) @@ -22,6 +23,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *mtk_tag_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dsa_port *dp = dsa_slave_to_port(dev); u8 *mtk_tag; bool is_vlan_skb = true; + unsigned char *dest = eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest; + bool is_multicast_skb = is_multicast_ether_addr(dest) && + !is_broadcast_ether_addr(dest); /* Build the special tag after the MAC Source Address. If VLAN header * is present, it's required that VLAN header and special tag is @@ -47,6 +51,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *mtk_tag_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, MTK_HDR_XMIT_UNTAGGED; mtk_tag[1] = (1 << dp->index) & MTK_HDR_XMIT_DP_BIT_MASK; + /* Disable SA learning for multicast frames */ + if (unlikely(is_multicast_skb)) + mtk_tag[1] |= MTK_HDR_XMIT_SA_DIS; + /* Tag control information is kept for 802.1Q */ if (!is_vlan_skb) { mtk_tag[2] = 0; @@ -61,6 +69,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *mtk_tag_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, { int port; __be16 *phdr, hdr; + unsigned char *dest = eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest; + bool is_multicast_skb = is_multicast_ether_addr(dest) && + !is_broadcast_ether_addr(dest); if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, MTK_HDR_LEN))) return NULL; @@ -86,6 +97,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *mtk_tag_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, if (!skb->dev) return NULL; + /* Only unicast or broadcast frames are offloaded */ + if (likely(!is_multicast_skb)) + skb->offload_fwd_mark = 1; + return skb; } -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 84be69b869a5a496a6cfde9b3c29509207a1f1fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ahern Date: Sun, 17 May 2020 11:26:32 -0600 Subject: nexthop: Fix attribute checking for groups For nexthop groups, attributes after NHA_GROUP_TYPE are invalid, but nh_check_attr_group starts checking at NHA_GROUP. The group type defaults to multipath and the NHA_GROUP_TYPE is currently optional so this has slipped through so far. Fix the attribute checking to handle support of new group types. Fixes: 430a049190de ("nexthop: Add support for nexthop groups") Signed-off-by: ASSOGBA Emery Signed-off-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/nexthop.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c index fdfca534d094..2a31c4af845e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c +++ b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static int nh_check_attr_group(struct net *net, struct nlattr *tb[], if (!valid_group_nh(nh, len, extack)) return -EINVAL; } - for (i = NHA_GROUP + 1; i < __NHA_MAX; ++i) { + for (i = NHA_GROUP_TYPE + 1; i < __NHA_MAX; ++i) { if (!tb[i]) continue; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From a6211caa634da39d861a47437ffcda8b38ef421b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuqi Jin Date: Sat, 16 May 2020 11:46:49 +0800 Subject: net: revert "net: get rid of an signed integer overflow in ip_idents_reserve()" Commit adb03115f459 ("net: get rid of an signed integer overflow in ip_idents_reserve()") used atomic_cmpxchg to replace "atomic_add_return" inside the function "ip_idents_reserve". The reason was to avoid UBSAN warning. However, this change has caused performance degrade and in GCC-8, fno-strict-overflow is now mapped to -fwrapv -fwrapv-pointer and signed integer overflow is now undefined by default at all optimization levels[1]. Moreover, it was a bug in UBSAN vs -fwrapv /-fno-strict-overflow, so Let's revert it safely. [1] https://gcc.gnu.org/gcc-8/changes.html Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI Cc: Jakub Kicinski Cc: Jiri Pirko Cc: Arvind Sankar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Jiong Wang Signed-off-by: Yuqi Jin Signed-off-by: Shaokun Zhang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/route.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index fa829f31a3f5..b73f540fa19b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -491,18 +491,16 @@ u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs) atomic_t *p_id = ip_idents + hash % IP_IDENTS_SZ; u32 old = READ_ONCE(*p_tstamp); u32 now = (u32)jiffies; - u32 new, delta = 0; + u32 delta = 0; if (old != now && cmpxchg(p_tstamp, old, now) == old) delta = prandom_u32_max(now - old); - /* Do not use atomic_add_return() as it makes UBSAN unhappy */ - do { - old = (u32)atomic_read(p_id); - new = old + delta + segs; - } while (atomic_cmpxchg(p_id, old, new) != old); - - return new - segs; + /* If UBSAN reports an error there, please make sure your compiler + * supports -fno-strict-overflow before reporting it that was a bug + * in UBSAN, and it has been fixed in GCC-8. + */ + return atomic_add_return(segs + delta, p_id) - segs; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_idents_reserve); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 12555a2d97e5784eeb105ca9b1b533d4c95f1115 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Todd Malsbary Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 09:45:34 -0700 Subject: mptcp: use rightmost 64 bits in ADD_ADDR HMAC This changes the HMAC used in the ADD_ADDR option from the leftmost 64 bits to the rightmost 64 bits as described in RFC 8684, section 3.4.1. This issue was discovered while adding support to packetdrill for the ADD_ADDR v1 option. Fixes: 3df523ab582c ("mptcp: Add ADD_ADDR handling") Signed-off-by: Todd Malsbary Acked-by: Christoph Paasch Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mptcp/options.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/options.c b/net/mptcp/options.c index 45497af23906..b88fae233a62 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/options.c +++ b/net/mptcp/options.c @@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ static u64 add_addr_generate_hmac(u64 key1, u64 key2, u8 addr_id, mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(key1, key2, msg, 7, hmac); - return get_unaligned_be64(hmac); + return get_unaligned_be64(&hmac[MPTCP_ADDR_HMAC_LEN - sizeof(u64)]); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP_IPV6) @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static u64 add_addr6_generate_hmac(u64 key1, u64 key2, u8 addr_id, mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(key1, key2, msg, 19, hmac); - return get_unaligned_be64(hmac); + return get_unaligned_be64(&hmac[MPTCP_ADDR_HMAC_LEN - sizeof(u64)]); } #endif -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 88d7fcfa3b1fe670f0412b95be785aafca63352b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin KaFai Lau Date: Mon, 18 May 2020 17:13:34 -0700 Subject: net: inet_csk: Fix so_reuseport bind-address cache in tb->fast* The commit 637bc8bbe6c0 ("inet: reset tb->fastreuseport when adding a reuseport sk") added a bind-address cache in tb->fast*. The tb->fast* caches the address of a sk which has successfully been binded with SO_REUSEPORT ON. The idea is to avoid the expensive conflict search in inet_csk_bind_conflict(). There is an issue with wildcard matching where sk_reuseport_match() should have returned false but it is currently returning true. It ends up hiding bind conflict. For example, bind("[::1]:443"); /* without SO_REUSEPORT. Succeed. */ bind("[::2]:443"); /* with SO_REUSEPORT. Succeed. */ bind("[::]:443"); /* with SO_REUSEPORT. Still Succeed where it shouldn't */ The last bind("[::]:443") with SO_REUSEPORT on should have failed because it should have a conflict with the very first bind("[::1]:443") which has SO_REUSEPORT off. However, the address "[::2]" is cached in tb->fast* in the second bind. In the last bind, the sk_reuseport_match() returns true because the binding sk's wildcard addr "[::]" matches with the "[::2]" cached in tb->fast*. The correct bind conflict is reported by removing the second bind such that tb->fast* cache is not involved and forces the bind("[::]:443") to go through the inet_csk_bind_conflict(): bind("[::1]:443"); /* without SO_REUSEPORT. Succeed. */ bind("[::]:443"); /* with SO_REUSEPORT. -EADDRINUSE */ The expected behavior for sk_reuseport_match() is, it should only allow the "cached" tb->fast* address to be used as a wildcard match but not the address of the binding sk. To do that, the current "bool match_wildcard" arg is split into "bool match_sk1_wildcard" and "bool match_sk2_wildcard". This change only affects the