cachepc-qemu

Fork of AMDESE/qemu with changes for cachepc side-channel attack
git clone https://git.sinitax.com/sinitax/cachepc-qemu
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secrets.rst (6123B)


      1.. _secret data:
      2
      3Providing secret data to QEMU
      4-----------------------------
      5
      6There are a variety of objects in QEMU which require secret data to be provided
      7by the administrator or management application. For example, network block
      8devices often require a password, LUKS block devices require a passphrase to
      9unlock key material, remote desktop services require an access password.
     10QEMU has a general purpose mechanism for providing secret data to QEMU in a
     11secure manner, using the ``secret`` object type.
     12
     13At startup this can be done using the ``-object secret,...`` command line
     14argument. At runtime this can be done using the ``object_add`` QMP / HMP
     15monitor commands. The examples that follow will illustrate use of ``-object``
     16command lines, but they all apply equivalentely in QMP / HMP. When creating
     17a ``secret`` object it must be given a unique ID string. This ID is then
     18used to identify the object when configuring the thing which need the data.
     19
     20
     21INSECURE: Passing secrets as clear text inline
     22~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     23
     24**The following should never be done in a production environment or on a
     25multi-user host. Command line arguments are usually visible in the process
     26listings and are often collected in log files by system monitoring agents
     27or bug reporting tools. QMP/HMP commands and their arguments are also often
     28logged and attached to bug reports. This all risks compromising secrets that
     29are passed inline.**
     30
     31For the convenience of people debugging / developing with QEMU, it is possible
     32to pass secret data inline on the command line.
     33
     34::
     35
     36   -object secret,id=secvnc0,data=87539319
     37
     38
     39Again it is possible to provide the data in base64 encoded format, which is
     40particularly useful if the data contains binary characters that would clash
     41with argument parsing.
     42
     43::
     44
     45   -object secret,id=secvnc0,data=ODc1MzkzMTk=,format=base64
     46
     47
     48**Note: base64 encoding does not provide any security benefit.**
     49
     50Passing secrets as clear text via a file
     51~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     52
     53The simplest approach to providing data securely is to use a file to store
     54the secret:
     55
     56::
     57
     58   -object secret,id=secvnc0,file=vnc-password.txt
     59
     60
     61In this example the file ``vnc-password.txt`` contains the plain text secret
     62data. It is important to note that the contents of the file are treated as an
     63opaque blob. The entire raw file contents is used as the value, thus it is
     64important not to mistakenly add any trailing newline character in the file if
     65this newline is not intended to be part of the secret data.
     66
     67In some cases it might be more convenient to pass the secret data in base64
     68format and have QEMU decode to get the raw bytes before use:
     69
     70::
     71
     72   -object secret,id=sec0,file=vnc-password.txt,format=base64
     73
     74
     75The file should generally be given mode ``0600`` or ``0400`` permissions, and
     76have its user/group ownership set to the same account that the QEMU process
     77will be launched under. If using mandatory access control such as SELinux, then
     78the file should be labelled to only grant access to the specific QEMU process
     79that needs access. This will prevent other processes/users from compromising the
     80secret data.
     81
     82
     83Passing secrets as cipher text inline
     84~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     85
     86To address the insecurity of passing secrets inline as clear text, it is
     87possible to configure a second secret as an AES key to use for decrypting
     88the data.
     89
     90The secret used as the AES key must always be configured using the file based
     91storage mechanism:
     92
     93::
     94
     95   -object secret,id=secmaster,file=masterkey.data,format=base64
     96
     97
     98In this case the ``masterkey.data`` file would be initialized with 32
     99cryptographically secure random bytes, which are then base64 encoded.
    100The contents of this file will by used as an AES-256 key to encrypt the
    101real secret that can now be safely passed to QEMU inline as cipher text
    102
    103::
    104
    105   -object secret,id=secvnc0,keyid=secmaster,data=BASE64-CIPHERTEXT,iv=BASE64-IV,format=base64
    106
    107
    108In this example ``BASE64-CIPHERTEXT`` is the result of AES-256-CBC encrypting
    109the secret with ``masterkey.data`` and then base64 encoding the ciphertext.
    110The ``BASE64-IV`` data is 16 random bytes which have been base64 encrypted.
    111These bytes are used as the initialization vector for the AES-256-CBC value.
    112
    113A single master key can be used to encrypt all subsequent secrets, **but it is
    114critical that a different initialization vector is used for every secret**.
    115
    116Passing secrets via the Linux keyring
    117~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    118
    119The earlier mechanisms described are platform agnostic. If using QEMU on a Linux
    120host, it is further possible to pass secrets to QEMU using the Linux keyring:
    121
    122::
    123
    124   -object secret_keyring,id=secvnc0,serial=1729
    125
    126
    127This instructs QEMU to load data from the Linux keyring secret identified by
    128the serial number ``1729``. It is possible to combine use of the keyring with
    129other features mentioned earlier such as base64 encoding:
    130
    131::
    132
    133   -object secret_keyring,id=secvnc0,serial=1729,format=base64
    134
    135
    136and also encryption with a master key:
    137
    138::
    139
    140   -object secret_keyring,id=secvnc0,keyid=secmaster,serial=1729,iv=BASE64-IV
    141
    142
    143Best practice
    144~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    145
    146It is recommended for production deployments to use a master key secret, and
    147then pass all subsequent inline secrets encrypted with the master key.
    148
    149Each QEMU instance must have a distinct master key, and that must be generated
    150from a cryptographically secure random data source. The master key should be
    151deleted immediately upon QEMU shutdown. If passing the master key as a file,
    152the key file must have access control rules applied that restrict access to
    153just the one QEMU process that is intended to use it. Alternatively the Linux
    154keyring can be used to pass the master key to QEMU.
    155
    156The secrets for individual QEMU device backends must all then be encrypted
    157with this master key.
    158
    159This procedure helps ensure that the individual secrets for QEMU backends will
    160not be compromised, even if ``-object`` CLI args or ``object_add`` monitor
    161commands are collected in log files and attached to public bug support tickets.
    162The only item that needs strongly protecting is the master key file.