Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
   (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

 - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
   sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.

 - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.

 - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
  selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
  KEYS: refcount bug fix
  ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
  IMA: policy can be updated zero times
  selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
  selinux: export validatetrans decisions
  gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
  selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
  security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
  selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
  selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
  keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
  keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
  keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
  tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
  tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
  tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
  tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
  ...

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index af9f0b9e80e6..f314275d4e3f 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -145,24 +145,24 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
 	return dest;
 }
 
-static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
+static inline bool cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
 {
 	unsigned __capi;
 	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
 		if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
-			return 0;
+			return false;
 	}
-	return 1;
+	return true;
 }
 
 /*
  * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
- * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
- *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
- * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
- *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
+ * return true if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
+ *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return true
+ * return false if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
+ *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return false
  */
-static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
+static inline bool cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
 {
 	kernel_cap_t dest;
 	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
@@ -171,12 +171,6 @@ static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
 
 /* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
 
-static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
-	return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
-}
-
 static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
 {
 	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;