sk_reuseport_match() which is only used by inet_csk (e.g. TCP). The other use cases are calling inet_rcv_saddr_equal() and this patch makes it pass the same "match_wildcard" arg twice to the "ipv[46]_rcv_saddr_equal(..., match_wildcard, match_wildcard)". Cc: Josef Bacik Fixes: 637bc8bbe6c0 ("inet: reset tb->fastreuseport when adding a reuseport sk") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c index 5f34eb951627..65c29f2bd89f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c @@ -24,17 +24,19 @@ #include #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) -/* match_wildcard == true: IPV6_ADDR_ANY equals to any IPv6 addresses if IPv6 - * only, and any IPv4 addresses if not IPv6 only - * match_wildcard == false: addresses must be exactly the same, i.e. - * IPV6_ADDR_ANY only equals to IPV6_ADDR_ANY, - * and 0.0.0.0 equals to 0.0.0.0 only +/* match_sk*_wildcard == true: IPV6_ADDR_ANY equals to any IPv6 addresses + * if IPv6 only, and any IPv4 addresses + * if not IPv6 only + * match_sk*_wildcard == false: addresses must be exactly the same, i.e. + * IPV6_ADDR_ANY only equals to IPV6_ADDR_ANY, + * and 0.0.0.0 equals to 0.0.0.0 only */ static bool ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal(const struct in6_addr *sk1_rcv_saddr6, const struct in6_addr *sk2_rcv_saddr6, __be32 sk1_rcv_saddr, __be32 sk2_rcv_saddr, bool sk1_ipv6only, bool sk2_ipv6only, - bool match_wildcard) + bool match_sk1_wildcard, + bool match_sk2_wildcard) { int addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(sk1_rcv_saddr6); int addr_type2 = sk2_rcv_saddr6 ? ipv6_addr_type(sk2_rcv_saddr6) : IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED; @@ -44,8 +46,8 @@ static bool ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal(const struct in6_addr *sk1_rcv_saddr6, if (!sk2_ipv6only) { if (sk1_rcv_saddr == sk2_rcv_saddr) return true; - if (!sk1_rcv_saddr || !sk2_rcv_saddr) - return match_wildcard; + return (match_sk1_wildcard && !sk1_rcv_saddr) || + (match_sk2_wildcard && !sk2_rcv_saddr); } return false; } @@ -53,11 +55,11 @@ static bool ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal(const struct in6_addr *sk1_rcv_saddr6, if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY && addr_type2 == IPV6_ADDR_ANY) return true; - if (addr_type2 == IPV6_ADDR_ANY && match_wildcard && + if (addr_type2 == IPV6_ADDR_ANY && match_sk2_wildcard && !(sk2_ipv6only && addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)) return true; - if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY && match_wildcard && + if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY && match_sk1_wildcard && !(sk1_ipv6only && addr_type2 == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)) return true; @@ -69,18 +71,19 @@ static bool ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal(const struct in6_addr *sk1_rcv_saddr6, } #endif -/* match_wildcard == true: 0.0.0.0 equals to any IPv4 addresses - * match_wildcard == false: addresses must be exactly the same, i.e. - * 0.0.0.0 only equals to 0.0.0.0 +/* match_sk*_wildcard == true: 0.0.0.0 equals to any IPv4 addresses + * match_sk*_wildcard == false: addresses must be exactly the same, i.e. + * 0.0.0.0 only equals to 0.0.0.0 */ static bool ipv4_rcv_saddr_equal(__be32 sk1_rcv_saddr, __be32 sk2_rcv_saddr, - bool sk2_ipv6only, bool match_wildcard) + bool sk2_ipv6only, bool match_sk1_wildcard, + bool match_sk2_wildcard) { if (!sk2_ipv6only) { if (sk1_rcv_saddr == sk2_rcv_saddr) return true; - if (!sk1_rcv_saddr || !sk2_rcv_saddr) - return match_wildcard; + return (match_sk1_wildcard && !sk1_rcv_saddr) || + (match_sk2_wildcard && !sk2_rcv_saddr); } return false; } @@ -96,10 +99,12 @@ bool inet_rcv_saddr_equal(const struct sock *sk, const struct sock *sk2, sk2->sk_rcv_saddr, ipv6_only_sock(sk), ipv6_only_sock(sk2), + match_wildcard, match_wildcard); #endif return ipv4_rcv_saddr_equal(sk->sk_rcv_saddr, sk2->sk_rcv_saddr, - ipv6_only_sock(sk2), match_wildcard); + ipv6_only_sock(sk2), match_wildcard, + match_wildcard); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_rcv_saddr_equal); @@ -285,10 +290,10 @@ static inline int sk_reuseport_match(struct inet_bind_bucket *tb, tb->fast_rcv_saddr, sk->sk_rcv_saddr, tb->fast_ipv6_only, - ipv6_only_sock(sk), true); + ipv6_only_sock(sk), true, false); #endif return ipv4_rcv_saddr_equal(tb->fast_rcv_saddr, sk->sk_rcv_saddr, - ipv6_only_sock(sk), true); + ipv6_only_sock(sk), true, false); } /* Obtain a reference to a local port for the given sock, -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From c0bbbdc32febd4f034ecbf3ea17865785b2c0652 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Boris Sukholitko Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 10:32:37 +0300 Subject: __netif_receive_skb_core: pass skb by reference __netif_receive_skb_core may change the skb pointer passed into it (e.g. in rx_handler). The original skb may be freed as a result of this operation. The callers of __netif_receive_skb_core may further process original skb by using pt_prev pointer returned by __netif_receive_skb_core thus leading to unpleasant effects. The solution is to pass skb by reference into __netif_receive_skb_core. v2: Added Fixes tag and comment regarding ppt_prev and skb invariant. Fixes: 88eb1944e18c ("net: core: propagate SKB lists through packet_type lookup") Signed-off-by: Boris Sukholitko Acked-by: Edward Cree Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dev.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 6d327b7aa813..2d8aceee4284 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -4988,11 +4988,12 @@ static inline int nf_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb, struct packet_type **pt_prev, return 0; } -static int __netif_receive_skb_core(struct sk_buff *skb, bool pfmemalloc, +static int __netif_receive_skb_core(struct sk_buff **pskb, bool pfmemalloc, struct packet_type **ppt_prev) { struct packet_type *ptype, *pt_prev; rx_handler_func_t *rx_handler; + struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb; struct net_device *orig_dev; bool deliver_exact = false; int ret = NET_RX_DROP; @@ -5023,8 +5024,10 @@ another_round: ret2 = do_xdp_generic(rcu_dereference(skb->dev->xdp_prog), skb); preempt_enable(); - if (ret2 != XDP_PASS) - return NET_RX_DROP; + if (ret2 != XDP_PASS) { + ret = NET_RX_DROP; + goto out; + } skb_reset_mac_len(skb); } @@ -5174,6 +5177,13 @@ drop: } out: + /* The invariant here is that if *ppt_prev is not NULL + * then skb should also be non-NULL. + * + * Apparently *ppt_prev assignment above holds this invariant due to + * skb dereferencing near it. + */ + *pskb = skb; return ret; } @@ -5183,7 +5193,7 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb_one_core(struct sk_buff *skb, bool pfmemalloc) struct packet_type *pt_prev = NULL; int ret; - ret = __netif_receive_skb_core(skb, pfmemalloc, &pt_prev); + ret = __netif_receive_skb_core(&skb, pfmemalloc, &pt_prev); if (pt_prev) ret = INDIRECT_CALL_INET(pt_prev->func, ipv6_rcv, ip_rcv, skb, skb->dev, pt_prev, orig_dev); @@ -5261,7 +5271,7 @@ static void __netif_receive_skb_list_core(struct list_head *head, bool pfmemallo struct packet_type *pt_prev = NULL; skb_list_del_init(skb); - __netif_receive_skb_core(skb, pfmemalloc, &pt_prev); + __netif_receive_skb_core(&skb, pfmemalloc, &pt_prev); if (!pt_prev) continue; if (pt_curr != pt_prev || od_curr != orig_dev) { -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 20a785aa52c82246055a089e55df9dac47d67da1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Neil Horman Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 16:04:05 -0400 Subject: sctp: Don't add the shutdown timer if its already been added This BUG halt was reported a while back, but the patch somehow got missed: PID: 2879 TASK: c16adaa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "sctpn" #0 [f418dd28] crash_kexec at c04a7d8c #1 [f418dd7c] oops_end at c0863e02 #2 [f418dd90] do_invalid_op at c040aaca #3 [f418de28] error_code (via invalid_op) at c08631a5 EAX: f34baac0 EBX: 00000090 ECX: f418deb0 EDX: f5542950 EBP: 00000000 DS: 007b ESI: f34ba800 ES: 007b EDI: f418dea0 GS: 00e0 CS: 0060 EIP: c046fa5e ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010286 #4 [f418de5c] add_timer at c046fa5e #5 [f418de68] sctp_do_sm at f8db8c77 [sctp] #6 [f418df30] sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN at f8dcc1b5 [sctp] #7 [f418df48] inet_shutdown at c080baf9 #8 [f418df5c] sys_shutdown at c079eedf #9 [f418df70] sys_socketcall at c079fe88 EAX: ffffffda EBX: 0000000d ECX: bfceea90 EDX: 0937af98 DS: 007b ESI: 0000000c ES: 007b EDI: b7150ae4 SS: 007b ESP: bfceea7c EBP: bfceeaa8 GS: 0033 CS: 0073 EIP: b775c424 ERR: 00000066 EFLAGS: 00000282 It appears that the side effect that starts the shutdown timer was processed multiple times, which can happen as multiple paths can trigger it. This of course leads to the BUG halt in add_timer getting called. Fix seems pretty straightforward, just check before the timer is added if its already been started. If it has mod the timer instead to min(current expiration, new expiration) Its been tested but not confirmed to fix the problem, as the issue has only occured in production environments where test kernels are enjoined from being installed. It appears to be a sane fix to me though. Also, recentely, Jere found a reproducer posted on list to confirm that this resolves the issues Signed-off-by: Neil Horman CC: Vlad Yasevich CC: "David S. Miller" CC: jere.leppanen@nokia.com CC: marcelo.leitner@gmail.com CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c index 2bc29463e1dc..9f36fe911d08 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c @@ -1523,9 +1523,17 @@ static int sctp_cmd_interpreter(enum sctp_event_type event_type, timeout = asoc->timeouts[cmd->obj.to]; BUG_ON(!timeout); - timer->expires = jiffies + timeout; - sctp_association_hold(asoc); - add_timer(timer); + /* + * SCTP has a hard time with timer starts. Because we process + * timer starts as side effects, it can be hard to tell if we + * have already started a timer or not, which leads to BUG + * halts when we call add_timer. So here, instead of just starting + * a timer, if the timer is already started, and just mod + * the timer with the shorter of the two expiration times + */ + if (!timer_pending(timer)) + sctp_association_hold(asoc); + timer_reduce(timer, jiffies + timeout); break; case SCTP_CMD_TIMER_RESTART: -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From d1f129470e6cb79b8b97fecd12689f6eb49e27fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 22:06:54 +0100 Subject: rxrpc: Trace discarded ACKs Add a tracepoint to track received ACKs that are discarded due to being outside of the Tx window. Signed-off-by: David Howells --- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/rxrpc/input.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h index ab75f261f04a..ba9efdc848f9 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +++ b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h @@ -1541,6 +1541,41 @@ TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_notify_socket, __entry->serial) ); +TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_rx_discard_ack, + TP_PROTO(unsigned int debug_id, rxrpc_serial_t serial, + rxrpc_seq_t first_soft_ack, rxrpc_seq_t call_ackr_first, + rxrpc_seq_t prev_pkt, rxrpc_seq_t call_ackr_prev), + + TP_ARGS(debug_id, serial, first_soft_ack, call_ackr_first, + prev_pkt, call_ackr_prev), + + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(unsigned int, debug_id ) + __field(rxrpc_serial_t, serial ) + __field(rxrpc_seq_t, first_soft_ack) + __field(rxrpc_seq_t, call_ackr_first) + __field(rxrpc_seq_t, prev_pkt) + __field(rxrpc_seq_t, call_ackr_prev) + ), + + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->debug_id = debug_id; + __entry->serial = serial; + __entry->first_soft_ack = first_soft_ack; + __entry->call_ackr_first = call_ackr_first; + __entry->prev_pkt = prev_pkt; + __entry->call_ackr_prev = call_ackr_prev; + ), + + TP_printk("c=%08x r=%08x %08x<%08x %08x<%08x", + __entry->debug_id, + __entry->serial, + __entry->first_soft_ack, + __entry->call_ackr_first, + __entry->prev_pkt, + __entry->call_ackr_prev) + ); + #endif /* _TRACE_RXRPC_H */ /* This part must be outside protection */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c index e438bfd3fdf5..2f22f082a66c 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/input.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c @@ -866,8 +866,12 @@ static void rxrpc_input_ack(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) /* Discard any out-of-order or duplicate ACKs (outside lock). */ if (before(first_soft_ack, call->ackr_first_seq) || - before(prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq)) + before(prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq)) { + trace_rxrpc_rx_discard_ack(call->debug_id, sp->hdr.serial, + first_soft_ack, call->ackr_first_seq, + prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq); return; + } buf.info.rxMTU = 0; ioffset = offset + nr_acks + 3; @@ -879,8 +883,12 @@ static void rxrpc_input_ack(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) /* Discard any out-of-order or duplicate ACKs (inside lock). */ if (before(first_soft_ack, call->ackr_first_seq) || - before(prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq)) + before(prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq)) { + trace_rxrpc_rx_discard_ack(call->debug_id, sp->hdr.serial, + first_soft_ack, call->ackr_first_seq, + prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq); goto out; + } call->acks_latest_ts = skb->tstamp; call->ackr_first_seq = first_soft_ack; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 441fdee1eaf050ef0040bde0d7af075c1c6a6d8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 23:48:43 +0100 Subject: rxrpc: Fix ack discard The Rx protocol has a "previousPacket" field in it that is not handled in the same way by all protocol implementations. Sometimes it contains the serial number of the last DATA packet received, sometimes the sequence number of the last DATA packet received and sometimes the highest sequence number so far received. AF_RXRPC is using this to weed out ACKs that are out of date (it's possible for ACK packets to get reordered on the wire), but this does not work with OpenAFS which will just stick the sequence number of the last packet seen into previousPacket. The issue being seen is that big AFS FS.StoreData RPC (eg. of ~256MiB) are timing out when partly sent. A trace was captured, with an additional tracepoint to show ACKs being discarded in rxrpc_input_ack(). Here's an excerpt showing the problem. 52873.203230: rxrpc_tx_data: c=000004ae DATA ed1a3584:00000002 0002449c q=00024499 fl=09 A DATA packet with sequence number 00024499 has been transmitted (the "q=" field). ... 52873.243296: rxrpc_rx_ack: c=000004ae 00012a2b DLY r=00024499 f=00024497 p=00024496 n=0 52873.243376: rxrpc_rx_ack: c=000004ae 00012a2c IDL r=0002449b f=00024499 p=00024498 n=0 52873.243383: rxrpc_rx_ack: c=000004ae 00012a2d OOS r=0002449d f=00024499 p=0002449a n=2 The Out-Of-Sequence ACK indicates that the server didn't see DATA sequence number 00024499, but did see seq 0002449a (previousPacket, shown as "p=", skipped the number, but firstPacket, "f=", which shows the bottom of the window is set at that point). 52873.252663: rxrpc_retransmit: c=000004ae q=24499 a=02 xp=14581537 52873.252664: rxrpc_tx_data: c=000004ae DATA ed1a3584:00000002 000244bc q=00024499 fl=0b *RETRANS* The packet has been retransmitted. Retransmission recurs until the peer says it got the packet. 52873.271013: rxrpc_rx_ack: c=000004ae 00012a31 OOS r=000244a1 f=00024499 p=0002449e n=6 More OOS ACKs indicate that the other packets that are already in the transmission pipeline are being received. The specific-ACK list is up to 6 ACKs and NAKs. ... 52873.284792: rxrpc_rx_ack: c=000004ae 00012a49 OOS r=000244b9 f=00024499 p=000244b6 n=30 52873.284802: rxrpc_retransmit: c=000004ae q=24499 a=0a xp=63505500 52873.284804: rxrpc_tx_data: c=000004ae DATA ed1a3584:00000002 000244c2 q=00024499 fl=0b *RETRANS* 52873.287468: rxrpc_rx_ack: c=000004ae 00012a4a OOS r=000244ba f=00024499 p=000244b7 n=31 52873.287478: rxrpc_rx_ack: c=000004ae 00012a4b OOS r=000244bb f=00024499 p=000244b8 n=32 At this point, the server's receive window is full (n=32) with presumably 1 NAK'd packet and 31 ACK'd packets. We can't transmit any more packets. 52873.287488: rxrpc_retransmit: c=000004ae q=24499 a=0a xp=61327980 52873.287489: rxrpc_tx_data: c=000004ae DATA ed1a3584:00000002 000244c3 q=00024499 fl=0b *RETRANS* 52873.293850: rxrpc_rx_ack: c=000004ae 00012a4c DLY r=000244bc f=000244a0 p=00024499 n=25 And now we've received an ACK indicating that a DATA retransmission was received. 7 packets have been processed (the occupied part of the window moved, as indicated by f= and n=). 52873.293853: rxrpc_rx_discard_ack: c=000004ae r=00012a4c 000244a0<00024499 00024499<000244b8 However, the DLY ACK gets discarded because its previousPacket has gone backwards (from p=000244b8, in the ACK at 52873.287478 to p=00024499 in the ACK at 52873.293850). We then end up in a continuous cycle of retransmit/discard. kafs fails to update its window because it's discarding the ACKs and can't transmit an extra packet that would clear the issue because the window is full. OpenAFS doesn't change the previousPacket value in the ACKs because no new DATA packets are received with a different previousPacket number. Fix this by altering the discard check to only discard an ACK based on previousPacket if there was no advance in the firstPacket. This allows us to transmit a new packet which will cause previousPacket to advance in the next ACK. The check, however, needs to allow for the possibility that previousPacket may actually have had the serial number placed in it instead - in which case it will go outside the window and we should ignore it. Fixes: 1a2391c30c0b ("rxrpc: Fix detection of out of order acks") Reported-by: Dave Botsch Signed-off-by: David Howells --- net/rxrpc/input.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c index 2f22f082a66c..3be4177baf70 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/input.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c @@ -802,6 +802,30 @@ static void rxrpc_input_soft_acks(struct rxrpc_call *call, u8 *acks, } } +/* + * Return true if the ACK is valid - ie. it doesn't appear to have regressed + * with respect to the ack state conveyed by preceding ACKs. + */ +static bool rxrpc_is_ack_valid(struct rxrpc_call *call, + rxrpc_seq_t first_pkt, rxrpc_seq_t prev_pkt) +{ + rxrpc_seq_t base = READ_ONCE(call->ackr_first_seq); + + if (after(first_pkt, base)) + return true; /* The window advanced */ + + if (before(first_pkt, base)) + return false; /* firstPacket regressed */ + + if (after_eq(prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq)) + return true; /* previousPacket hasn't regressed. */ + + /* Some rx implementations put a serial number in previousPacket. */ + if (after_eq(prev_pkt, base + call->tx_winsize)) + return false; + return true; +} + /* * Process an ACK packet. * @@ -865,8 +889,7 @@ static void rxrpc_input_ack(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) } /* Discard any out-of-order or duplicate ACKs (outside lock). */ - if (before(first_soft_ack, call->ackr_first_seq) || - before(prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq)) { + if (!rxrpc_is_ack_valid(call, first_soft_ack, prev_pkt)) { trace_rxrpc_rx_discard_ack(call->debug_id, sp->hdr.serial, first_soft_ack, call->ackr_first_seq, prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq); @@ -882,8 +905,7 @@ static void rxrpc_input_ack(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) spin_lock(&call->input_lock); /* Discard any out-of-order or duplicate ACKs (inside lock). */ - if (before(first_soft_ack, call->ackr_first_seq) || - before(prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq)) { + if (!rxrpc_is_ack_valid(call, first_soft_ack, prev_pkt)) { trace_rxrpc_rx_discard_ack(call->debug_id, sp->hdr.serial, first_soft_ack, call->ackr_first_seq, prev_pkt, call->ackr_prev_seq); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 687775cec056b38a4c8f3291e0dd7a9145f7b667 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 18:24:43 -0700 Subject: ax25: fix setsockopt(SO_BINDTODEVICE) syzbot was able to trigger this trace [1], probably by using a zero optlen. While we are at it, cap optlen to IFNAMSIZ - 1 instead of IFNAMSIZ. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strnlen+0xf9/0x170 lib/string.c:569 CPU: 0 PID: 8807 Comm: syz-executor483 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118 kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:121 __msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215 strnlen+0xf9/0x170 lib/string.c:569 dev_name_hash net/core/dev.c:207 [inline] netdev_name_node_lookup net/core/dev.c:277 [inline] __dev_get_by_name+0x75/0x2b0 net/core/dev.c:778 ax25_setsockopt+0xfa3/0x1170 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:654 __compat_sys_setsockopt+0x4ed/0x910 net/compat.c:403 __do_compat_sys_setsockopt net/compat.c:413 [inline] __se_compat_sys_setsockopt+0xdd/0x100 net/compat.c:410 __ia32_compat_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x80 net/compat.c:410 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:339 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3bf/0x6d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:398 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x68/0x77 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139 RIP: 0023:0xf7f57dd9 Code: 90 e8 0b 00 00 00 f3 90 0f ae e8 eb f9 8d 74 26 00 89 3c 24 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 eb 0d 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 002b:00000000ffae8c1c EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000016e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000101 RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000012 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Local variable ----devname@ax25_setsockopt created at: ax25_setsockopt+0xe6/0x1170 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:536 ax25_setsockopt+0xe6/0x1170 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:536 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c index ff57ea89c27e..fd91cd34f25e 100644 --- a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c +++ b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c @@ -635,8 +635,10 @@ static int ax25_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, break; case SO_BINDTODEVICE: - if (optlen > IFNAMSIZ) - optlen = IFNAMSIZ; + if (optlen > IFNAMSIZ - 1) + optlen = IFNAMSIZ - 1; + + memset(devname, 0, sizeof(devname)); if (copy_from_user(devname, optval, optlen)) { res = -EFAULT; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From d69100b8eee27c2d60ee52df76e0b80a8d492d34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Worley Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 21:57:12 -0400 Subject: net: nlmsg_cancel() if put fails for nhmsg Fixes data remnant seen when we fail to reserve space for a nexthop group during a larger dump. If we fail the reservation, we goto nla_put_failure and cancel the message. Reproduce with the following iproute2 commands: ===================== ip link add dummy1 type dummy ip link add dummy2 type dummy ip link add dummy3 type dummy ip link add dummy4 type dummy ip link add dummy5 type dummy ip link add dummy6 type dummy ip link add dummy7 type dummy ip link add dummy8 type dummy ip link add dummy9 type dummy ip link add dummy10 type dummy ip link add dummy11 type dummy ip link add dummy12 type dummy ip link add dummy13 type dummy ip link add dummy14 type dummy ip link add dummy15 type dummy ip link add dummy16 type dummy ip link add dummy17 type dummy ip link add dummy18 type dummy ip link add dummy19 type dummy ip link add dummy20 type dummy ip link add dummy21 type dummy ip link add dummy22 type dummy ip link add dummy23 type dummy ip link add dummy24 type dummy ip link add dummy25 type dummy ip link add dummy26 type dummy ip link add dummy27 type dummy ip link add dummy28 type dummy ip link add dummy29 type dummy ip link add dummy30 type dummy ip link add dummy31 type dummy ip link add dummy32 type dummy ip link set dummy1 up ip link set dummy2 up ip link set dummy3 up ip link set dummy4 up ip link set dummy5 up ip link set dummy6 up ip link set dummy7 up ip link set dummy8 up ip link set dummy9 up ip link set dummy10 up ip link set dummy11 up ip link set dummy12 up ip link set dummy13 up ip link set dummy14 up ip link set dummy15 up ip link set dummy16 up ip link set dummy17 up ip link set dummy18 up ip link set dummy19 up ip link set dummy20 up ip link set dummy21 up ip link set dummy22 up ip link set dummy23 up ip link set dummy24 up ip link set dummy25 up ip link set dummy26 up ip link set dummy27 up ip link set dummy28 up ip link set dummy29 up ip link set dummy30 up ip link set dummy31 up ip link set dummy32 up ip link set dummy33 up ip link set dummy34 up ip link set vrf-red up ip link set vrf-blue up ip link set dummyVRFred up ip link set dummyVRFblue up ip ro add 1.1.1.1/32 dev dummy1 ip ro add 1.1.1.2/32 dev dummy2 ip ro add 1.1.1.3/32 dev dummy3 ip ro add 1.1.1.4/32 dev dummy4 ip ro add 1.1.1.5/32 dev dummy5 ip ro add 1.1.1.6/32 dev dummy6 ip ro add 1.1.1.7/32 dev dummy7 ip ro add 1.1.1.8/32 dev dummy8 ip ro add 1.1.1.9/32 dev dummy9 ip ro add 1.1.1.10/32 dev dummy10 ip ro add 1.1.1.11/32 dev dummy11 ip ro add 1.1.1.12/32 dev dummy12 ip ro add 1.1.1.13/32 dev dummy13 ip ro add 1.1.1.14/32 dev dummy14 ip ro add 1.1.1.15/32 dev dummy15 ip ro add 1.1.1.16/32 dev dummy16 ip ro add 1.1.1.17/32 dev dummy17 ip ro add 1.1.1.18/32 dev dummy18 ip ro add 1.1.1.19/32 dev dummy19 ip ro add 1.1.1.20/32 dev dummy20 ip ro add 1.1.1.21/32 dev dummy21 ip ro add 1.1.1.22/32 dev dummy22 ip ro add 1.1.1.23/32 dev dummy23 ip ro add 1.1.1.24/32 dev dummy24 ip ro add 1.1.1.25/32 dev dummy25 ip ro add 1.1.1.26/32 dev dummy26 ip ro add 1.1.1.27/32 dev dummy27 ip ro add 1.1.1.28/32 dev dummy28 ip ro add 1.1.1.29/32 dev dummy29 ip ro add 1.1.1.30/32 dev dummy30 ip ro add 1.1.1.31/32 dev dummy31 ip ro add 1.1.1.32/32 dev dummy32 ip next add id 1 via 1.1.1.1 dev dummy1 ip next add id 2 via 1.1.1.2 dev dummy2 ip next add id 3 via 1.1.1.3 dev dummy3 ip next add id 4 via 1.1.1.4 dev dummy4 ip next add id 5 via 1.1.1.5 dev dummy5 ip next add id 6 via 1.1.1.6 dev dummy6 ip next add id 7 via 1.1.1.7 dev dummy7 ip next add id 8 via 1.1.1.8 dev dummy8 ip next add id 9 via 1.1.1.9 dev dummy9 ip next add id 10 via 1.1.1.10 dev dummy10 ip next add id 11 via 1.1.1.11 dev dummy11 ip next add id 12 via 1.1.1.12 dev dummy12 ip next add id 13 via 1.1.1.13 dev dummy13 ip next add id 14 via 1.1.1.14 dev dummy14 ip next add id 15 via 1.1.1.15 dev dummy15 ip next add id 16 via 1.1.1.16 dev dummy16 ip next add id 17 via 1.1.1.17 dev dummy17 ip next add id 18 via 1.1.1.18 dev dummy18 ip next add id 19 via 1.1.1.19 dev dummy19 ip next add id 20 via 1.1.1.20 dev dummy20 ip next add id 21 via 1.1.1.21 dev dummy21 ip next add id 22 via 1.1.1.22 dev dummy22 ip next add id 23 via 1.1.1.23 dev dummy23 ip next add id 24 via 1.1.1.24 dev dummy24 ip next add id 25 via 1.1.1.25 dev dummy25 ip next add id 26 via 1.1.1.26 dev dummy26 ip next add id 27 via 1.1.1.27 dev dummy27 ip next add id 28 via 1.1.1.28 dev dummy28 ip next add id 29 via 1.1.1.29 dev dummy29 ip next add id 30 via 1.1.1.30 dev dummy30 ip next add id 31 via 1.1.1.31 dev dummy31 ip next add id 32 via 1.1.1.32 dev dummy32 i=100 while [ $i -le 200 ] do ip next add id $i group 1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8/9/10/11/12/13/14/15/16/17/18/19 echo $i ((i++)) done ip next add id 999 group 1/2/3/4/5/6 ip next ls ======================== Fixes: ab84be7e54fc ("net: Initial nexthop code") Signed-off-by: Stephen Worley Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/nexthop.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c index 2a31c4af845e..715e14475220 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/nexthop.c +++ b/net/ipv4/nexthop.c @@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ out: return 0; nla_put_failure: + nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh); return -EMSGSIZE; } -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 7c87e32d2e380228ada79d20ac5b7674718ef097 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Kubecek Date: Sun, 10 May 2020 21:04:09 +0200 Subject: ethtool: count header size in reply size estimate As ethnl_request_ops::reply_size handlers do not include common header size into calculated/estimated reply size, it needs to be added in ethnl_default_doit() and ethnl_default_notify() before allocating the message. On the other hand, strset_reply_size() should not add common header size. Fixes: 728480f12442 ("ethtool: default handlers for GET requests") Reported-by: Oleksij Rempel Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ethtool/netlink.c | 4 ++-- net/ethtool/strset.c | 1 - 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ethtool/netlink.c b/net/ethtool/netlink.c index 0c772318c023..ed5357210193 100644 --- a/net/ethtool/netlink.c +++ b/net/ethtool/netlink.c @@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static int ethnl_default_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) ret = ops->reply_size(req_info, reply_data); if (ret < 0) goto err_cleanup; - reply_len = ret; + reply_len = ret + ethnl_reply_header_size(); ret = -ENOMEM; rskb = ethnl_reply_init(reply_len, req_info->dev, ops->reply_cmd, ops->hdr_attr, info, &reply_payload); @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ static void ethnl_default_notify(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int cmd, ret = ops->reply_size(req_info, reply_data); if (ret < 0) goto err_cleanup; - reply_len = ret; + reply_len = ret + ethnl_reply_header_size(); ret = -ENOMEM; skb = genlmsg_new(reply_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!skb) diff --git a/net/ethtool/strset.c b/net/ethtool/strset.c index 95eae5c68a52..0eed4e4909ab 100644 --- a/net/ethtool/strset.c +++ b/net/ethtool/strset.c @@ -324,7 +324,6 @@ static int strset_reply_size(const struct ethnl_req_info *req_base, int len = 0; int ret; - len += ethnl_reply_header_size(); for (i = 0; i < ETH_SS_COUNT; i++) { const struct strset_info *set_info = &data->sets[i]; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From d28ea1fbbf437054ef339afec241019f2c4e2bb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Manivannan Sadhasivam Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 23:44:16 +0530 Subject: net: qrtr: Fix passing invalid reference to qrtr_local_enqueue() Once the traversal of the list is completed with list_for_each_entry(), the iterator (node) will point to an invalid object. So passing this to qrtr_local_enqueue() which is outside of the iterator block is erroneous eventhough the object is not used. So fix this by passing NULL to qrtr_local_enqueue(). Fixes: bdabad3e363d ("net: Add Qualcomm IPC router") Reported-by: kbuild test robot Reported-by: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/qrtr/qrtr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/qrtr/qrtr.c b/net/qrtr/qrtr.c index 7ed31b5e77e4..2d8d6131bc5f 100644 --- a/net/qrtr/qrtr.c +++ b/net/qrtr/qrtr.c @@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ static int qrtr_bcast_enqueue(struct qrtr_node *node, struct sk_buff *skb, } mutex_unlock(&qrtr_node_lock); - qrtr_local_enqueue(node, skb, type, from, to); + qrtr_local_enqueue(NULL, skb, type, from, to); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From a7bff11f6f9afa87c25711db8050c9b5324db0e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vadim Fedorenko Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 11:41:43 +0300 Subject: net/tls: fix encryption error checking bpf_exec_tx_verdict() can return negative value for copied variable. In that case this value will be pushed back to caller and the real error code will be lost. Fix it using signed type and checking for positive value. Fixes: d10523d0b3d7 ("net/tls: free the record on encryption error") Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index e23f94a5549b..57f80823330e 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags, static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk, bool full_record, u8 record_type, - size_t *copied, int flags) + ssize_t *copied, int flags) { struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); @@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA; bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter); bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE); - size_t try_to_copy, copied = 0; + size_t try_to_copy; + ssize_t copied = 0; struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en; struct tls_rec *rec; int required_size; @@ -1118,7 +1119,7 @@ send_end: release_sock(sk); mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); - return copied ? copied : ret; + return copied > 0 ? copied : ret; } static int tls_sw_do_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page, @@ -1132,7 +1133,7 @@ static int tls_sw_do_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page, struct sk_msg *msg_pl; struct tls_rec *rec; int num_async = 0; - size_t copied = 0; + ssize_t copied = 0; bool full_record; int record_room; int ret = 0; @@ -1234,7 +1235,7 @@ wait_for_memory: } sendpage_end: ret = sk_stream_error(sk, flags, ret); - return copied ? copied : ret; + return copied > 0 ? copied : ret; } int tls_sw_sendpage_locked(struct sock *sk, struct page *page, -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 635d9398178659d8ddba79dd061f9451cec0b4d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vadim Fedorenko Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 11:41:44 +0300 Subject: net/tls: free record only on encryption error We cannot free record on any transient error because it leads to losing previos data. Check socket error to know whether record must be freed or not. Fixes: d10523d0b3d7 ("net/tls: free the record on encryption error") Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 57f80823330e..2d399b6c4075 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -796,9 +796,10 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk, psock = sk_psock_get(sk); if (!psock || !policy) { err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type); - if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS) { + if (err && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) { *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg); tls_free_open_rec(sk); + err = -sk->sk_err; } if (psock) sk_psock_put(sk, psock); @@ -824,9 +825,10 @@ more_data: switch (psock->eval) { case __SK_PASS: err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type); - if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS) { + if (err && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) { *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg); tls_free_open_rec(sk); + err = -sk->sk_err; goto out_err; } break; -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 57ebc8f08504f176eb0f25b3e0fde517dec61a4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vadim Fedorenko Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 11:50:48 +0300 Subject: net: ipip: fix wrong address family in init error path In case of error with MPLS support the code is misusing AF_INET instead of AF_MPLS. Fixes: 1b69e7e6c4da ("ipip: support MPLS over IPv4") Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ipip.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipip.c b/net/ipv4/ipip.c index 2f01cf6fa0de..678575adaf3b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipip.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipip.c @@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ out: rtnl_link_failed: #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPLS) - xfrm4_tunnel_deregister(&mplsip_handler, AF_INET); + xfrm4_tunnel_deregister(&mplsip_handler, AF_MPLS); xfrm_tunnel_mplsip_failed: #endif -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 41b4bd986f86331efc599b9a3f5fb86ad92e9af9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sabrina Dubroca Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 11:15:46 +0200 Subject: net: don't return invalid table id error when we fall back to PF_UNSPEC In case we can't find a ->dumpit callback for the requested (family,type) pair, we fall back to (PF_UNSPEC,type). In effect, we're in the same situation as if userspace had requested a PF_UNSPEC dump. For RTM_GETROUTE, that handler is rtnl_dump_all, which calls all the registered RTM_GETROUTE handlers. The requested table id may or may not exist for all of those families. commit ae677bbb4441 ("net: Don't return invalid table id error when dumping all families") fixed the problem when userspace explicitly requests a PF_UNSPEC dump, but missed the fallback case. For example, when we pass ipv6.disable=1 to a kernel with CONFIG_IP_MROUTE=y and CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y, the (PF_INET6, RTM_GETROUTE) handler isn't registered, so we end up in rtnl_dump_all, and listing IPv6 routes will unexpectedly print: # ip -6 r Error: ipv4: MR table does not exist. Dump terminated commit ae677bbb4441 introduced the dump_all_families variable, which gets set when userspace requests a PF_UNSPEC dump. However, we can't simply set the family to PF_UNSPEC in rtnetlink_rcv_msg in the fallback case to get dump_all_families == true, because some messages types (for example RTM_GETRULE and RTM_GETNEIGH) only register the PF_UNSPEC handler and use the family to filter in the kernel what is dumped to userspace. We would then export more entries, that userspace would have to filter. iproute does that, but other programs may not. Instead, this patch removes dump_all_families and updates the RTM_GETROUTE handlers to check if the family that is being dumped is their own. When it's not, which covers both the intentional PF_UNSPEC dumps (as dump_all_families did) and the fallback case, ignore the missing table id error. Fixes: cb167893f41e ("net: Plumb support for filtering ipv4 and ipv6 multicast route dumps") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/ip_fib.h | 1 - net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 3 +-- net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/ip_fib.h b/include/net/ip_fib.h index 59e0d4e99f94..b219a8fe0950 100644 --- a/include/net/ip_fib.h +++ b/include/net/ip_fib.h @@ -257,7 +257,6 @@ struct fib_dump_filter { u32 table_id; /* filter_set is an optimization that an entry is set */ bool filter_set; - bool dump_all_families; bool dump_routes; bool dump_exceptions; unsigned char protocol; diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c index 213be9c050ad..1bf9da3a75f9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c @@ -918,7 +918,6 @@ int ip_valid_fib_dump_req(struct net *net, const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, else filter->dump_exceptions = false; - filter->dump_all_families = (rtm->rtm_family == AF_UNSPEC); filter->flags = rtm->rtm_flags; filter->protocol = rtm->rtm_protocol; filter->rt_type = rtm->rtm_type; @@ -990,7 +989,7 @@ static int inet_dump_fib(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) if (filter.table_id) { tb = fib_get_table(net, filter.table_id); if (!tb) { - if (filter.dump_all_families) + if (rtnl_msg_family(cb->nlh) != PF_INET) return skb->len; NL_SET_ERR_MSG(cb->extack, "ipv4: FIB table does not exist"); diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c index 5c218db2dede..b2363b82b48d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c @@ -2613,7 +2613,7 @@ static int ipmr_rtm_dumproute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) mrt = ipmr_get_table(sock_net(skb->sk), filter.table_id); if (!mrt) { - if (filter.dump_all_families) + if (rtnl_msg_family(cb->nlh) != RTNL_FAMILY_IPMR) return skb->len; NL_SET_ERR_MSG(cb->extack, "ipv4: MR table does not exist"); diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c index 46ed56719476..20314895509c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int inet6_dump_fib(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) if (arg.filter.table_id) { tb = fib6_get_table(net, arg.filter.table_id); if (!tb) { - if (arg.filter.dump_all_families) + if (rtnl_msg_family(cb->nlh) != PF_INET6) goto out; NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(cb->extack, "FIB table does not exist"); diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index 1e223e26f079..1f4d20e97c07 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -2503,7 +2503,7 @@ static int ip6mr_rtm_dumproute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) mrt = ip6mr_get_table(sock_net(skb->sk), filter.table_id); if (!mrt) { - if (filter.dump_all_families) + if (rtnl_msg_family(cb->nlh) != RTNL_FAMILY_IP6MR) return skb->len; NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(cb->extack, "MR table does not exist"); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 5cf65922bb15279402e1e19b5ee8c51d618fa51f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Sitnicki Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 10:34:35 +0200 Subject: flow_dissector: Drop BPF flow dissector prog ref on netns cleanup When attaching a flow dissector program to a network namespace with bpf(BPF_PROG_ATTACH, ...) we grab a reference to bpf_prog. If netns gets destroyed while a flow dissector is still attached, and there are no other references to the prog, we leak the reference and the program remains loaded. Leak can be reproduced by running flow dissector tests from selftests/bpf: # bpftool prog list # ./test_flow_dissector.sh ... selftests: test_flow_dissector [PASS] # bpftool prog list 4: flow_dissector name _dissect tag e314084d332a5338 gpl loaded_at 2020-05-20T18:50:53+0200 uid 0 xlated 552B jited 355B memlock 4096B map_ids 3,4 btf_id 4 # Fix it by detaching the flow dissector program when netns is going away. Fixes: d58e468b1112 ("flow_dissector: implements flow dissector BPF hook") Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Reviewed-by: Stanislav Fomichev Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200521083435.560256-1-jakub@cloudflare.com --- net/core/flow_dissector.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/flow_dissector.c b/net/core/flow_dissector.c index 3eff84824c8b..5dceed467f64 100644 --- a/net/core/flow_dissector.c +++ b/net/core/flow_dissector.c @@ -160,12 +160,10 @@ out: return ret; } -int skb_flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr) +static int flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(struct net *net) { struct bpf_prog *attached; - struct net *net; - net = current->nsproxy->net_ns; mutex_lock(&flow_dissector_mutex); attached = rcu_dereference_protected(net->flow_dissector_prog, lockdep_is_held(&flow_dissector_mutex)); @@ -179,6 +177,24 @@ int skb_flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr) return 0; } +int skb_flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr) +{ + return flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(current->nsproxy->net_ns); +} + +static void __net_exit flow_dissector_pernet_pre_exit(struct net *net) +{ + /* We're not racing with attach/detach because there are no + * references to netns left when pre_exit gets called. + */ + if (rcu_access_pointer(net->flow_dissector_prog)) + flow_dissector_bpf_prog_detach(net); +} + +static struct pernet_operations flow_dissector_pernet_ops __net_initdata = { + .pre_exit = flow_dissector_pernet_pre_exit, +}; + /** * __skb_flow_get_ports - extract the upper layer ports and return them * @skb: sk_buff to extract the ports from @@ -1836,7 +1852,7 @@ static int __init init_default_flow_dissectors(void) skb_flow_dissector_init(&flow_keys_basic_dissector, flow_keys_basic_dissector_keys, ARRAY_SIZE(flow_keys_basic_dissector_keys)); - return 0; -} + return register_pernet_subsys(&flow_dissector_pernet_ops); +} core_initcall(init_default_flow_dissectors); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From bd6972226f50910a5b97e6b9d443c5d0433bf054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Todd Malsbary Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 19:10:49 -0700 Subject: mptcp: use untruncated hash in ADD_ADDR HMAC There is some ambiguity in the RFC as to whether the ADD_ADDR HMAC is the rightmost 64 bits of the entire hash or of the leftmost 160 bits of the hash. The intention, as clarified with the author of the RFC, is the entire hash. This change returns the entire hash from mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha (instead of only the first 160 bits), and moves any truncation/selection operation on the hash to the caller. Fixes: 12555a2d97e5 ("mptcp: use rightmost 64 bits in ADD_ADDR HMAC") Reviewed-by: Christoph Paasch Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: Todd Malsbary Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mptcp/crypto.c | 24 +++++++++--------------- net/mptcp/options.c | 9 +++++---- net/mptcp/protocol.h | 1 - net/mptcp/subflow.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/crypto.c b/net/mptcp/crypto.c index c151628bd416..0f5a414a9366 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/crypto.c +++ b/net/mptcp/crypto.c @@ -47,8 +47,6 @@ void mptcp_crypto_key_sha(u64 key, u32 *token, u64 *idsn) void mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(u64 key1, u64 key2, u8 *msg, int len, void *hmac) { u8 input[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; - __be32 mptcp_hashed_key[SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS]; - __be32 *hash_out = (__force __be32 *)hmac; struct sha256_state state; u8 key1be[8]; u8 key2be[8]; @@ -86,11 +84,7 @@ void mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(u64 key1, u64 key2, u8 *msg, int len, void *hmac) sha256_init(&state); sha256_update(&state, input, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - sha256_final(&state, (u8 *)mptcp_hashed_key); - - /* takes only first 160 bits */ - for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) - hash_out[i] = mptcp_hashed_key[i]; + sha256_final(&state, (u8 *)hmac); } #ifdef CONFIG_MPTCP_HMAC_TEST @@ -101,29 +95,29 @@ struct test_cast { }; /* we can't reuse RFC 4231 test vectors, as we have constraint on the - * input and key size, and we truncate the output. + * input and key size. */ static struct test_cast tests[] = { { .key = "0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b", .msg = "48692054", - .result = "8385e24fb4235ac37556b6b886db106284a1da67", + .result = "8385e24fb4235ac37556b6b886db106284a1da671699f46db1f235ec622dcafa", }, { .key = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", .msg = "dddddddd", - .result = "2c5e219164ff1dca1c4a92318d847bb6b9d44492", + .result = "2c5e219164ff1dca1c4a92318d847bb6b9d44492984e1eb71aff9022f71046e9", }, { .key = "0102030405060708", .msg = "cdcdcdcd", - .result = "e73b9ba9969969cefb04aa0d6df18ec2fcc075b6", + .result = "e73b9ba9969969cefb04aa0d6df18ec2fcc075b6f23b4d8c4da736a5dbbc6e7d", }, }; static int __init test_mptcp_crypto(void) { - char hmac[20], hmac_hex[41]; + char hmac[32], hmac_hex[65]; u32 nonce1, nonce2; u64 key1, key2; u8 msg[8]; @@ -140,11 +134,11 @@ static int __init test_mptcp_crypto(void) put_unaligned_be32(nonce2, &msg[4]); mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(key1, key2, msg, 8, hmac); - for (j = 0; j < 20; ++j) + for (j = 0; j < 32; ++j) sprintf(&hmac_hex[j << 1], "%02x", hmac[j] & 0xff); - hmac_hex[40] = 0; + hmac_hex[64] = 0; - if (memcmp(hmac_hex, tests[i].result, 40)) + if (memcmp(hmac_hex, tests[i].result, 64)) pr_err("test %d failed, got %s expected %s", i, hmac_hex, tests[i].result); else diff --git a/net/mptcp/options.c b/net/mptcp/options.c index b88fae233a62..7793b6011fa7 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/options.c +++ b/net/mptcp/options.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "MPTCP: " fmt #include +#include #include #include #include "protocol.h" @@ -535,7 +536,7 @@ static bool mptcp_established_options_dss(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, static u64 add_addr_generate_hmac(u64 key1, u64 key2, u8 addr_id, struct in_addr *addr) { - u8 hmac[MPTCP_ADDR_HMAC_LEN]; + u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; u8 msg[7]; msg[0] = addr_id; @@ -545,14 +546,14 @@ static u64 add_addr_generate_hmac(u64 key1, u64 key2, u8 addr_id, mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(key1, key2, msg, 7, hmac); - return get_unaligned_be64(&hmac[MPTCP_ADDR_HMAC_LEN - sizeof(u64)]); + return get_unaligned_be64(&hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE - sizeof(u64)]); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP_IPV6) static u64 add_addr6_generate_hmac(u64 key1, u64 key2, u8 addr_id, struct in6_addr *addr) { - u8 hmac[MPTCP_ADDR_HMAC_LEN]; + u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; u8 msg[19]; msg[0] = addr_id; @@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ static u64 add_addr6_generate_hmac(u64 key1, u64 key2, u8 addr_id, mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(key1, key2, msg, 19, hmac); - return get_unaligned_be64(&hmac[MPTCP_ADDR_HMAC_LEN - sizeof(u64)]); + return get_unaligned_be64(&hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE - sizeof(u64)]); } #endif diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.h b/net/mptcp/protocol.h index e4ca6320ce76..d0803dfb8108 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.h +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.h @@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ /* MPTCP ADD_ADDR flags */ #define MPTCP_ADDR_ECHO BIT(0) -#define MPTCP_ADDR_HMAC_LEN 20 #define MPTCP_ADDR_IPVERSION_4 4 #define MPTCP_ADDR_IPVERSION_6 6 diff --git a/net/mptcp/subflow.c b/net/mptcp/subflow.c index 4931a29a6f08..8968b2c065e7 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/subflow.c +++ b/net/mptcp/subflow.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ static bool subflow_token_join_request(struct request_sock *req, const struct sk_buff *skb) { struct mptcp_subflow_request_sock *subflow_req = mptcp_subflow_rsk(req); - u8 hmac[MPTCPOPT_HMAC_LEN]; + u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct mptcp_sock *msk; int local_id; @@ -201,7 +202,7 @@ static void subflow_v6_init_req(struct request_sock *req, /* validate received truncated hmac and create hmac for third ACK */ static bool subflow_thmac_valid(struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow) { - u8 hmac[MPTCPOPT_HMAC_LEN]; + u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; u64 thmac; subflow_generate_hmac(subflow->remote_key, subflow->local_key, @@ -267,6 +268,8 @@ static void subflow_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) subflow->ssn_offset = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq; } } else if (subflow->mp_join) { + u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + pr_debug("subflow=%p, thmac=%llu, remote_nonce=%u", subflow, subflow->thmac, subflow->remote_nonce); @@ -279,7 +282,9 @@ static void subflow_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) subflow_generate_hmac(subflow->local_key, subflow->remote_key, subflow->local_nonce, subflow->remote_nonce, - subflow->hmac); + hmac); + + memcpy(subflow->hmac, hmac, MPTCPOPT_HMAC_LEN); if (skb) subflow->ssn_offset = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq; @@ -347,7 +352,7 @@ static bool subflow_hmac_valid(const struct request_sock *req, const struct mptcp_options_received *mp_opt) { const struct mptcp_subflow_request_sock *subflow_req; - u8 hmac[MPTCPOPT_HMAC_LEN]; + u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct mptcp_sock *msk; bool ret; @@ -361,7 +366,7 @@ static bool subflow_hmac_valid(const struct request_sock *req, subflow_req->local_nonce, hmac); ret = true; - if (crypto_memneq(hmac, mp_opt->hmac, sizeof(hmac))) + if (crypto_memneq(hmac, mp_opt->hmac, MPTCPOPT_HMAC_LEN)) ret = false; sock_put((struct sock *)msk); -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From 1378817486d6860f6a927f573491afe65287abf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 11:29:58 -0700 Subject: tipc: block BH before using dst_cache dst_cache_get() documents it must be used with BH disabled. sysbot reported : BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: /21697 caller is dst_cache_get+0x3a/0xb0 net/core/dst_cache.c:68 CPU: 0 PID: 21697 Comm: Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118 check_preemption_disabled lib/smp_processor_id.c:47 [inline] debug_smp_processor_id.cold+0x88/0x9b lib/smp_processor_id.c:57 dst_cache_get+0x3a/0xb0 net/core/dst_cache.c:68 tipc_udp_xmit.isra.0+0xb9/0xad0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:164 tipc_udp_send_msg+0x3e6/0x490 net/tipc/udp_media.c:244 tipc_bearer_xmit_skb+0x1de/0x3f0 net/tipc/bearer.c:526 tipc_enable_bearer+0xb2f/0xd60 net/tipc/bearer.c:331 __tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x2bf/0x390 net/tipc/bearer.c:995 tipc_nl_bearer_enable+0x1e/0x30 net/tipc/bearer.c:1003 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:673 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:718 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x627/0xdf0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:735 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:746 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x537/0x740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6bf/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2362 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2416 __sys_sendmsg+0xec/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2449 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 RIP: 0033:0x45ca29 Fixes: e9c1a793210f ("tipc: add dst_cache support for udp media") Cc: Xin Long Cc: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/udp_media.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/udp_media.c b/net/tipc/udp_media.c index d6620ad53546..28a283f26a8d 100644 --- a/net/tipc/udp_media.c +++ b/net/tipc/udp_media.c @@ -161,9 +161,11 @@ static int tipc_udp_xmit(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_bearer *ub, struct udp_media_addr *src, struct udp_media_addr *dst, struct dst_cache *cache) { - struct dst_entry *ndst = dst_cache_get(cache); + struct dst_entry *ndst; int ttl, err = 0; + local_bh_disable(); + ndst = dst_cache_get(cache); if (dst->proto == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)ndst; @@ -210,9 +212,11 @@ static int tipc_udp_xmit(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, src->port, dst->port, false); #endif } + local_bh_enable(); return err; tx_error: + local_bh_enable(); kfree_skb(skb); return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From d3e8e4c11870413789f029a71e72ae6e971fe678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jere Leppänen Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 18:15:31 +0300 Subject: sctp: Start shutdown on association restart if in SHUTDOWN-SENT state and socket is closed MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Commit bdf6fa52f01b ("sctp: handle association restarts when the socket is closed.") starts shutdown when an association is restarted, if in SHUTDOWN-PENDING state and the socket is closed. However, the rationale stated in that commit applies also when in SHUTDOWN-SENT state - we don't want to move an association to ESTABLISHED state when the socket has been closed, because that results in an association that is unreachable from user space. The problem scenario: 1. Client crashes and/or restarts. 2. Server (using one-to-one socket) calls close(). SHUTDOWN is lost. 3. Client reconnects using the same addresses and ports. 4. Server's association is restarted. The association and the socket move to ESTABLISHED state, even though the server process has closed its descriptor. Also, after step 4 when the server process exits, some resources are leaked in an attempt to release the underlying inet sock structure in ESTABLISHED state: IPv4: Attempt to release TCP socket in state 1 00000000377288c7 Fix by acting the same way as in SHUTDOWN-PENDING state. That is, if an association is restarted in SHUTDOWN-SENT state and the socket is closed, then start shutdown and don't move the association or the socket to ESTABLISHED state. Fixes: bdf6fa52f01b ("sctp: handle association restarts when the socket is closed.") Signed-off-by: Jere Leppänen Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 26788f4a3b9e..e86620fbd90f 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -1856,12 +1856,13 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a( /* Update the content of current association. */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc)); sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_EVENT_ULP, SCTP_ULPEVENT(ev)); - if (sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_PENDING) && + if ((sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_PENDING) || + sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_SENT)) && (sctp_sstate(asoc->base.sk, CLOSING) || sock_flag(asoc->base.sk, SOCK_DEAD))) { - /* if were currently in SHUTDOWN_PENDING, but the socket - * has been closed by user, don't transition to ESTABLISHED. - * Instead trigger SHUTDOWN bundled with COOKIE_ACK. + /* If the socket has been closed by user, don't + * transition to ESTABLISHED. Instead trigger SHUTDOWN + * bundled with COOKIE_ACK. */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl)); return sctp_sf_do_9_2_start_shutdown(net, ep, asoc, -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317 From f45d01f4f30b53c3a0a1c6c1c154acb7ff74ab9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qiushi Wu Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 13:45:18 -0500 Subject: rxrpc: Fix a memory leak in rxkad_verify_response() A ticket was not released after a call of the function "rxkad_decrypt_ticket" failed. Thus replace the jump target "temporary_error_free_resp" by "temporary_error_free_ticket". Fixes: 8c2f826dc3631 ("rxrpc: Don't put crypto buffers on the stack") Signed-off-by: Qiushi Wu Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Markus Elfring --- net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c index 098f1f9ec53b..52a24d4ef5d8 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c @@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, ret = rxkad_decrypt_ticket(conn, skb, ticket, ticket_len, &session_key, &expiry, _abort_code); if (ret < 0) - goto temporary_error_free_resp; + goto temporary_error_free_ticket; /* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the * response */ @@ -1230,7 +1230,6 @@ protocol_error: temporary_error_free_ticket: kfree(ticket); -temporary_error_free_resp: kfree(response); temporary_error: /* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as -- cgit v1.2.3-71-gd317